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Memorandum by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
(ISS 8) 
 
This response is compiled from the views of the relevant national leads for the areas being 
considered.  I have broken the response down into four of the five intentions the 
Commission’s Communication describes. 
 
Disrupt international crime networks 
Disrupting international crime networks that work across national boundaries will provide a 
benefit to the UK. Organised Crime Group Mapping is developing in the UK and while this is 
early days, it is already proving to be effective; however, ACPO’s view is that it would be 
premature to expand this work overseas.  Such a focus would be a distraction from ensuring 
that it is as effective as it can be in the UK while the approach is developing, and we believe 
that there would be a greater benefit in waiting until we have more evidence on how the 
approach has worked in the UK and what lessons can be learnt for emulating it elsewhere. 
 
Prevent terrorism and address radicalisation and recruitment 
The National Prevent Delivery Unit is embedded within the Association Of Chief Police 
Officers Terrorism and Allied Matters and has been established over the last few years and 
its core objective has been around Preventing Violent Extremism. 
 
It was recognised very early on in the UK that acts of terrorism and violent extremism are 
crimes but due to the overlap of these crimes with polarisation, religious extremism and 
social segregation, law enforcement agencies alone cannot solve this problem.  The threat of 
international terrorist attacks on society and infrastructure across Europe including the UK 
is highly likely.  This threat is now leading to an offset in balancing integration due to the rise 
of domestic extremism and in particular right wing and left wing extremism.  
 
Society is dependent on our communities and partners to help stop people becoming or 
terrorists or violent extremists.  The main focus of all activity within the Prevent Delivery 
Unit has been based on effective engagement with key stakeholders across UK, without 
which counter terrorism initiatives would not be sustainable.   
 
Experience has shown that the best results are achieved by: 
 
• Partnership working and effective engagement – getting the right people working  
together 
• Understanding the challenge and its context 
• Developing an effective action plan 
• Managing risk 
• Tracking progress and evaluating success 
• Sharing learning and best practice 
• Local communities should be actively engaged in the partnership and in the 
development and implementation of programmes of action 
• A  ‘whole community’ approach should be taken to ensure that this work does not 
inadvertently lead to increased pressure on vulnerable sections of the community 
 
 Empower communities to prevent radicalisation and recruitment 
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The Prevent Delivery Unit has primarily focussed on the above work stream and evolved as 
a national co-ordination centre supporting Counter Terrorism Units across the UK.  Our 
work has been centred around developing community based approaches and prevention 
policies to enable local authorities and civil society to be empowered to prevent all forms of 
violent extremism. We have achieved this by using the following approach: 
 
Understanding the threat  
The PDU has done an extensive amount of research based on analytical data as well as joint 
agency work including agencies such as Security Services, Chief Executives from local 
councils, etc., to map vulnerable communities and understand the nature of the threat within 
certain sectors of the community.  This research has extended into all forms of extremism 
including understanding the threat towards certain vulnerable infrastructures.  Information 
sharing outside of law enforcement agencies is crucial if we are to achieve full partnership 
engagement in tackling the threat of violent extremism within our communities.   
 
Community and Partner Engagement   
NPDU have also been co-ordinating responsibility for developing initiatives to empower 
communities and key stakeholders while also specifically addressing activities around 
education, health, front line sector, women and young people.  The team focuses on 
supporting police forces and partners by developing new and existing products and applying 
interactive and pedagogy methods of education to raise awareness of radicalisation and 
recruitment within communities.  Products are based on capacity building within 
communities.  These initiatives help break down barriers as well as implement measures to 
enhance engagement with civil society to strengthen resilience of individuals and 
communities against radicalisation.  The projects help maintain a measure of the impact of 
counter terrorism initiatives and facilitate a creation of networks which promote a positive 
narrative which further delegitimizes extremist narratives.   
 
Training of agencies and law enforcement agencies around delivery of products has also been 
co-ordinated by NPDU in order to ensure consistency in delivery of key messages and 
allowing agencies to prevent further radicalisation by implementing standard referral and 
intervention measures.   
 
Education has been a key area in this empowerment phase as recent history has shown that 
young people may be more vulnerable to prejudices and this can easily lead to radicalisation.  
Projects used within education can offer opportunities to help young people understand the 
risk associated with violent extremism and help develop their knowledge, skills and critical 
thinking ability to challenge the extremist narrative.  This form of activity also encompasses 
the monitoring of local tensions within communities and addresses grievances around the 
impact of global and national events on local people.  The empowerment and engagement 
techniques allow safe spaces for grievances to be aired as lack of understanding can increase 
the threat of vulnerability.   
 
Partnership Interventions 
The PDU have been instrumental and done a considerable amount of work to strengthen 
and develop a wide range of partnership interventions around identifying vulnerable 
individuals and creating support mechanisms for these vulnerable individuals which are 
community and partner led.  This approach is focused on multi-agency interaction and ties 
intervention into other safe-guarding mechanisms that are already embedded within the 
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current civic society.  This form of intervention enables communities to provide platforms in 
order to support positive narratives which can balance and negate the need for violence. 
 
Communication  
The success of any form of community empowerment relies heavily on open and transparent 
communication and the use of appropriate terminology.  Effective communication is critical 
to influence attitudes and properly explain how prevention of radicalisation and recruitment 
needs the active participation of all partners, agencies and communities to succeed.  NPDU 
has worked with cross government departmental agencies to develop guidance and effective 
methodology in communicating messages in a language that does not alienate those we wish 
to communicate with.   
 
Raise levels of security for citizens and businesses in cyberspace 
We have a general concern that there should be agreed, auditable and enforced controls to 
protect information shared between members states and with the EU institutions to ensure 
that the risk to citizens and to member state interests is appropriately managed. The 
controls should be a combination of procedural, personnel, physical or technical and achieve 
a common standard acceptable to all those sharing data. It may be that the Police Service 
needs to seek specific assurances before it agrees to share data which may, for 
example, assist an investigation in another member state but could if compromised prejudice 
an investigation in the UK.  
 
Build capacity in law enforcement and the judiciary 
PDU have embedded a Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit within their structure 
which enables the public to report unlawful terrorist and violent extremist material which 
they may come across on the internet.  The CTIRU investigates referrals from the public, 
proactively seeks out illegal material on websites and works closely with industry to make it 
harder for terrorists to exploit the internet.  Tackling terrorism on the internet is a key part 
of building capacity within law enforcement and the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral 
Unit play an integral role in helping to tackle terrorist and violent extremists from using the 
internet for unlawful messages and recruitment.  The referrals are reported by the public 
through a web page and offer the privilege of anonymity to the public and agencies.   
 
Work with industry to empower and protect citizens 
It is recognised that communities and agencies such as Social Services, Education, and Youth 
Offending Teams play a vital role in helping to tackle terrorism over the internet.  The 
internet has become a powerful medium both for terrorist activity as well as presenting itself 
as an effective platform to send out effective messages.  Over the last decade, it has 
developed from being an academic tool to an integral part of life, socialisation and business.  
More and more young people are using the internet in new ways to build identities, socialise 
and share experiences.  At the same time, it has become a powerful medium for criminals 
including paedophiles, terrorists, etc to exploit vulnerability and undermine the credible 
voice.   
 
The PDU have developed Internet Safety Resources as safeguarding young and old on the 
internet should be seen in very much the same way as road safety is thought of today, as a 
vital life skill to be taught early and often and as a critical investment in preventing harm later 
on.  This program of work needs to be supported by projects, using interactive and 
appealing technology which can be used by educational and vulnerable institutions, 
communities, prisons, etc.  This subject matter will not only tackle radicalisation, but also 
sexual grooming, human trafficking, etc. 
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The internet can also be used to ensure credible voices are given a platform to delegitimize 
violent narratives used by terrorists.  This can be done using strong global communities and 
this form of empowerment can be a useful way of expressing credibility as well as 
undermining the extremist platform.  The internet can be used as an extremely positive 
communications tool.  Other media channels can also be tapped into to promote credible 
voices.  The PDU have spear-headed this form of work but it is still in its early stages.  With 
the help of EU partners and a global structure, this work-stream should be seen as an 
influential challenge to root out cyber-crime. 
 
The role of the Prevent Delivery Unit has been to enhance trust and confidence within 
communities and key stakeholders around the Prevention of Violent Extremism in all 
aspects.  Effective civil society engagement has been an integral part of this agenda in order 
to gain a deeper understanding of the vulnerabilities and drivers that lead to extremism 
within communities so that we can collectively empower them to increase their own 
resilience against violent extremism.  
 
Despite the level of threat being a global issue, there has been a disparate lack of global co-
ordination in the quality, quantity, value for money and lack of scrutiny and consistency in 
combating international terrorism.  This has enhanced negative media attention and 
increased misconception amongst Muslim communities as well as created a rise in 
polarisation and social segregation and consequently a rise in domestic extremism.   
 
Our involvement within the EU Internal Security Strategy development will bring together a 
wide range of expertise and promote co-ordination, cooperation and mutual understanding 
through enhanced working relationships.  We can bring the expertise that we have 
developed through existing networks and by implementing proactive initiatives that are 
intelligence led, using lessons learnt from previous case studies and which can help promote 
improved information sharing and good practice.  
 
As a result, best practice and developed products can be rolled out into low priority areas 
cost effectively so that the strategy does not exclude any specific community where the 
threat level can change overnight as the extremists refocus their targets.  
 
There also needs to be a sustainable balance in managing anti-radicalisation methodology so 
that all forms of extremism are tackled and methods applied to cater for the diverse 
demographics, existing white communities as well as new and emerging communities across 
Europe.   
 
Increase Europe’s resilience to crisis and disasters 
Following the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 26th December 2004 and the London bombings of 
July 2005, the UK Disaster Victim Identification (UK DVI) Team was established, which sits 
under the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Emergency Procedures Portfolio. 
This in turn is responsible to the Uniformed Operations Business Area.  
Prior to the inception of this team, forces responded to incidents within their own 
jurisdictions on an individual basis and arranged for additional resources through local and or 
regional arrangements or through the Police National Information and Coordination Centre 
(PNICC).  
For international incidents, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) provided the primary 
response to requests for assistance from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to 
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incidents involving fatalities of British nationals overseas where identification issues appeared 
to be, were apparent, or where the UK intended to offer DVI skills on a humanitarian aid 
basis. 
At the request of the Home Office, ACPO have worked closely with Central Government 
and other partners in developing a national DVI team, drawn from every UK police force on 
the basis of proportional representation to enable the Service to provide an effective 
response to mass fatality incidents.  
The purpose of the UK DVI team is twofold. Firstly to supplement local or regional 
arrangements to a mass fatality incident, and secondly, to assist in the response to a fatality 
incident overseas when requested to do so by the FCO. The UK DVI team is notional and 
its members remain in their host force area and are called upon to assist in the event of an 
incident requiring a DVI response.  
 
The current ACPO DVI Five Year Strategy has a number of key objectives which may 
change. These are: 
 
• Develop force/regional DVI capacity commensurate with local/national risk 
assessment. 
• Continue to contribute on a proportionate basis to the UK DVI Team. To maintain 
capability and capacity commensurate with the national risk assessment. 
• Develop National Casualty Bureau arrangements that enable an effective and 
appropriate bureau to be established in accordance with national risk assessment and 
forthcoming major events. 
• Establish three Forensic Matching Centres that can respond commensurate with the 
national risk assessment. 
• Develop a UK DVI CBRN capacity and capability that will enable an effective 
response commensurate with the national risk assessment. 
• Develop DVI capacity and capability to enable an appropriate and effective response 
to the 2012 London Olympic Games and 2013 G8 Summit. 
• Develop an appropriate training and exercise programme that underpins the 
maintenance and development of DVI capacity and capability within the Service. 
 
UK DVI deployments to date 
Only a small number of DVI trained staff have been actively deployed on five international 
deployments in the past five years.   
 
• Thailand September 2007 (Phuket - One to Go air crash)  
• Bangladesh March 2009 (Bangladesh - rifles uprising) 
• Air France AF 447 air crash, (Brazil - June 2009) 
• Afriqiyah Air 771 air crash (Libya - May 2010) 
• Pamir Airways Flight 112 air crash (Afghanistan - May 2010) 
 
21 December 2010 
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Memorandum by Professor Didier Bigo (ISS 7) 
 
1. As the Committee suggests, one of the key questions concerns the scope, the scale and 
subsequent priorities of the Internal Security Strategy.   
 
What is to be delivered by the Internal security strategy? Is it security only or is it liberty, 
security, and justice? Is the new division of labour between the two commissioners limiting 
their purposes or do they have to work together? If the ambition of the ISS is the three 
objectives together, then it needs to be readjusted in order to avoid contradictions of 
objectives. Freedom and fundamental rights are at the core of what has to be promoted. 
Security cannot “balance” Liberty.1 Security is a means to achieve liberty, and any claim of a 
“security gap” makes sense only if the measures to reduce the security gap with more 
surveillance and detention don’t create distrust in institutions and an enlarged liberty-
democracy gap. Security is important but cannot be “unlimited”.  
 
So the central question for the internal security strategy is to determine the limits to 
security, and to the actions of the EU itself in this regard, and to determine the appropriate 
means to achieve security once the limits have been clearly drawn. It seems that the lack of 
real collaboration of the services and operational agencies attached to Viviane Reding as 
commissioner on Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship and the ones attached to 
Cecilia Malmström as commissioner on Home Affairs has given the upper hand to the latter, 
and especially to some operational agencies (Europol and Frontex).  
 
The discussions in COSI concerning ISS are paradoxically less a dialogue between different 
opinions as was intended by the Stockholm programme, and more a quasi monopoly of the 
Department of Home Affairs in a traditional sense of an old boys network of policemen who 
disregard objections and reaffirm beliefs they have had from the very beginning of the 
Maastricht period. Have we forgotten Tampere, Amsterdam and Stockholm? Are we back to 
the first version of the third pillar in Maastricht with the strategy planned for Internal 
Security? A list of the participants writing the draft of the ISS would be relevant in this 
regard. 
 
2. The ISS is focused on important questions concerning terrorism, organised crime, cyber 
crime, border management, resilience to crises, but it does not appear as a strategy that 
raises questions and opens alternatives. . On the contrary it looks like a list of well known 
recipes whose results have not been excellent (or are unknown). The ISS seems to pretend 
that a zero risk society is possible and desirable, but social science and technological 
research have shown that this is a dangerous illusion. Security is not a technique that can be 
applied in a straightforward way; security requires judgements about the balance to be 
accorded to the values of solidarity, freedom, and equality.  
 
A security strategy must take into account how far effective freedom of movement (which is 
not to be confused with speed of travel under surveillance), the presumption of innocence, 
and the right to privacy of individuals blocks in practice (or not) the work of law 
enforcement and intelligence services? Do these agencies require a greater exchange of 
information? Does data mining and profiling intrude on the right to privacy? How much 
 
1 Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild, and Rob Walker, Europe's 21st Century Challenge: Delivering Liberty and 
Security.Ashgate, 2010) and Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera, and Elspeth Guild, 'What Future for the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice? Recommendations on Eu Migration and Borders Policies in a Globalising World'. CEPS Policy Brief, no. 156 
(2008): 4 p.  
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control at borders and beyond national borders, can be implemented without raising serious 
questions about the invasion of sovereignty and the erosion of reciprocity? To what extent 
can detention be justified in terms of a threat of danger as opposed to strict culpability? 
Unfortunately these questions are not addressed in this document (which is considered to 
contain the the key reflections of the EU on these matters), or in other security document 
from the EU.  So, what is the thinking that would explain the choices to be found in the 
Internal Security Strategy document?  
 
Strategy supposes options and choices. It is the privilege of the EU commission to be in a 
position to open a debate and to propose alternatives. Its main advantage is to have the 
resources of the 27 member states with their traditions, trajectories, and differences to help 
it create a dialogue. Yet the ISS text reduces this diversity to a “dogma”, which is not 
sustained by the evidences coming from the knowledge based researches of the DG 
research, DG JLS or FRA on these topics. It seems that the professionals of security in 
Europe have acted as a guild, resilient to different points of view, and that they use only 
“corporate” information already framed so as to justify their view of an expanding and 
interconnecting level of threat at the world level which makes it necessary to collaborate 
more, to integrate data better, and to find one technology as a solution against all specific 
threats. The path dependency towards a homeland security adjusted to Europe is strong, 
even if these ideas were floating about in some member states before 2001. Europe has to 
find its own strategy and to respect its diversity. 
  
3. For the moment the text of the internal security strategy shuts down options and is 
driven by only one main narrative guided by a belief in the technologies of identification and 
surveillance as the solution for any problem of security. This grand strategy’s narrative 
supposes that we are confronting globalised threats, always on the rise, with more and more 
interconnection between the different forms of threats (reports of Europol, Frontex, 
Eurojust, proposals from the EC Commission on Eurosur and border surveillance present as 
facts the idea of a globalised insecurity). From this unexplored assumption, the logical answer 
seems to require more globalised security (with fewer national or regional sovereign 
decisions), to require more coordination and integration (with less diversity of vision) and to 
require more technologies of identification. The leading idea seems to be: we don’t have 
confine ourselves to reaction and protection, but we also have to, focus on prevention, 
because of the dire consequences of low level probability events (nuclear terrorism, 
pandemics, now volcanoes, or meteorites falling on the planet…). Each element of this 
narrative conducted by a coalition or guild of intelligence services” has to be questioned and 
tested against liberal political choices of acceptance of risk in everyday life. It is important to 
give voice to alternatives coming from classical security measures, and rule of law oriented 
approaches. Most of our interviews show a deep resentment of key professionals against this 
discourse, but who, nevertheless, are uneasy about challenging it openly, as they feel this 
narrative is what the politicians want as it may help building EU “capabilities”.2 Suggestions 
coming from them would be that the EU reports should make a clear distinction between 
national authorities and European Union responsibilities in the statistics themselves and that 
they should not aggregate national data as EU data. They should have to describe the EU 
level with specific EU (only) data. 
 
4. It raises the question of roles and responsibilities towards threats, and the interpretation 
given to the same phenomenon by different agencies, regarding to their interests to 
centralise information under the label of information exchange. What are the threats against 
 
2 Didier et als Bigo, ed. The Field of the Eu Internal Security Agencies (Paris: Centre d'études sur les conflits/l'Harmattan, 2007). 
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which the EU is struggling?  Are the threats globalised?  Are all of them globalised? Certainly 
it is true only if one accepts the confusion between global, regional, transnational, cross 
border, and local. But, the different terminologies cannot be fused as if every threat was of 
global reach and without boundaries. A global scale of threat is exceptional (even for 
finance). A minority of threats are “glocal” and their local manifestations so diverse that 
solutions need to be locally configured, even if knowledge can be wider and shared; a 
majority are just local (including cross border ones) and don’t need to be seen as part of a 
global phenomenon in the making. The list of threats in the Stockholm programme (4-1) has 
to be re-evaluated by differentiating what is and what is not global. For example the 
Corsican FLNC is not Al Qaeda and should not be conflated with the fear of nuclear or very 
serious terrorism, even if they are put under the same label and the same statistics. But, as 
the report is at pains to demonstrate (with statistics of bombings) the danger of Al Qaeda, 
these past few years has increased.  In order to strengthen their case, they add to the 
terminology of terrorism many other small scale activities including the ones of the FLNC.  
This has the effect of making the threat more credible. It is typical of Europol reports, to 
connect the two, by insisting on the danger of the threat of terrorism in general shown by 
large numbers and statistics of hundreds of bombings, and by developing a narrative about 
radicalisation of Muslim communities not sustained by the very same statistics. Either FLNC 
is purely local, or it is the most dangerous threat of the EU in terms of statistics, and if so 
why focus only on the Muslim communities? Why not ask for a special European operation 
on Corsica. The ambiguous language is always there. What is local is seen as part of a global 
element. This discourse did not simply emerge in a mysterious fashion.   It is the result 
(rather  than a conscious strategy) of the pressure to cooperate brought to bear on different 
agencies which have to gather the local threats into a  global one in the making, in order to 
show that they effectively collaborate and that they are improving their co-operative 
exchanges. 
 
The intensity of collaboration may depend on the scale, but the interest of each EU agency 
(or transatlantic committee) is to present its own mission against a threat as an important 
one, and to use the keywords “global”, and “common”.  It is important to limit EU activity to 
a certain scale and to resist the tendency to speak about all threats as global. Subsidiarity is 
more important than worst-case scenarios. Budgets have to be calibrated. Limits have to be 
placed on the ability of security concerns to expand to include all things.  
 
5. If not globalised, are the different threats interconnected? Is terrorism linked with 
organised crime, with illegal migration, with asylum seekers, with overstayers? Is any flow of 
movement an internal security “competence”? Are the distinctions of Amsterdam erased? 
Are we coming back to an extensive vision of JHA including legal border crossings, visas, 
migration, asylum, plus now external actions and foreign affairs on any assumption of 
overflows? The interconnection argument is a different question to the one about 
globalisation (of one threat). To point to the interconnection of local events is not to make 
them global. We have to understand what a network is, what are its limits and its nodes. A 
discourse insisting on the interconnection of the different threats has emerged as a reaction 
against freedom of movement of people inside the EU, and then against mobility in general 
(Single act, end of cold war, post 201 and 2004). Its accuracy in terms of knowledge has been 
very limited. Some specific connections and nodes may exist, but it is not a complete fusion. 
We don’t have a merging between war and crime at the world level. Nevertheless, if this 
narrative of an “insecurity continuum” has been successful, it is because we have more and 
more, after the end of the cold war, witnessed entanglements between the universes of 
policing and that of military activity. This has lead to the rise of the “intermediary agencies”: 
police with military status, border guards, immigration services, and intelligence services. 
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This may explain how in a situation of uncertainty concerning their missions, each agency 
tries to promote its struggle against a threat, as the central one, by explaining that it is 
interconnected to the other ones and will solve the other problems too. The appeal to 
some technologies (such as biometric systems, databases, traceability, profiling, and data 
mining) by the security industry, which present these as solutions against many threats (from 
identity theft to terrorism), follows the same logic. Mapping the field of the security agencies, 
their contacts, oppositions and alliances, gives reasonable answers to their beliefs, interests 
and why they develop (or not) a discourse concerning a global insecurity (see bibliography). 
The field needs to be regulated instead to accept any form of networking to be developed. It 
has incidence at the transatlantic level, and even more when cooperation goes beyond 
democratic regime collaboration under the pretext of “sharing information” which may have 
value in the future. 
 
6. When it comes to information, more is not always best. The accumulation of information 
whose reliability is diverse can create error on intelligence and obliges those collecting it to 
rely more and more on software to sort out the most important cases. This takes time and 
often there is an imperative to act before the process is completed.  . The future of human 
actions cannot be deciphered through profiling technology. Knowledge certainty cannot be 
merged with astrological reasoning by the magic of technology. The seriousness of the 
terminologies of prevention and anticipation regarding the results has to be addressed in 
detail. During our interviews, no one example given resisted the test of success in 
anticipating human behaviour, and this confidence was often based on  the results of 
statistical correlations,  often not accurate about a previously unknown individual.  . . A 
better option is to avoid to overload the system with information and to rely more on 
human beings capacity. It goes against the theology of the “unknown unknowns” of the neo 
conservatives and the total information awareness they wanted. But it goes against with 
good reason for both freedom and efficiency on security missions. Asking for an internal 
survey about the optimal level of information (and not the maximum) will certainly permit a 
better appreciation of the difference between the need for data, and the strategies to 
accumulate them. Once again, the technologies are not the solution to security problems.  
These technologies need to be supplemented with a discussion of the political and 
democratic issues involved in security questions. The Information management strategy has 
to be revised to take this into account. It is central to present alternatives to Eurosur, to the 
European entry and exist system and a technologisation which confuses speed of travel with 
freedom of movement. 
 
12 December 2010 
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Memorandum by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
(ISS 2) 
Introduction 
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is among the most experienced and 
authoritative think tanks operating in the European Union today. CEPS serves as a leading 
platform for debate on EU affairs. Its most distinguishing feature lies in its strong in-house 
research capacity, complemented by an extensive network of partner institutes throughout 
the world. Researchers in the Justice and Home Affairs Section at CEPS examine the main 
issues and dilemmas related to the construction of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ) in the EU, its internal and external dimensions and how these impact on the liberty 
and security of individuals.3 It is an honour and a pleasure to submit evidence to the Select 
Committee on the EU on this important aspect of EU policy. 
1. The EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS) was adopted by the Council in February 2010 
under the auspices of the Spanish Presidency with a view to setting out a common 
European Security Model.4 This initial document followed the entry into force of the new 
treaty setting of the EU, brought about by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and 
the Stockholm Programme setting out the new five-year plan for the development of the 
EU’s Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) in December 2009. The AFSJ was 
created by the Amsterdam Treaty amendments to the EU treaties in 1999. In its original 
form, the AFSJ comprised the fields of borders, immigration, asylum and judicial 
cooperation in civil matters in a legally binding form (previously called the EU’s “first 
pillar”), and policing, terrorism and judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the more 
intergovernmental venue of the EU (formerly known as the “third pillar”). The Lisbon 
Treaty formally abolished the old pillar structure in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
policies and brought (to varying degrees and subject to several exceptions) the different 
policy fields of the AFSJ into one fairly homogeneous legal and institutional framework. 
However, the ISS and the Commission’s vision outlined in the Communication offer 
evidence that the old third-pillar spirit and intergovernmental ways of thinking and 
working (police-led, secretive and unaccountable) are still very much in favour and can 
be expected to be expanded through their practical implementation.  
2. The Stockholm Programme stressed that it “is of paramount importance that law 
enforcement measures, on the one hand, and measures to safeguard individual rights, the 
rule of law and international protection rules, on the other, go hand in hand in the same 
direction and are mutually reinforced.”5 Do the ISS and the Commission Communication 
‘putting it into action’ fulfill this political priority? This submission of evidence argues and 
provides evidence to the contrary. Both official documents illustrate how the insecurity 
concerns enshrined in the ISS are attempting to take over the EU’s AFSJ agenda. Justice is 
relegated second to the service of security, and individuals’ security and liberty remain 
absent from the overall objectives of the strategy. The concrete steps presented by the 
Commission Communication exclusively serve ‘internal security’ purposes and interests, 
an approach that positions rule of law and fundamental rights (aside from formalistic 
sentences and announcements) at the margins. The Communication advocates a 
 
3 For more information about the JHA Section activities refer to http://www.ceps.eu/content/justice-and-home-affairs as 
well as the CEPS Activities Report (Review 2009 / Preview 2010) available at 
http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/article/2009/08/CEPS_Report2009_webversion.pdf  
4 Council of the EU, Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security Model, Brussels, 
23 February 2010, 5842/2/10. 
5 Council of the EU, The Stockholm Programme: An Open and Secure Europe serving and protecting Citizens, 5731/10, 
Brussels, 3 March 2010, page 9. 
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predominant ‘Home Affairs model’, based on a number of ‘common threats’ that the 
Union allegedly faces globally and that are said to justify the further integration of 
security cooperation at EU level in both operations and substance. This home affairs 
model proposed by the Directorate General Home Affairs of the Commission has not 
been accompanied by (and in our view remains in tension with) a credible and sound EU 
citizenship, fundamental rights and justice strategy meeting the liberty-related challenges 
that a majority of the ISS objectives and policy proposals (especially those related to a 
proactive, intelligence-based approach and a model for information exchange as well as 
the call for further operational integration of EU security agencies) will increasingly 
create to a Europe of law, justice and rights. This, we argue, will constitute one of the 
main challenges for Europe’s future which remains unresolved. 
 
The UK’s Position in the AFSJ 
3. The UK’s position in the AFSJ has been somewhat exceptional. By virtue of Protocols to 
the Treaties, the UK was, from the beginning, not obliged to participate in EU measures 
on borders, immigration and asylum. According to the Protocol No. 21 on the position 
of the UK and Ireland in respect of the AFSJ attached to the Lisbon Treaty, this 
exception has been extended to criminal justice matters as well. Article 4a of the 
mentioned Protocol has expanded the ‘opt out’ to all the Chapters falling within the 
scope of the new Title V on the AFSJ of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) including Chapter 4 on ‘Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ and 
Chapter 5 on ‘Police Cooperation’. Yet, according to the second paragraph of that same 
article, a certain amount of pressure can be exerted on the UK to make it participate in 
the adoption and implementation of legislative measures that aim at purely amending 
existing (former EU third pillar) measures where it is participating. Refusal to participate 
could lead to the cessation of application of that measure to the UK and the financial 
consequences that would stem from this situation.  
4. In practice, the UK has participated in the EU’s asylum matters until recently, when the 
decision was taken to no longer to participate in some of the revised measures. The UK 
has not participated in any of the border and immigration-related measures with a small 
number of exceptions that relate to formal matters. The UK expressed interest in 
participating in the EU’s external border agency Frontex, in biometric documents and in 
the visa database, which the EU is creating (the Visa Information System), but is not 
entitled to according to refusals by the Council, which have been upheld by decisions of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union.6 For the moment the UK participates in the 
measures adopted before the Lisbon Treaty on judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
such as the European Arrest and Evidence Warrants. 
 
The Objectives of the Internal Security Strategy 
5. The objective of the EU’s ISS is to establish a shared agenda on internal security that 
enjoys the support of all the Member States, the EU institutions, civil society and local 
authorities, and interestingly enough, the EU security industry. What the ISS does not 
include are institutions and issues that are associated with external security, such as the 
military, defence and international relations. There is only one cross-over issue: the 
 
6 C-482/08 UK v Council, 26 October 2010; C-137/05, UK v Council 18 December 2007; C-77/05 UK v Council 18 December 
2007. 
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possible duties of the European External Action Service where a number of suggestions 
for activities are made in the Commission’s Communication (COM (2010) 673).  
6. The ISS identified a number of principles and guidelines for action in pursuit of a 
‘European security model’.7 The principles included: 
a. Justice, freedom and security policies which are mutually reinforcing whilst 
respecting fundamental rights, international protection, the rule of law and 
privacy; 
b. Protection of all citizens, especially the most vulnerable; 
c. Transparency and accountability in security policies; 
d. Dialogue as the means of resolving differences in accordance with the principles 
of tolerance, respect and freedom of expression; 
e. Integration, social inclusion and the fight against discrimination; 
f. Solidarity between EU Member States; and 
g. Mutual Trust. 
On the basis of these principles, the ISS provided a number of guidelines for action 
“to guarantee the EU’s internal security”, which inter alia included a proactive 
(intelligence-led) approach driven by prevention and anticipation, the reinvigoration 
of information exchange between law enforcement authorities through the use of EU 
databases as well as an improved operation cooperation between EU security 
agencies (Europol, Eurojust, Cepol, Sitcen and Frontex) and ensuring stringent 
coordination between them by the Standing Committee on Operation Cooperation 
on Internal Security (COSI). The only guideline presented by the ISS that even 
partially dealt with rule of law-related aspects was entitled “Ensuring the effective 
democratic and judicial supervision of security activities”. The latter referred in 
rather general terms to the importance of the involvement of the European 
Parliament and national parliaments, and referred to the EU’s accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights.8 Apart from that, the ISS did not specify the 
actual ways in which the specific guidelines were going to constitute an 
implementation of the above-mentioned general principles. Moreover, as we will 
develop more in detail below, the Commission Communication putting the ISS into 
action has gone even further by completely neglecting the fundamental rights and rule 
of law dimensions amongst its five strategic objectives.  
7. The Treaty of Lisbon and the Stockholm Programme have provided the legal and political 
impetus for the ISS to be developed and implemented. The Commission Communication 
thus comes indeed at a moment when there is much clearer responsibility within the EU 
institutions on competence for internal security generally; the framework of Member 
State/EU institution activity is more precisely delineated and the balance of powers 
among the EU institutions following the augmentation of the European Parliament’s 
competences by the Lisbon Treaty is beginning to become apparent. That 
notwithstanding the new institutional and legislative framework provided by the Treaty 
of Lisbon has not meant a formal end to the third pillar ‘way of working and thinking’ on 
 
7 Council Document 5842/2/2010, Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security Model.  
8 Similarly in the Commission Communication “The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Main Achievements and future 
Challenges, COM(2010) 386 final, Brussels, 20.7.2010, the respect for fundamental rights was identified as an ‘horizontal 
issue’ in the implementation of the strategy, for instance in what concerns the protection of personal data and the effects 
on vulnerable groups. See page 11 of the Communication. This element however has not been either incorporated in the 
Communication putting into action the ISS.  
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issues of security at EU level. On the contrary, when reading the Communication, it 
appears as if the old third pillar spirit is not only very much present but it is also now 
contaminating other (formerly considered) first pillar areas, such as for instance those of 
external border controls and migration/asylum policies as well as agencies such as 
Frontex. The ‘depillarization’ emerging from the Lisbon Treaty is allowing for the 
extension of the police and insecurity-led (intergovernmental) approach to spread over 
the entire EU’s AFSJ and not – as it might have been originally expected – the other way 
around (the Community method of cooperation logic to expand over internal security 
matters). This, of course, raises concerns over the greater effectiveness, democratic 
accountability and judicial control as well as rule of law/fundamental rights consequences 
that the end of the pillar divide in JHA policies was expected to bring at EU level and that 
seem to be now at stake.  
8. The former ‘third pillar’ policies (police and criminal justice) are amongst those in the 
new Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) where more 
exceptions to the general rules and ‘flexibility’ mechanisms have been allowed in 
European cooperation. This will further enhance the intergovernmental and ‘police-led’ 
motif of future EU security measures. Not only the maintenance of law and order and 
the safeguarding of internal security remain exclusively a matter of national competence 
under the Treaties, but there are a number of important derogations from the expansion 
of the Community method of cooperation over these domains. As a way of illustration, 
“cooperation between police, customs and other specialized law enforcement services in 
relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences” remains 
under unanimity and mere consultation with the European Parliament. This goes along 
with the possibility offered to EU Member States to use ‘emergency brakes’ and/or 
enhanced cooperation (such as for instance in relation to the setting up of the European 
Public Prosecutor Office). Or the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to review 
the validity and proportionality of operations carried out by the police and other law-
enforcement authorities and the Protocol 36 on Transitional Provisions (Article 10).9 
Overall, the exceptions permitted by the Treaty of Lisbon on EU AFSJ (security) policies 
will not only allow for the continuation of ‘Third Pillar’ ways of working in JHA domains. 
It is also expected to increase the insecurity and vulnerability of the individual, which 
depending on her/his geographical location in the EU will be facing different degrees of 
European rights and freedoms.  
 
A Shared Agenda: The starting point 
9. Not surprisingly, the Commission’s position on an EU ISS commences with a series of 
arguments that move in one direction only: first, there is a need for ‘more security’ 
(never defined but quite clearly not including social security), and secondly the EU 27 
Member States share a common framework based on convergence of ‘security threats’ 
which provides the objective framework for a common ISS. 
10. It is our view that these assumptions need to be examined on the basis of the available 
evidence. One shortcoming of the Communication is a tendency for assertions about 
factual matters to be included which lack any indication of the evidential basis on which 
they repose. It is critically important that the EU develop policy on the basis of the best 
research, analysis and evidence available in whichever field is under discussion. Indeed, 
 
9 According to this provision , as a transitional measure, the powers of the Commission and the Court of Justice in relation 
to acts dealing with ‘police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters” will continue to be ‘as they were’ in 
the EU Third Pillar for a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
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the EU itself is an important actor in funding research on all the areas of its competences 
(and many others) which is carried out at universities and research institutes across the 
world. Much EU (social sciences) research attention and funding has been directed at 
security-related issues. It would well behoove the EU institutions (and particularly the 
European Commission) to examine this body of knowledge in the formulation of policy 
and to address the existing gap between the findings of these research projects and the 
ISS. It is also central that the EU continues to support independent social sciences and 
humanities research projects, which while perhaps not being ‘policy-driven’ (already-
decided) by EU policy priorities of the day, might however be extremely ‘policy-relevant’ 
in pointing out main issues and dilemmas of these very policy choices, and offer 
independent evidence calling at times for a reconfiguration and reframing of the priorities 
and agendas.  
11. As regards the issue of security and the people, we cannot resist commencing with an 
anecdote: a middle-aged man finds himself in a foreign city late at night on a quiet street. 
He sees a policeman and he is reassured. The same man finds himself again on the same 
street late at night and sees two policemen walking together. He is reassured. The same 
man is once again on the street of the foreign city late at night and he sees 50 policemen 
coming towards him; he turns and runs as fast as he can in the opposite direction. The 
purpose of this anecdote is to set the stage – ‘more security’ is not always reassuring for 
the EU citizen.  
 
Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights 
12. The Commission’s Communication on the ISS highlights at the beginning of the 
document the importance it attaches to the rule of law, fundamental rights and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. The EU is indeed, according to its treaty, founded on the 
principle of rule of law and the respect for fundamental rights. Although the UK has a 
somewhat sui generis protocol which purports to limit the application of the EU’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU, as the Charter itself states that it does not 
more than bring together in one place rights which people already enjoy in the EU by 
virtue of other treaties, for the purposes of this submission, the exact status of the 
Charter in the UK is only marginally relevant. Sadly, the Communication does not return 
to this matter which is perhaps the most important one to consider. The sensitive issues 
that are dealt with in the Communication include a number which have been the subject 
of important judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) – for instance 
on privacy the decision in S & Marper v UK10 where the ECtHR found the UK’s DNA and 
other biometric information database inconsistent with the right to privacy in Article 8 
ECHR. Similarly, the same court found, in Quinton and Gillan v UK,11 that the wide anti-
terrorism measures permitting the police stop and search powers unfettered by the 
need for a reasonable suspicion too wide to be compatible with the same provision of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). More attention to the matter of 
correct application of fundamental rights duties of Member States in the internal security 
policies would help states to avoid these errors in the application of their national 
policies. 
13. The Commission identifies five key themes (strategic objectives) which form the pillars of 
the ISS and around which it is structured: 
 
10 Case numbers 30562/04; 30566/04; 4 December 2008. 
11 Case number 4158/05; 12 January 2010. 
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a. Organised crime; 
b. Terrorism; 
c. Cybercrime; 
d. External borders; and 
e. Natural disasters. 
14. The first question that needs to be addressed is the extent to which these five issues, all 
of which are concerns for at least some Member States, are concerns for all EU Member 
States and the extent to which the issues share common aspects in the 27 Member 
States at all. 
 
Organised Crime in the EU 27 
15. As regards organised crime, it is apparent that there are very wide differences regarding 
this across the Member States. The EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 
was established following the recommendation of the Hague Programme (the five-year 
plan for the AFSJ 2004-09).12 In its 2009 report it states that there are five criminal hubs 
with a wide influence on criminal market dynamics in the EU. These are the North West 
criminal hub which acts as a distribution centre for heroin, cocaine and synthetic drugs 
but influences the UK, Ireland, France Spain, Germany and the Baltic and Scandinavian 
countries. The South West hub is formed around the Iberian Peninsula and the issues for 
this hub are cocaine, cannabis, trafficking in human beings and illegal immigration. The 
North East hub, which borders the Russian Federation, and Belarus, engages in human 
trafficking (women for sex) irregular immigrants, cigarettes, counterfeit goods, synthetic 
drugs and heroin. The Southern criminal hub is based in Italy; where in addition to drugs 
and irregular migration it is involved in genuine and counterfeit cigarettes and the 
production and distribution of counterfeit euros. The South East criminal hub centred in 
Bulgaria and Romania is involved in drugs, heroin, counterfeit euros and payment card 
fraud.13 What is interesting from this summary for the purposes of the ISS around 
organised crime is the wide differences across the EU, which are evident even in a report 
designed to highlight synergies and homogeneity in the Union. There is clearly much 
competition in the field of organised crime and different parts of the EU face very 
different challenges. Any one-size-fits-all approach to policy is therefore likely to be 
highly counterproductive. 
 
Terrorism in the EU 
16. Turning then to terrorism, there do not appear to be very many Member States that are 
touched by terrorist acts and those that are appear to be concerned primarily with local 
terrorism. According to TE-SAT 2010, the EU’s Terrorism Situation and Trend Report,14 
in 2009, six Member States15 reported a total of 294 failed, foiled or successfully 
perpetrated terrorist attacks and the UK reported 124 attacks in Northern Ireland. Only 
one ‘Islamist’ attack was reported (in Italy), while France reported 89 Separatist attacks 
and Spain 148. The next largest category of attacks was under the heading ‘Left Wing’ 
 
12 Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 4 and 5 November 2004, 14292/1/04, Brussels, 8 December 2004, 
Annex I, “The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union”, point 1.5. 
2005/C53/01, OJ C53/1, 3.3.2005. 
13 Europol, OCTA 2009 pp 13 – 15. 
14 Europol, TE-SAT 2010 pp 6 – 8. 
15 Austria, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Spain. 
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with 15 in Greece and 23 in Spain. Clearly, the vast majority of terrorist acts reported in 
the Member States relate to various separatist groups active primarily in particular parts 
of the affected Member States. The issues are so intricately related to specific local or 
national political issues which are only fully accessible to the national and local authorities 
that to call terrorism in the EU a common issue is problematic. Certainly there is 
political violence in the EU, but a single common approach is unlikely to capture the 
specificities of the national and local situations. Further it is an issue that affects less than 
a third of the Member States which raises questions about the appropriateness of EU 
budgetary expenditure on the subject. 
 
Cybercrime and the EU 
17. Data regarding cybercrime are fairly limited. The Commission produced a 
Communication towards a general policy on the fight against cybercrime in 2007,16 in 
which it most helpfully sought to clarify what it is (including computer crime, computer-
related crime, high-tech crime and other possible synonyms). Most importantly, it covers 
traditional forms of crime (such as forgery and fraud) carried out over electronic 
communications networks, the publication of illegal content and crimes to electronic 
networks such as attacks on information systems, denial of service and hacking. The 
Commission, rightly, identified the problem as one for the criminal justice systems of the 
Member States as the issues that hamper coercive action against cybercrime relate to the 
jurisdictional limitations of criminal justice systems. The Communication also recognizes 
that by its very nature, cybercrime is not limited to Member States but may commence 
on the other side of the world. It can only be classified as crime if the places where it 
takes place have in their criminal code offences that encompass the activities which some 
EU Member States consider crimes. The current situation regarding the 2010 WikiLeaks 
revelations, which are subject to very different legal regimes depending on which country 
is host to the WikiLeaks activities, highlights the problem.  
18. The private sector is particularly engaged with this aspect of the ISS. Cybercrime is most 
problematic for industry, although of course it touches citizens as well. The 
Commission’s Communication finishes with an ambitious list of activities to be 
undertaken. However, according to the Council’s document base, not much appears to 
have happened. There are Conclusions in September 2008 which call for a working 
strategy against cybercrime and enhanced public-private partnership regarding the issue. 
In 2009 the Dutch Delegation presented its position on fighting cybercrime which places 
particular importance on coordination of the action with the Council of Europe. 
However, on 14 and 15 June 2010, following a conference in the Hague, a European 
Union Cybercrime Task Force has been established under the aegis of Europol. 
 
The EU’s External Borders 
19. For the UK, the issue of the external borders of the EU is a delicate matter as it does 
not participate in the EU’s common actions and indeed is excluded from participation in 
the EU’s external border agency Frontex. For the rest of the Member States, the EU’s 
external border commences at the UK’s border. Thus common issues of border 
controls are somewhat irrelevant for the UK as regards to EU’s Internal Security Policy 
as it is on the outside. 
 
16 COM(2007) 267 
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20. According to the Council, there were an estimated 355 million entries by persons into 
the Schengen area in 2009.17 Of these people entering, about 105 million were third 
country nationals (approximately 61 million non-visa nationals and the rest visa 
nationals). According to Frontex, over the first three months of 2010, 14,200 detections 
of irregular external border crossings were reported.18 A yearly figure on that basis is 
56,800 irregular external border crossings. Further irregular border crossings in the first 
three months of 2010 dropped by 36% in comparison with the final quarter of 2009. The 
disproportionate nature of the two figures – the 61 million third country nationals who 
enter the Schengen area annually, against the approximately 56,000 people who are 
treated as entering irregularly most graphically indicates that border crossing by 
individuals is not a security issue in the EU. It is a matter of trade and tourism, industry 
and family relations. To the extent that there is a security dimension at all, this is in 
relation to travel infrastructure. The external border of the EU most properly facilitates 
the entry and exit of people who seek to enter the EU whether they are citizens of the 
Union or third country nationals. The number of people who are treated as inadmissible 
and thus seeking to enter irregularly is statistically insignificant. In an EU of over 500 
million people, there is a real need for a sense of proportion regarding the policy area of 
irregular migration.  
 
Natural Disasters 
21. Natural disasters are a subject where there is perhaps greater scope for common 
approaches. The eruption of a volcano in Iceland certainly showed many EU citizens, 
wherever they were in the world, the need for more consistent and coherent consular 
protection and assistance in the face of such disasters. The fact that many EU citizens 
were stranded in far-off countries, were provided highly misleading information by 
government departments of some Member States and felt abandoned by their authorities 
and unable to access the assistance of the authorities of other Member States leads to 
the conclusion that we could do much better in this regard. 
 
Conclusions: Towards a European Liberty Strategy 
22. A European ISS must be built on the basis of evidence and analysis of the security 
interests of the people of Europe as well as the added value and effects of new (internal 
security) policy strategies. It must not be promoted on the basis of a lack of information 
and data or a willful misrepresentation of the available data. This has been also 
highlighted by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), which has called for a 
systematic approach in these areas (ensuring consistency and clear relations between all 
policies and initiatives in the area of home affairs and internal security) instead of an 
‘incident-driven policy-making’.19 Moreover, it may be easy for some parts of the media 
(and sadly also some EU leaders and politicians) to fan fears about irregular migrations, 
terrorist threats and organised crime among the people of Europe, but such 
irresponsible behaviour helps neither EU citizens to understand their world, nor policy-
makers to promote sound and measured policy responses.  
 
17 Council Document 13267/09. 
18 FRONTEX, News release: Irregular immigration hits net low in first quarter of 2010, facilitator detections up 13%, 7 July 
2010. 
19 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), on the Communication from the Commission “The EU 
Counter-Terrorism Policy: Main Achievements and Future Challenges, 24 November 2010, Brussels.  
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23. All five strategic objectives that the Commission Communication proposes as core pillars 
reveal substantial variations across the Member States whether it regards relevance to 
some Member States at all, fundamental heterogeneity or insignificance. This, in our view, 
challenges assertions referring to a common EU model on internal security. Another 
issue of concern is that the strategy proposed by the Council and followed up by the 
European Commission is to bring back (through the back door) the old ‘third pillar’ logic 
of cooperation on JHA (police and insecurity-driven policies) and spread it throughout 
the Freedom, Security and Justice domains, including policies and EU agencies dealing 
with migration, asylum and external borders.  
24. Will the ISS make the EU more secure or insecure? The ISS offers little in terms of new 
or innovative policy initiatives towards meeting the challenges that the Union will 
increasingly face in delivering liberty and security to individuals across the EU. The field 
of an ISS which touches all Member States and touches a central concern of the people 
of Europe is the one least developed in the specific actions – promoting the Rule of Law 
and fundamental rights as the central planks of an EU ISS. By not addressing these 
elements, the strategy will lead to more insecurity for the individuals subject to these 
public policy responses. In light of this, the strategy could therefore be re-labelled: the 
European Insecurity Strategy. Indeed, as the former UN Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Mary Robinson, has so eloquently explained, the essential element for any 
community to be secure is the uncompromising championship of Rule of Law and human 
rights. When people know that their rights are protected by law, law enforcement 
officials are secure in the knowledge that their actions are fully compatible with 
fundamental rights and the accused are guaranteed a fair trial, a truly effective Internal 
Security Strategy will be achieved. In such an environment, criminal gangs are unable to 
extort money from people as the police will defend the citizen, corrupt officials cannot 
prosper as the fundamental right of the citizen to transparency will uncover the 
corruption and law enforcement agents will act in the interest of the Rule of Law.  
25. Formalistic statements on the way in which Europe guarantees and respects human 
rights and the rule of law are not enough and call for constant (evolving) efforts at 
meeting the liberty-related challenges posed by new EU and national public policy 
responses. The EU’s ISS should be built around the objective of delivering to everyone 
living in the EU the twin rights of Rule of Law and protection of Fundamental Rights. A 
solid rule of law and liberty strategy (model) should be jointly devised by the Directorate 
General of Justice, Citizenship and Fundamental Rights of the European Commission 
along with the one put forward on ‘insecurity’ by Home Affairs. Such a strategy should 
be not only focus on the development of better (fundamental rights) monitoring and – ex 
ante and ex post – evaluation of EU policies (and practices) and their national 
implementation.20 It should also ensure a more integrated cooperation and coordination 
between EU (freedom) agencies, such as the European Agency for Fundamental Rights 
(FRA), the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the European Ombudsman, etc. 
The FRA should make use of its current (post-Treaty of Lisbon) powers to assess the ISS 
from a fundamental rights perspective and it should also see its competences expanded 
as regards independent and objective evaluation (not only research activities) of EU 
policies covering in particular the domains of police cooperation and criminal justice.21 
 
20 Refer to the Commission Communication “Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights by the European Union”, COM(2010) 573 final, 19.10.2010. 
21 Refer to Proposal for a Council Decision amending Decision (2008/203/EC) of 28 February 2008 implementing 
Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 as regards the adoption of a Multi-annual Framework for the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights for 2007-2012, COM(2010) 708 final, Brussels, 2.12.2010. The objective of this proposal would be 
destined to expand the FRA’s tasks to these areas.  
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All this should go hand-in-hand with strengthening the democratic accountability (and EU 
parliamentary representativeness) in the activities and cooperation by EU security 
agencies and of the coordination role played by the COSI. 
 
December 2010 
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Memorandum by the European Network and Security Agency 
(ENISA) (ISS 5) 
 
The Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Union, chaired by Lord Hannay of Chiswick, is conducting an inquiry into the EU’s 
approach to internal security.  
 
This inquiry will concentrate on: 
  
• EU and Member State responsibilities for internal security including the role of COSI 
(the Committee set up under art. 71 TFEU) 
• the scope, scale, priorities and intent of the ISS 
• prospects and plans for implementation of the ISS  
• the relationship between the ISS and global security initiatives, especially those of the 
United States 
• the relationship between the ISS and other EU strategies, policies and plans 
• the balance between better security and greater intrusion into individual privacy. 
 
The Sub-Committee has requested evidence on any aspect of the Internal Security Strategy 
(ISS) for the European Union, its development and its proposed implementation. 
 
In line with the call for evidence, this note provides feedback from the European Network 
and Information Security Agency (ENISA) under the following headings: 
 
• Scope, scale and range 
• Roles and responsibilities 
• Prevention and anticipation 
• Information exchange 
• Operational cooperation 
• Integrated border management 
 
In providing this feedback, ENISA aims to provide the House of Lords Sub-Committee with 
an objective response to the questions raised, but also highlights the role that the Agency 
could play in supporting the ISS. 
 
Scope, scale and range 
 
In general, ENISA believes that the scope, scale and range of the ISS are reasonable given the 
nature of the threat. However, it is clear that as Europe becomes increasingly dependent on 
the correct functioning of ICT systems to support essential day-to-day operations, 
proportionately more effort and budget should be dedicated to keeping these systems 
secure, both at the Member State level and at the pan-European level. 
 
Roles and responsibilities 
 
The importance of subsidiarity 
 
The principle of subsidiarity is key to ensuring a successful response to an eventual cyber 
attack or other large-scale disruption of ICT systems. Ideally, subsidiarity should ensure that 
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the local response to a global issue will be optimal. In other words, Member States are best 
positioned to defend their own infrastructures. 
 
However, in a global networked environment, subsidiarity will only result in an optimal 
response if issues that transcend national boundaries are managed and controlled correctly. 
Without a coordinated global approach to major incidents on the Internet, Member States 
could find themselves in a situation where local systems cannot function correctly due to 
issues that are outside their control.  
 
ENISA expects that international coordination in the area of Information Security will grow 
in importance throughout the next decade as countries become increasingly dependent on 
ICT functions that are offered and maintained in locations outside national boundaries. The 
recent phenomenon of Cloud Computing is highly illustrative of this trend. 
 
The role of ENISA 
 
ENISA will continue to liaise closely with stakeholders, such as Member States and industry, 
to empower and protect citizens by identifying the most important knowledge and skills 
which are needed to create a safe virtual environment in which European citizens feel 
protected (as identified as Objective 3, Action 2 in COM(2010) 673). The Agency will 
continue to assess the key risks and corresponding solutions in areas judged to be important 
by the Member States in order to provide an information exchange and knowledge sharing 
platform for the key stakeholders across Europe 
 
New roles 
 
ENISA supports the idea that ’security expertise should be deployed to EU Delegations, 
particularly in priority countries, including Europol liaison officers and liaison magistrates. 
Appropriate responsibilities and functions for these experts will be defined by the 
Commission and the European External Action Service’ (COM 2010(673), section 1).  
 
In achieving this, it will be extremely important to ensure that the skill-sets and training are 
closely matched to the target functions. In addition, this new network of security contacts 
should be complementary to existing networks (e.g. the ENISA network of National Liaison 
Officers (NLO)) and potential synergies should be fully exploited. 
 
Increasing dialogue between communities 
 
The ISS clearly foresees the need to bring together actors from different communities in 
order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the security approach. In particular, 
dialogue between entities that were formerly separated by the ‘pillar system’ is now 
explicitly mentioned (e.g. COM 2010(673), Objective 3, action 1 – ‘The (cybercrime) centre 
will ..., establish cooperation with the European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA) and interface with a network of National /governmental Computer Emergency 
Response Teams (CERTs).’). 
 
ENISA believes that increased dialogue and cooperation between different operational 
communities is a key requirement for underpinning a new strategy. 
 
Prevention and anticipation 
 
Memorandum by the European Network and Security Agency (ENISA) (ISS 5) 
23 
                                           
The objectives 
 
The document ‘The EU Security Strategy in Action: Five Steps Towards a More Secure 
Europe’ defines five strategic objectives for internal security: 
 
• Disrupt international crime networks. 
• Prevent terrorism and address radicalisation and recruitment. 
• Raise levels of security for citizens and businesses in cyberspace. 
• Strengthen security through border management. 
• Increase Europe’s resilience to crises and disasters. 
 
Following the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, ENISA expects to contribute to 
objectives 1, 2, 3 and 5 but anticipates that the Agency’s most significant contribution will be 
in the area of objective 3. 
 
At present, the Agency works mainly in the area of prevention, but could also take a more 
active role in assisting Member States in coordinating the response capability if Member 
States believe that this is appropriate. At present, a pan-European response to a cyber-
incident would be based on bi-lateral arrangements. 
 
The following headings summarise how ENISA expects to contribute to the ISS. 
 
Risk management 
 
A common condition for success for each of the above objectives is the application of 
proven risk management techniques. Indeed, Information Security can be seen as a form of 
risk management – where the risks under consideration are taken to be those affecting data 
and the information systems that process data. 
 
ENISA has significant experience in the area of Risk Management, which has been one of the 
main components of the work programme in previous years. In 2011 and beyond, the 
identification of Information Security risks continues to be a central element of ENISA work. 
Issues of global risk management and risk assessment, emerging threats and dissemination of 
good practices for Risk Management and IT Contingency are subject of work both within 
ENISA and the Commission. 
 
Improving resilience at the pan-European level 
 
Where objective 5 is concerned, it should be noted that ENISA is contributing to the 
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) action plan, as defined in the 
Commission Communication on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) of 
March 200922. This action plan will clearly contribute to the goals defined under objectives 3 
and 5. 
 
Notable initiatives in this area include the coordination of the first pan-European 
Cybersecurity exercise (Cyber Europe 2010), support for the European Forum for Member 
States (EFMS) and the European Public Private Partnership for Resilience (EP3R). 
 
22 Commission Communication of March 2009, “Protecting Europe from large-scale cyber-attacks and disruptions: 
enhancing preparedness, security and resilience”, COM(2009)149. 
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In 2011, ENISA plans to build on these initial steps in the following way: 
 
• In the area of exercises the Agency will begin discussions with the Member States on the 
planning of the second pan European exercise. 
• We will gather knowledge, expertise and good practices on the threats and 
vulnerabilities of Industrial Control Systems (SCADA). 
• We will also work with Member States to analyse the interdependencies of Information 
and Communication Technologies within the Energy, Transport and Finance Sectors. 
 
Working with CERTs 
 
Under OBJECTIVE 3, Action 1, the EC proposes to establish, within existing structures, a 
cyber crime centre, that should act as operational and analytical capacity for investigations 
and cooperation for the Member States and international partners. This prospective centre 
shall 
 
“[...] establish cooperation with the European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA) and interface with a network of national / governmental [...] CERTs". 
 
ENISA acknowledges the importance of the fight against cyber crime as well as the need for 
a strong collaboration between CERTs and law enforcement. Since its inception, ENISA has 
sought to foster a good working relationship with relevant communities in both areas (e.g. 
by working in close collaboration with the "Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams" 
(FIRST)).  
 
ENISA is recognised as facilitator and supporter of cooperation, also in operational aspects, 
by both communities. ENISA experts are invited to closed events organised by law 
enforcement agencies (like the "Underground Economy" conference organised by Interpol), 
and is also, since 2008, active in the organisation of the "Financial Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centre (ISAC)" cooperation activity, that brings together players from the banking 
sector, CERTs and law enforcement (for example Europol or the Dutch national police) for 
a vital and trusted information exchange. 
 
A special emphasis is put on a good working relationship between national / governmental 
CERTs and law enforcement. As such, ENISA has foreseen in its Work Programme for 2011, 
a dedicated Work Package that aims at establishing (where needed) and fostering these 
relationships. 
 
Reporting of Serious Incidents - Article 13 a of the new Telecom Package 
 
ENISA is assisting Member States in the implementation of Article 13 a of the new 
Telecommunications Regulatory Package23 in order to achieve a consistent and harmonized 
implementation of mandatory incident reporting scheme throughout the EU.   
 
ENISA acts as a facilitator, by identifying the appropriate competent regulatory authorities 
and engaging them in a structured dialogue on the relevant issues.  
 
The main objectives of this work are to: 
 
 
23 Telecommunications Regulatory Package (article 13a. amended Directive 2002/21/EC Framework Directive) 
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• Identify, disseminate and consolidate the use of good practices in the area of incident 
collection and reporting.  
• Define a unified scheme for reporting that delivers added value to the Member States. 
• Work together with Member States and the private sector to increase their level of 
preparedness by developing minimum security requirements for addressing risks to 
resilience and security. 
• Support the creation of a trusted environment or community for information sharing 
between Member States. 
 
Improving capability for dealing with cyber attacks 
 
Action 3 of objective 3 is entitled ‘Improving capability for dealing with cyber attacks’. In 
addition to the work being done together with the CERT communities, ENISA regularly 
undertakes studies that help Member States to identify the key threats and that propose 
suitable mitigation strategies.  
 
ENISA notes a number of challenges posed by the asymmetric nature of the fight against 
cybercrime – in particular the flexibility now enjoyed by cybercriminals in moving between 
jurisdictions, technical solutions and control structures and stresses the importance of a 
number of measures for dealing with these challenges24. In particular:  
 
• Improving the accuracy of information about the level of threat posed in different areas 
of cybercrime. Current data provides at best estimates based on very limited samples 
and poorly documented methodology.  
• Increasing the efficiency of cross-border legal mechanisms, in particular the time taken to 
effect sanctions against criminals. 
• Enabling and incentivising those in a position to react – for example, by providing tools, 
support and incentives for ordinary citizens to maintain home systems free of malware. 
• Promoting efficient cross-border information-sharing mechanisms between all parties 
maintaining appropriate levels of confidentiality. 
• Putting a focus on addressing all factors contributing to cybercrime including installation 
of malware on citizen PC’s, revenues collected by criminal networks and command and 
control of botnets. 
 
Supporting European Privacy and Data Protection initiatives 
 
Under the heading ‘Security policies based on common values’ in section 1 of COM 
2010(673), it is noted that ‘Where efficient law enforcement in the EU is facilitated through 
information exchange, we must also protect the 
privacy of individuals and their fundamental right to protection of personal data.’ 
 
ENISA is currently working together with the European Commission and the  European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) on the implementation of Article 4 of the ePrivacy 
Directive. We intend to extend this work during 2011 by assisting the Member States and 
the Commission in identifying and responding to privacy and security issues related to 
current and future technology. This will be achieved by promoting methods and tools and 
standards for recognising and responding to threats, vulnerabilities and risks at both the 
infrastructure and application levels. 
 
24 ENISA will publish a report detailing these - Botnets: Detection, Measurement, Disinfection & Defence –in January, 2011. 
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Increase Europe’s resilience to crises and disasters. 
 
Crisis response should assess information technology dependencies and interdependencies. 
In particular, crisis planning should address not only network infrastructure risks, but risks to 
the provision of critical IT services whose unavailability affects a significant number of 
European citizens. Such services might include: 
 
• Single points of failure such as single points of contact for cross border service provision 
(as required by the services directive). 
• IT services such as cloud providers with a market share affecting a significant number of 
citizens (we note that certain cloud service providers now cover 100’s of millions of EU 
citizens). 
 
The committee may wish to consider the provision of shared information processing 
resources in the context of a pan European mutual aid and assistance plan for emergencies. 
For example, the availability of emergency cloud-based IT capacity for emergency response 
teams. 
 
Information exchange 
 
The importance of information sharing 
 
Information exchange is a fundamental component of any global initiative to improve 
security. Without effective information exchange mechanisms, European Member States will 
not be in a position to correctly assess global threats and may therefore put in place 
procedures and mechanisms that do not respond to the most important risks. 
 
Similarly, poor information exchange mechanisms are likely to result in a duplication of effort 
and a slower learning curve for implementing approaches, processes and technology for 
mitigating the key risks once they are understood. 
 
ENISA and information sharing 
 
ENISA has significant experience in promoting the exchange of information related to 
Information Security between Member States. In the area of Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) for instance, the approach has been to work together with 
Member States in order to identify lessons learned from National approaches and to enable 
Member States to learn from each other. As a concrete example, the recent Cybersecurity 
exercise involving all 27 Member States and facilitated by ENISA was prepared in this way. 
 
The Agency developed a good practice guide on Information Sharing using the experience of 
UK’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI). The Agency promotes the 
concept of information sharing in Member States public institutions and private sector. 
Through this it hopes to increase the number of countries effectively using public private 
sector information sharing to enhance their cyber security strategy.  
 
In addition, the Agency also exchanges information with countries outside Europe when it 
clearly makes sense to do so. Recent examples include the work done on Cloud Computing, 
which involved input from many Member States, but also a collaboration with the Cloud 
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Security Alliance (CSA) and participation in an international conference in Japan on security 
and the Internet of Things (IoT). 
 
ENISA and awareness raising 
 
In a more general context, a high-level of awareness of security issues amongst European 
Citizens can only be achieved if the appropriate information is shared between expert 
communities and the Citizens themselves. The ENISA Work Programme 2011 includes 
efforts to enhance European cooperation to generate awareness about NIS, disseminate 
security relevant information and to assist Member States in coordinating these activities 
internationally. The Agency is investigating the viability of a European Cyber Security 
Awareness month partnership to create synergies and mutual benefits at international level 
and by making use of existing networks and amplifiers. Such an initiative has already met with 
success in the United States and the Agency aims to build on US experiences. The main 
concept is to bring basic ideas, tips and practices on NIS to the general public. 
 
Furthermore, as recognised in Council Doc. 7120/10 “Security policies, especially those of 
prevention, must take a broad approach”, ENISA has identified the need to focus on 
integrating Information Security into the school curriculum and to provide similar 
opportunities to young people in vocational training. 
 
Operational cooperation 
 
The ISS clearly identifies the need for closer operational cooperation between EU 
institutions, Member States and between the public and private sector: 
 
‘The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action therefore puts forward a shared agenda for 
Member States, the European Parliament, the Commission, the Council and agencies and 
others, including civil society and local authorities. This agenda should be supported by a 
solid EU security industry in which manufacturers and service providers work closely 
together with end-users.’ 
 
A significant part of ENISA’s work programme is aimed at improving cooperation between 
the different actors involved in improving European security. In particular, ENISA works very 
closely with both the public sector and the private sector and continually strives to align the 
goals and activities of these two communities in all areas in which the Agency is present. 
 
We therefore fully support the goals of the ISS in this regard. 
 
Integrated border management 
 
This aspect of the inquiry is not within the scope of ENISA’s activities. We do not therefore 
make any comment on this subject. 
 
10 December 2010 
  
Memorandum by Europol (ISS 11) 
28 
Memorandum by Europol (ISS 11) 
 
Scope, scale and range 
The scope of the ISS; whether it covers the appropriate range of threats, issues and problems;  any 
gaps and omissions (or inappropriate inclusions); the proportionality and ambition of the approach in 
relation to the threats and issues identified; the practicability and appropriateness of  the proposed 
European Security Model; priorities for the ISS and its likely impact. How should success be judged? 
 
Europol welcomed the adoption of the Internal Security Strategy as well as the recent 
publication of the related Commission’s Communication. Europol considers the scope of 
both documents in question as appropriate and comprehensive. They will undoubtedly 
facilitate and streamline the EU’s decision-making in the field of home affairs, especially the 
coordinative efforts of the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on 
Internal Security (COSI) established under art. 71 of the Treaty on the functioning of the 
EU.  
 
The Strategy and the Communication will enhance the EU position towards its partners, as 
they make the internal security policy more coherent and clear to the external world. 
 
The Internal Security Strategy maps out the different aspects of internal security policy and 
lists strategic guidelines for action. Europol fully supports all of them and is convinced that 
their full implementation will be beneficial to the fight against crime.  
 
Europol (‘the Agency’) is satisfied to see a proactive, intelligence-led approach (Guideline III) 
as one of the leading concepts in the field of home affairs. Moreover, the European Council’s 
support for comprehensive information exchange (Guideline IV), focus on operational 
cooperation (Guideline V) as well as its commitment to innovation (Guideline VIII) fully 
reflect the Agency’s understanding of efficient, modern policing.   
 
Moreover, the Strategy correctly identifies the role of Europol stating that its main aims are 
to collect and exchange information and to facilitate cooperation between law enforcement 
authorities in their fight against organised crime and terrorism. It also underlines Europol’s 
role as a provider of regular threat assessments.   
 
The Commission’s Communication describes concrete objectives and actions to be taken by 
Member States, EU institutions and agencies. Three of five objectives listed there, namely the 
disruption of crime networks (Objective 1), prevention of terrorism (Objective 2) and 
security of cyberspace (Objective 3), are extensively covered by Europol’s mandate. 
Moreover, strengthening security through border management (Objective 4) is also distinctly 
related to Europol’s core business and is an area where the Agency could add significant 
value in close cooperation with other EU bodies, especially Frontex. Concrete actions 
proposed by the Commission in order to meet the objectives indeed mirror the Agency’s 
well- established fields of expertise.  
 
Europol’s primary goal is to support Member States in identifying and dismantling criminal 
networks, facilitating the exchange of relevant intelligence, providing analysis and 
coordinating multi-national operations. Thus Europol could play a vital role in initiatives 
under Objective 1, Action 1. Concrete proposals made by the Commission under this 
Action, such as the establishment of EU Passenger Name Records or revision of the EU 
Anti-Money Laundering legislation, would undoubtedly facilitate investigations across 
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the European Union. These improvements could be combined with increasing analytical 
capabilities at the European level, in order to detect and disrupt transnational criminal 
activities more effectively.  
 
Attention paid by the Commission to criminal assets, under Actions 1 and 3, is very much 
welcomed by Europol since it is considered a key element of successful policing and 
prevention.  
 
Asset Recovery Offices (AROs), mentioned in the Communication, are actively 
supported by Europol. In 2007 Europol established the Europol Criminal Assets Bureau 
(ECAB) which supports Member States in the identification and confiscation of criminal 
proceeds. Europol is currently working to facilitate communication between AROs via the 
SIENA25 system. This provides the Member States with the opportunity not only to 
exchange information, but also to crossmatch the exchanged data with Europol’s databases. 
Moreover, Europol serves as a secretariat for the CARIN Network dealing with asset 
recovery on a global scale, thus facilitating exchange of information with partners outside the 
EU.  
In order to tackle criminal assets successfully, the development of legal tools for 
confiscation, and the establishment of AROs equipped with the necessary resources, powers 
and training, should be combined, in the opinion of Europol, with the mainstreaming of 
financial investigations. They should be widely applied against serious and organised crime 
across the EU. 
 
Moreover, the Communication states that the Commission and Member States should 
continue to ensure effective implementation of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). 
The inclusion of Europol in the circulation of EAWs which fall within its mandate would 
certainly serve the purpose. Information covered by an EAW, especially a description of the 
circumstances in which the offence was committed, including the time, place and degree of 
participation by the requested person, are highly valuable from Europol’s point of view. 
  
Action 2 focuses on protection of the economy against criminal infiltration and also covers 
fields where Europol already has vast potential and experience, such as the fight against 
counterfeit goods. It also encourages the development of policies to engage governmental 
and regulatory bodies responsible for granting licences, authorisations, procurement 
contracts or subsidies, known as the 'administrative approach', in order to fight 
organised crime. Europol welcomes this idea which could significantly supplement traditional 
policing. It is fully in line with Europol’s Strategy that encourages crime prevention, 
pioneering new techniques and advising on new legal or administrative instruments capable 
of reducing the threat of organised crime. In order to support the approach, the Agency can 
serve as a platform for the exchange of strategic information and good practices as well as 
explore the possibilities to facilitate cross-border investigations based on the administrative 
approach. Exchange of relevant operational information could take place via law 
enforcement channels already available at Europol.  
 
Objective 2: Preventing terrorism and addressing radicalisation and recruitment is of vital 
importance to Europol and lies at the heart of its activities. Synergy between new initiatives 
and current activities should be developed to ensure that actions undertaken are efficient 
and cost-effective; for example the work of civil society organisations which expose, 
 
25 Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA), is an IT tool developed by Europol in order to ensure 
secure communication.   
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translate and challenge violent extremist propaganda on the internet could benefit from the 
experience Europol have gained running the Check the Web project, which has very 
similar objectives.  
Following the signature of the EU-US Terrorist Financing Tracking Programme 
(TFTP) agreement, in 2011 the Commission will develop a policy for the EU to extract 
and analyse financial messaging data held on its own territory. Europol is of the opinion that 
the establishment of such a mechanism within the EU would greatly facilitate investigations. 
Europol is convinced that it could, due to its operational character, analytical capacities and 
experience in the field of counter-terrorism, be considered a vital element of the future 
system. Undoubtedly, the debate on the establishment of a EU-wide TFTP system and 
necessary feasibility studies could take into account Europol’s experience in verifying US 
requests pursuant to article 4 of the current EU-US TFTP agreement. Europol’s robust data 
protection regime and unparalleled expertise in processing large amounts of data offer 
potential for future common EU data systems.   
 
Under Action 2 the Commission proposes to establish a law enforcement Early Warning 
System at Europol for incidents related to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 
Nuclear (CBRN) materials. This idea is considered feasible and could constitute an 
element of Europol’s 24/7 capability.  
 
Moreover, setting up a European network of specialised CBRN law enforcement units 
proposed under the same Action could also be combined with ongoing networking of 
experts facilitated by Europol.   
 
Objective 3, which deals with cyberspace security, is also closely related to Europol’s 
mandate. Cybercrime is already a vital element of its Strategy 2010-2014. The 
Communication rightly underlines the role of Europol’s High Tech Crime Centre 
(HTCC) which coordinates operational activities, serves as a communication platform and 
produces strategic analysis (Europol High Tech Crime Threat Assessment and iOCTA). 
Action 1 provides for the establishment, within existing structures, of a cybercrime centre, 
through which Member States and EU institutions will be able to build operational and 
analytical capacity for investigations and cooperation with international partners.  
 
Taking into account Europol’s experience in fighting cybercrime and the unique technical and 
analytical expertise built in this field, as well as the fact that the centre is supposed to 
facilitate operational cooperation, the Agency could play a primary role in the 
establishment of the future entity. Dispersion of investigative and analytical capacities in 
the fight against cybercrime should be avoided in order to safeguard the necessary 
coordination and cost-effectiveness.     
 
Roles and responsibilities 
Clarity of roles and responsibilities between national authorities and the Union; the role of COSI; 
relationships and interdependencies between the ISS and other strategies and policies, including the 
external dimension. 
 
The Strategy states that further developing, monitoring and implementing the Internal 
Security Strategy must become one of the priority tasks of the Standing Committee on 
Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI). Moreover, according to the 
document, stringent cooperation between EU agencies and bodies involved in EU internal 
security (Europol, Frontex, Eurojust, CEPOL and SitCen) is to be ensured by COSI so as to 
encourage increasingly coordinated, integrated and effective operations. Europol welcomes 
Memorandum by Europol (ISS 11) 
31 
                                           
this approach and considers the Committee a major improvement provided for by the 
Lisbon Treaty in the field of overall coordination of operational activities. The Committee is 
considered an important platform, where Europol’s expertise can be used by Member States 
and the necessary coordination between national services and EU bodies is enhanced.  
COSI is also a vital element of the EU policy cycle for organised and serious 
international crime26 recently established by the Council. Its aim is to tackle the most 
important criminal threats in a coherent and methodological manner through optimum 
cooperation between the relevant services of the Member States, EU institutions and EU 
agencies, as well as relevant third countries and organisations. The policy cycle for serious 
international and organised crime will consist of four steps. The first step is policy 
development on the basis of a European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment (EU SOCTA) that must provide a complete and thorough picture of criminal 
threats impacting the European Union. The report will be produced by Europol and based 
on input received from Member States, other EU bodies, third parties and the Agency’s own 
data.  
 
The second step is the policy setting and decision-making through the Council’s identification 
of a limited number of priorities, both regional and pan-European. For each of the priorities 
a Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (MASP) is to be developed to achieve a multidisciplinary, 
integrated and integral (covering preventive as well repressive measures) approach to 
effectively address the prioritised threats.  
Implementation and monitoring of annual Operational Action Plans (OAP) is the third step. 
Europol will seek to integrate the COSPOL projects into the new policy cycle as much as 
possible, notably by streamlining them with the future action plans in order to provide more 
coherence to the process. At the end of each policy cycle a thorough evaluation is to be 
conducted and will serve as input for the next policy cycle. 
 
The Agency considers the adopted model practicable and clear, allowing for the 
identification of key threats and prioritisation of actions to be taken.  
Since the model is based on a thorough threat assessment, it implements the idea of an 
intelligence-led and knowledge-based fight against crime.  
Since it provides for both regional and pan-European measures, it can be flexibly adopted to 
specific needs of a group of Member States or particular crime phenomenon.  
As it is a policy cycle, where results of the previous round influence actions to be taken in 
the future, regular analysis of achievements and shortcomings is of vital importance. This also 
contributes to the overall accountability of all entities involved; both decision-making bodies 
as well as executive agencies. Europol welcomes this approach, since it considers 
accountability and effectiveness its key values.      
 
Europol fully subscribes to the statement of the Strategy, which says that a concept of 
internal security cannot exist without an external dimension, since internal security 
increasingly depends, to a large extent, on external security.   
The Strategy rightly says that failed states and areas of regional conflict have frequently 
proven to be breeding grounds for organised crime and terrorism. This evaluation closely 
corresponds to Europol’s own findings, as expressed in Europol’s Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment (OCTA). The first line of defence against such threats must be at the source, 
and therefore outside the borders of the EU. In this regard Europol would be ready to 
second its experts to key EU delegations, in order to foster operational cooperation against 
serious and organised crime.  
 
26 Doc. 15358/10, COSI 69 ENFOPOL 298 CRIMORG 185 ENFOCUSTOM 94. 
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Moreover, the Council has established an administrative arrangement allowing for Europol 
to cooperate and exchange information (excluding personal data) with all CSDP civilian 
police missions. The Stockholm Programme called for the improvement of these 
cooperation mechanisms, while the EU Internal Security Strategy encourages law 
enforcement agencies to strengthen their participation in civilian crisis management missions.  
Europol can help to improve the performance of Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) police missions by providing them with analysis which can allow them to adjust their 
strategies in response to criminal trends. Equally, Europol would very much benefit 
from the expertise and local knowledge gathered by the police missions to 
improve its analysis, thereby providing EU decision-making bodies and Member States with a 
comprehensive picture of criminal threats, both operational and strategic.   
In order to enhance coherence between external and internal security, further steps should 
also be taken to increase Europol’s cooperation with the EU Joint Situation Centre, for 
example with regard to joint threat assessments before CSDP police missions are planned 
and deployed. 
 
Lastly, Europol supports its Member States wherever they are actively fighting crime, in 
particular in the framework of regional police initiatives, such as the Maritime Analysis and 
Operations Centre (MAOC) or the two West African platforms in Ghana and Dakar. 
  
Prevention and anticipation 
The systems, mechanisms and processes needed to improve confidence in the early warning of 
threats and problems; the scope for greater cooperation with non-government actors, including the 
private and education sectors, and civil society organisations; ways to counter radicalisation and 
reduce vulnerability and risk.  
 
Europol is of the opinion that prevention and anticipation are at the heart of 
efficient and cost-effective law enforcement.  
 
The recently adopted policy cycle guarantees the permanent monitoring of criminal trends 
and allows for coordinated countermeasures based on clearly defined priorities. 
Understanding of criminal trends, which is the objective of Europol’s main analytical product 
- the Organised Crime Threat Assessment - is indispensable for the anticipation of threats 
and proactive policing.  
 
A long-term policy cycle does not exclude flexible reaction in case of sudden changes in the 
criminal world and application of new investigative techniques. One of Europol’s objectives is 
to pioneer new policing techniques and react flexibly to new ways of committing crimes, 
especially in the Hi-Tech area. As indicated above, both strategic documents rightly address 
developing threats, empowering, for example, civil society to counter radicalisation or 
proposing the establishment of a law enforcement Early Warning System at Europol for 
incidents related to CBRN materials. 
 
Moreover, Europol fully recognises the preventive role of confiscating criminal assets and 
welcomes the attention the Commission attaches to the topic in its Communication. Also, 
other proposals made by the Commission, such as the increase of security in cyberspace, 
and the enhanced exchange of financial messaging data or passenger names records, will 
greatly contribute to overall prevention. 
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Europol acknowledges the importance of extending its reach beyond formal official 
law enforcement channels of cooperation. The outreach approach is being currently 
developed at Europol to tackle security threats through building trusted relationships with a 
variety of partners and other relevant actors. It is to be based on collaboration with 
academia, private industry and other organisations of both a national and international 
nature. 
 
Within Europol’s overall vision, outreach will create a strategic capability enabling the 
organisation to benefit from knowledge, information, research and resources held outside of 
the law enforcement community. It will allow Europol to identify and develop the latest 
techniques available in combating crime and terrorism and be better informed about current 
security concerns, phenomena and trends. It will also facilitate the necessary exchange of 
expertise thus bridging the gap in fields such as IT, where the law enforcement community 
lacks specific knowledge. On the other hand, close cooperation with industry could have a 
major preventive dimension - certain new technologies could be discussed before they enter 
the market, in order to make them ‘crimeproof’ and to limit the opportunities for criminals 
to misuse them.   
 
Information exchange 
Practical measures to build trust and encourage the timely exchange and appropriate access to data 
whilst maintaining the right to privacy and the requirements of data protection. 
 
There are numerous communication channels and information systems in the area of 
freedom, security and justice.27 Europol enjoys access to many of them and uses them on a 
daily basis for its operational activities.  
The Strategy rightly states that Member States have to share intelligence in time to prevent 
crime and bring offenders to justice.  
Trust and the timely exchange of intelligence are of primary importance to Europol which is, 
first and foremost, an intelligence hub. The quality and quantity of intelligence is a major 
factor that determines the effectiveness of the Agency.  
 
Information exchange on the basis of mutual trust, and culminating in the principle of 
information availability, is rightly named one of the Strategy’s key objectives. This is also 
supported by the explicit statement of the Communication, which says that efficient law 
enforcement in the EU is facilitated through information exchange. All measures following 
this reasoning and enhancing intelligence exchange will be welcomed by Europol. At the 
same time privacy and data protection are of utmost importance, constitute a vital 
element of Europol’s culture and are crucial for the Agency’s accountability. Europol’s robust 
data protection regime is based on a number of clear values, such as lawfulness of 
processing, quality of data, proportionality and data security. Europol implements numerous 
technical and organisational security measures that are appropriate to the risks presented by 
the processing of data. It also enjoys a well-established system of bodies, both external and 
internal, supervising the use of data. Observance of the Europol data protection principles is 
guaranteed and monitored by independent supervisory authorities, both at national and 
European level. The Europol Joint Supervisory Body (JSB) has powers to rectify or erase data 
which was processed unlawfully or which is inaccurate or incomplete. Moreover, 
transparency is one of the guiding principles of Europol’s data protection regimes. The data 
subject has a right to be informed of all data processed at Europol that relates to them, 
where there are no operational reasons for withholding that data, and they have a right to 
 
27 Doc. 12579/10, JAI 660 DAPIX 12 DATAPROTECT 60. 
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correction of that data where it is shown to be inaccurate. The communication of data shall 
only be refused if such refusal is necessary for law enforcement authorities to fulfil their 
duties properly, to protect security and public order, or to prevent crime and to protect the 
rights and freedoms of third parties.   
 
Operational cooperation 
The effectiveness of cooperation between EU agencies and bodies involved in EU internal security 
including Europol, Frontex, Eurojust, CEPOL and SitCen, and measures for the improvement of 
cooperation; cooperation and support for major and mass international events. 
 
The Strategy calls for stringent cooperation between EU agencies and bodies involved in EU 
internal security (Europol, Frontex, Eurojust, CEPOL and SitCen) to be ensured by COSI so 
as to encourage increasingly coordinated, integrated and effective operations. The 
establishment of COSI indeed enhanced cooperation between the agencies in question, not 
only by providing a platform where the agencies can communicate with Member States, but 
also by fostering contacts and coordination among them. Joint reports on the cooperation 
between Europol, Eurojust, CEPOL and Frontex were produced, and subsequently 
presented to COSI, leading to concrete recommendations and improvements. Meetings of 
Heads of JHA Agencies are organised on a regular basis. In 2010 it was Europol that hosted 
the event. 
 
A common threat assessment is considered a vital prerequisite for more robust 
coordination between the agencies in question. Indeed, such a document was presented to 
COSI. The combined report28 was based on three strategic documents: Europol’s Organised 
Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA), EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), 
and Frontex’s Annual Risk Analysis (ARA).  
 
Major international events, especially sports events are potential targets for organised crime 
and terrorism. The host Member State is primarily responsible for providing security to such 
events. However, due to the international character of these events, all other Member 
States and EU competent bodies have a responsibility to assist and support the provision of 
such security. 
 
Europol may support coordination of the activities and act as an information hub.   
Providing intelligence and analytical support to Member States in connection with major 
international events is explicitly listed in the Europol Council Decision (ECD) as one of 
Europol’s principal tasks.  
 
Europol has provided support to Member States and third parties in the preparation and 
development of several major international sports events such as the 2004 European 
Football Championships in Portugal and the 2004 Olympic and Paralympic Games.  
On a strategic level, Europol participates in different forums, working groups and initiatives 
developing policies related to police cooperation in the organisation of these events. 
Europol’s handbook on support for Member States’ Major International Events, that is 
currently being updated, will cover the whole variety of actions Europol may take. 
The Strategy states that progress should be made on the development of a cooperation 
framework to improve security and safety at major and mass international events. Further 
developments in this field, contributing to better coordination and more extensive data 
exchange, could be built on the experience and capacities of the Agency.   
 
28 Doc. 8849/4/10 REV 4, LIMITE JAI 323 COSI 21. 
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Integrated border management 
The need to reinforce border management mechanisms and share best practice; the case for a 
European system of border guards; the scope for greater use of technology to facilitate border 
crossing by citizens whilst maintaining or improving security.  
  
Security at the EU’s external border and security inside the European Union are 
interdependent, thus Frontex and Europol must strengthen their relations, seek greater 
synergy of their actions and avoid duplication. This principle is specifically enshrined in 
the Commission’s Communication and is fully supported by Europol. 
Frontex’s task is to help Member States organise joint operations at the EU’s external 
borders. Europol is an intelligence agency whose main task is to analyse criminal data sent by 
Member States’ law enforcement authorities, including customs and border guards. 
Information gathered during Frontex’s joint operations is analysed by Europol to support the 
investigation of organised crime and terrorist networks. Thus the roles of the two agencies 
are complementary. 
 
Currently, the legal framework of Frontex does not allow the storage of personal data. 
However, in order to improve this symbiotic relationship, Europol would welcome the 
strengthening of Frontex’s operational capacities. Providing Frontex with the right to 
process personal data entails, however, some risks of duplication. Therefore Europol 
supports the possibility of Frontex being able to process personal data, but for the purposes 
of information exchange with Member States and Europol only.   
 
In practice this means the establishment of an ‘information exchange system’ at Frontex but 
with no capacity to store personal data in any ‘analysis system’, that would duplicate what 
Europol already does. Such a clear ‘purpose limitation clause’ would also be attractive in 
terms of data protection safeguards.  
 
Moreover, Europol could provide Frontex with dedicated access to its analysis work files 
(AWFs) and Frontex could make use of Europol’s SIENA communication system to improve 
interoperability and cohesion. 
 
The misuse of legal procedures, such as the asylum regimes, is one of the most used modus 
operandi in the area of illegal immigration. In the absence of any significant harmonisation of 
standards in asylum systems in the EU Member States, this method will continue to be used 
or might even become more popular. 
 
Organised crime networks always probe the administrative processes of Member States to 
find weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and possible opportunities to corrupt, and this will 
continue. 
 
Thus it is vital for law enforcement authorities to be able to cross-check, store and process 
information on illegal migrants. This may lead to the identification of suspects or organised 
crime groups. 
 
Therefore, Europol welcomes the introduction of the new agency - European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO). Facilitating, coordinating and strengthening practical cooperation 
amongst the EU Member States in the field of asylum, EASO will complement and support 
the efforts made by Europol in the fight against illegal immigration. 
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The Communication states that, by 2014, the Commission will develop, together with 
Frontex, Europol and the European Asylum Support Office, minimum standards and best 
practices for interagency cooperation. These shall particularly be applied to joint risk 
analysis, joint investigations, joint operations and exchanging intelligence. Europol fully 
supports this initiative and is of the opinion that it should be built on the already-developing 
cooperation between the respective agencies, especially in the field of strategic threat 
assessments, and take into account the coordinative role of the COSI Committee.  
 
29 December 2010 
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Memorandum by the Foundation for Information Policy Research 
(FIPR) (ISS 3) 
 
The Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR) is an independent body that studies 
the interaction between information technology and society. Its goal is to identify technical 
developments with significant social impact, commission and undertake research into public 
policy alternatives, and promote public understanding and dialogue between technologists 
and policy-makers in the UK and Europe.  
 
We would like to make the following response to the House of Lords inquiry into the EU 
Internal Security Strategy29 30. 
 
We welcome the European Commission's proposals to establish a cybercrime centre and to 
improve interagency cooperation at national level; we recommended in a report we wrote 
two years ago for ENISA [3] that Europe needed a “NATO for cybercrime” and while this 
falls somewhat short of that, at least it's a start. We note the strategy states that “Member 
States should ensure that people can easily report cybercrime incidents” rather than 
proposing security-breach reporting legislation as is now in force in most US states. So 
Europe will still lag the USA in this regard. 
 
Overall, however, these documents are disappointing. The Internal Security Strategy31 has 
not been carefully written: for example, at p 5 we find “Terrorism, in any form, has an 
absolute disregard for human life and democratic values.” This is exaggerated: different 
terrorist organisations have had widely different attitudes towards civilian casualties, with the 
Provisional IRA generally seeking to minimise them; and while Al-Qaida has staged mass 
casualty attacks, the recent toner cartridge bombs were aimed explicitly at causing economic 
damage. If we were to go through the report and examine every sentence for accuracy and 
relevance, our response would be rather long. 
 
We would like to bring to your attention a public comment by European Digital Rights 
(EDRi), an organisation of which FIPR is a member32. This highlights the security strategy's 
inconsistency in the way it handles issues such as copyright infringement and unlawful images 
of child sex abuse. The authorities in many countries are more willing to listen to wealthy 
complainants, such as the music industry, and take their concerns more seriously than those 
of the much less vocal and well-resourced victims of child abuse.  
 
The strategy’s failure to deal honestly with priorities is compounded by its silence on the 
real tensions between information sharing and human rights; these were discussed in our 
“Database State” report last year which found that some EU systems were probably in 
violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. We also found that the Prüm 
 
29 Internal Security Strategy for the European Union (Council Doc. 7120/10, 8 March 2010): 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st07/st07120.en10.pdf  
30 Communication from the Commission: The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure 
Europe (COM(2010)673 final, 22 November 2010): http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0673:FIN:EN:PDF 
31 Ross Anderson, Rainer Böhme, Richard Clayton and Tyler Moore, Security Economics and the Internal Market. ENISA, 
March 2008: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/enisa-short.pdf 
32 ENDItorial: EC Internal Security Strategy – My dog is a cat, EDRi, December 1st 2010: 
http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number8.23/ec-internal-security-strategy  
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Framework was almost certainly in breach of the Convention33. This is now highly topical in 
the context of the revision, following the Lisbon Treaty, of the Data Protection Directive. 
Yet the strategy avoids discussion of this tension, and its general tenor is that privacy must 
come second to security: this is implied by the ‘comprehensive model for information 
exchange’ that we’re supposed to develop in order to facilitate ‘a proactive, intelligence-led 
approach’. 
 
The Communication, COM(2010) 673 final, is similarly muddled. It is unclear what PNR 
legislation has to do with identifying and dismantling criminal networks, or what further IP 
enforcement measures have to do with protecting the economy against criminal infiltration. 
 
As for new powers, given the current controversy over the European Arrest Warrant, it 
seems rather courageous of the Commission to propose asset-recovery legislation “to 
facilitate mutual recognition of non-conviction-based confiscation orders between Member 
States”. 
 
In conclusion, what these documents mostly reveal is a lack of joined-up thinking about 
security in the Commission. They are a laundry list of policies being pursued by various parts 
of the Commission for various reasons, good and bad, with varying levels of effectiveness; a 
strategy, however, they are not. 
 
15 December 2010  
  
 
33 Ross Anderson, Ian Brown, Terri Dowty, Philip Inglesant, William Heath, Angela Sasse, Database State. Joseph Rowntree 
Reform Trust, 2009: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/database-state.pdf  
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Memorandum by Dr Claudia Hillebrand (ISS 9)  
 
1. The 1999 Amsterdam Treaty formally set out the aim of the European Union (EU) to 
create the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). The policies within this realm refer 
to, in particular, policing issues, border controls, immigration and asylum, judicial 
cooperation in criminal and civil matters as well as related fields. Next to external security 
matters, internal security policies have become an important concern of the Union’s efforts. 
The policies under the AFSJ have been growing throughout the last decade and led to 
increasing executive action at the EU level. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
reinforced and strengthened the EU’s efforts to create an AFSJ.  
 
2. Overall, the Treaty of Lisbon provides for a shift from rather intergovernmental co-
operation towards a more Community approach in this field. This implies a strengthened 
role in the policy-making process for the European Parliament (EP) and new possibilities for 
scrutiny through national parliaments. The key body in this sensitive field remains the 
European Council, however, which also, according to Article 68 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), “shall define the strategic guidelines for 
legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice.” The 
European Commission has also taken on an important role in this field over time. 
 
3. From the perspective of democratic governance, the intensified activities of internal 
security authorities – either directly at the EU level or channelled through EU institutions, 
continue to pose challenges with respect to democratic accountability. Creating the AFSJ at 
the Tampere Council in October 1999, the idea was to base the related policies upon the 
principles of transparency and democratic control to strengthen the acceptance of citizens. 
While the Treaty of Lisbon brought important changes, the EU’s AFSJ policies still do not 
fully meet those ideals. Both the development of the Internal Security Strategy (ISS) for the 
EU and the related creation of the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on 
Internal Security (COSI) are examples of the ongoing lack of transparency concerning the 
EU’s field of internal security.  
 
4. The ISS, adopted under the Spanish Presidency in February 2010 and endorsed by the 
European Council on 25/26 March 2010, presents the first strategy paper concerning the 
EU’s policy field of internal security. Broadly speaking, parliaments have not been involved in 
the development of this paper. In a written exchange among ministers while at the G6 
meeting of 15 March 2009, the Spanish government had announced the development of such 
a security strategy. A full draft strategy paper was presented on the 3rd of December 2009 
and circulated among the EU Member States’ governments in preparation for the informal 
ministerial meeting in Toledo 20-22 January 2010.34 At least some national parliaments were 
informed very late about the content of the strategy. For example, the German Bundestag 
received notice about it in a preparatory report concerning the ministerial meeting in 
Toledo on the 20th of January 2010 – thus, only on the first day of the meeting.35  
5. Rather than parliamentary actors, executive authorities have been developing the key 
features of the ISS. Crucially, Europol, Eurojust and Frontex have done preliminary work on 
the Strategy. In a Joint Report of July 2010 entitled ‘The State of Internal Security in the 
EU’, they described the nature of key common threats, based on the Europol’s Organised 
 
34 See statement by Ole Schröder, Secretary of State in the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Deutscher Bundestag, 
17th legislative period, 23rd session, 24 February 2010 (p. 1977). Online at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/17/17023.pdf.  
35 Ibid. 
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Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) and Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) as 
well as Frontex’s Annual Risk Analysis (ARA). 
6. As a consequence, there has not been a broad discussion about the term ‘internal 
security’, for example, which the ISS refers to as “a wide and comprehensive concept which 
straddles multiple sectors in order to address these major threats and others which have a 
direct impact on the lives, safety and well-being of citizens, including natural and man-made 
disasters.” This definition seems to allow the EU to include all matters relating to the 
maintenance of law and public order. As Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Home 
Affairs, pointed out, for the ISS the EU “took inspiration from the comprehensive approach 
of the US Homeland Security Strategy”.36 As a consequence of such a wide understanding, a 
great variety of actors is foreseen in the ISS to fulfil the strategy’s aims, including law 
enforcement, border management, judicial coop, civil protection agencies, 
political/economic/financial/social/private sectors (incl. NGOs) as well as regional and global 
partners.  
7. Concerning the COSI, public information about its composition, function and its work 
remain scarce. However, a pre-requisite of effective parliamentary – as well as wider public – 
scrutiny is a certain degree of transparency and adequate access to information. Without 
information, it is impossible to hold actors to account and to make reasoned judgements 
about their performance. Decision-making processes should be clear and the information 
upon which the decision is based ought to be publicly available.  
 
8. In accordance with Article 71 TFEU, the COSI has been created on the basis of a Council 
Decision.37 Its basic mandate is “to ensure that “operational cooperation on internal security 
is promoted and strengthened within the Union. ... (It) shall facilitate coordination of the 
action of Member States’ competent authorities.” This mandate is vague and there has not 
yet been published a more detailed outline of the COSI’s functions, powers and mandate. It 
appears that the COSI’s responsibilities stretch from co-operation between police, judicial, 
customs, border protection personnel. Precise functions, areas of responsibilities and form 
remain unclear, at least to the wider public. Moreover, it is not clear what the benchmarks 
are for evaluating the direction, efficiency and effectiveness of operational co-operation. 
9. As this body is a crucial product of the changing EU working structures concerning the 
AFSJ, and it is likely to take on a central role in the EU policy cycle as applied to internal 
security, it is regrettable that parliaments and the public are marginalized from scrutinizing 
the work of the COSI. Parliaments, which were not involved in the creation of the COSI, 
were kept in the dark about the COSI’s exact functions until the body was actually set up. 
Moreover, Article 71 TFEU maintained that, concerning the COSI, “(t)he European 
Parliament and national Parliaments shall be kept informed of the proceedings.” To be 
merely informed about the proceedings is an insufficient mechanism to ensure effective 
parliamentary scrutiny. The EP’s resolution of 25 November 2009 concerning the Stockholm 
Programme has therefore to be welcomed in which the EP “calls for the creation of the 
evaluation system to give Parliament and national parliaments access to information related 
 
36 Malmström, Cecilia: ‘The EU Internal Security Strategy – what does it mean for the United States’, Discussion organised 
by The Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington DC, 8 December 2010, Doc. SPEECH/10/739. 
37 Council of the European Union: ‘Council Decision on setting up the Standing Committee on operational cooperation on 
internal security’, Council Doc. 16515/09, Brussels, 27 November 2009. 
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to the policies (Article 70 of the TFEU) and activities of the internal security committee 
(Article 71 of the TFEU).”38 
10. A crucial limitation of the COSI’s mandate is that it is not supposed to conduct 
operations or prepare legislative acts. However, the COSI is to evaluate the efficiency of 
operational cooperation and the general direction of this field. This would not only have an 
effect on the Council’s policy priorities in this area, but also on national policing policies. 
That means it will have at least an indirect impact on legislation on matters of internal 
security. Moreover, the COSI will also be responsible for the Comprehensive Operational 
Strategic Plan for Police (COSPOL). Such involvement in intelligence-led policing and 
strategic planning for law enforcement operations will put the COSI into a position to have a 
substantial impact on the EU’s priority-setting in this policy field.  
11. Given the enormous mandate and potentially gigantic workload of the COSI, it is 
surprising that the group has only met a few times since its meeting in March 2010. Such a 
slow start might indicate that there is no agreement (yet) by national officials on the way the 
body is supposed to work. 
12. Parliamentary bodies as well as the broader public require a certain degree of 
transparency and adequate access to information in order to be able to monitor, scrutinize 
and judge existing structures, institutions and policies. It remains unclear what the terms are 
in this respect concerning the COSI. For example, will the documents which COSI receives 
from other EU bodies be accessible to parliamentary bodies, or the public as a whole? 
 
Conclusion 
 
13. The debate about the ISS has to be welcomed as it allows for a wider discussion about 
the EU’s ambitions and efforts in the field of internal security. Usually, AFSJ-related efforts 
are technocratic and do not gain much public attention.  
14. The EU’s agenda concerning the AFSJ remains ambitious, also because the field 
comprises of a diverse set of policy areas. Given the haphazard way of constructing this field 
so far, the ISS should be welcomed for providing a more coherent overview. It is useful that 
the EU presents its overall threat assessment and the related policies in one coherent paper, 
together with confirming the EU’s commitment to the Union’s principles and values in the 
field of internal security (in particular “respects for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
the rule of law, democracy, dialogue, tolerance, transparency and solidarity”).  
 
15. With respect to the COSI, it seems useful to have a body at EU level to avoid duplication 
and unnecessary overlap of EU internal security bodies and ensure good co-ordination 
among the agencies involved. However, the lack of involvement of the EP and national 
parliaments has to be regretted from the point of view of democratic legitimacy. As the AFSJ 
comprises many policies and measures which can have a direct impact on the rights and 
freedoms of individuals, a more democratic approach in this area ought to be ensured. 
Instead, the COSI currently appears to be another rather opaque Council body. However, 
the supranational nature that the Lisbon Treaty aspires for the AFSJ calls for improved 
democratic accountability mechanisms as well. It is a serious shortcoming that, given the 
 
38 European Parliament: ‘Multi-annual programme 2010-2014 regarding the area of freedom, security and justice (Stockholm 
programme)’, European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2009 on the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council – An area of freedom, security and justice serving the citizen – Stockholm 
programme, Doc. P7_TA(2009)0090, Brussels. 
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current legal basis, the EP and national parliaments will not be able to scrutinize the COSI’s 
activities in any detail.  
 
December 2010   
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Memorandum by the Institute of Civil Protection and Emergency 
Management (ICPEM) (ISS 6) 
 
Executive Summary 
 
The Internal Security Strategy for the European Union. 
 
The document provides a framework for developing an EU-wide Internal Security Strategy in 
that it sets out the need for cooperation and coordination between the various internal 
state organisations.  
 
However, the Institute makes a number of observations: 
• It is not a strategy document in the true sense of the word (paragraph 2). 
• There is a tendency throughout the document to group law enforcement activities 
with societal education and civil protection.   However, the Institute suggests that 
they are mutually exclusive and there is a danger that non-law enforcement agencies 
may exclude themselves from the holistic view put forward in this document 
(paragraphs 2 and 3). 
• It appears that the Commission have taken an existing security strategy and merely 
‘bolted’ on civil protection to the end of certain sections (paragraphs 4, 5, 9 & 29).   
• The paper mentions matters, such as road traffic accidents, missing persons, stolen 
vehicles, which are, in the Institute’s view not at the appropriate level for a pan EU 
internal security strategy (paragraph 6). 
• The document claims that evaluation mechanisms have been developed to assess the 
effectiveness of the EC’s actions in the field of terrorism and organised crime but 
makes no mention of any evaluations in relation to natural and man-made disasters, 
despite exercises that have taken place in this area (paragraphs 7-9). 
 
The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure 
Europe. 
 
The document focuses on the aspiration of what is to be achieved.   It sets out a vision for 
achieving common efforts and then sets out five strategic objectives and specific actions for 
2011-2014 which, if achieved, will help to ensure the security of the population within the 
EU.   The Institute finds these both informative and helpful.   Indeed, it goes so far as to 
suggest that a failure to deliver the key components within the strategy will lead to a Europe 
that is less safe and more vulnerable to terrorists, criminals, cyber-attacks and disasters 
(paragraphs 10-12 & 26). 
 
However the Institute makes a number of observations:  
• Passenger Name Records (PNR) of passengers on flights, it appears, will only relate 
to flights entering and leaving the EU, not on internal flights between Member States.   
It should be extended to include EU internal flights (paragraph 13). 
• The objective relating to terrorism appears to concentrate on Al Qaeda motivated 
or inspired terrorism but neglects to address the threat from domestic groups such 
as that experienced in Greece, Northern Ireland and Spain.   It also fails to address 
‘single-issue’ extremists (paragraph 14). 
• The Commission has identified the need to set up a standing committee on land 
transport security but the Institute feels it ought to be widened to ‘crowded spaces’ 
(paragraph 15). 
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• The Institute feels that greater priority should be given to the setting up of 
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and the cybercrime centre 
(paragraph 16). 
• The solidarity clause in the Lisbon Treat introduces a legal obligation on the EU and 
its member States to assist each other when a Member State is the object of a 
terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster.   The Institute queries as to who 
has primacy on the disposition of resources in such cases and, in addition to security 
experts being deployed to EU delegations, there is an opportunity for civil protection 
expertise to be similarly deployed (paragraph 18 & 19). 
• In relation to the development of risk assessment and the mapping of threats, 
together with the need for situational awareness, issues of focus, trust, transparency 
and credibility, together with linguistic, cultural and lack of common/integrated 
technology platforms within a pan-27 member organisation could conspire to render 
the process almost unworkable (paragraphs 20 & 21). 
• In relation to the development of a European Emergency Response Capacity based 
on pre-committed assets, the Institute points out that providing mutual aid within 
national borders is often a challenging issue.   This multiplies when trying to 
coordinate external aid (paragraphs 22 & 23). 
• Many of the proposals are focused towards reactive measures with little or no focus 
on proactive measures to reduce risk (paragraph 24).   
• There is an absence of a clear commitment on the level of funding and on-going 
support for funding the initiatives (paragraph 25).  
 
General Comments 
 
The Institute submits that there are two serious omissions in both documents, viz: 
• No mention is made of the role of the military (paragraph 27). 
• Although the importance of information exchange is referred to on a number of 
occasions, neither document deals adequately with the role of intelligence.   And yet, 
it is difficult to see how objectives 1, 2 and 3 can be achieved without appropriate 
intelligence exchange (paragraph 28). 
 
The Sub-Committee might wish to consider a third document, ‘Towards a stronger 
European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance’, issued 
one month before the second document to be reviewed.   The Institute queries whether the 
various Directorates-General within the EC are working in unison (paragraph 30). 
 
The two documents under review offer a basis for progress provided the whole process is 
headed by operationally experienced officials rather than people who are politically driven 
(paragraph 31). 
     
Introduction 
 
1. This evidence is submitted in response to the above Sub-Committee’s call for 
evidence to assist its inquiry into the EU Internal Security Strategy.   The inquiry will focus 
on two documents: 
• the Internal Security Strategy for the European Union (Council Doc. 7120/10, 8 
March 2010), hereafter referred to in places as the First Document; and 
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• the Communication from the Commission: The EU Internal Security Strategy in 
Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe (COM(2010)673 final, 22 
November 2010), hereafter referred to in places as the Second Document. 
 
The Internal Security Strategy for the European Union 
 
2. This document provides a framework for developing an EU-wide Internal Security 
Strategy.   In the recently published UK National Security Strategy39 it clearly states what 
constitutes a ‘strategy’, viz: 
“...any strategy, must be a combination of ends (what we are seeking to achieve), 
ways (the ways by which we seek to achieve those ends) and means (the resources 
we can devote to achieving those ends) ...”40 
In its current form, it is the Institute’s view that the European document does not meet 
those criteria.   Nevertheless, it is a helpful document in that it sets out the common threats 
and hazards that currently pose a risk to people and institutions within the European Union.   
Further it sets out the need for cooperation and coordination between the various internal 
state organisations that respond to those threats and hazards on a national, rather than an 
international basis.   These organisations include law-enforcement and border management 
authorities, judicial authorities, civil protection agencies and also “political, economic, 
financial, social and private sectors, including non-governmental organisations.”41   However, 
notable omissions are the roles played by national security and intelligence agencies and the 
military (see paragraph 27 and 28 below).   In reference to border controls, the strategy 
seems to have been drafted in the assumption that all EU members are part of the Schengen 
area. 
 
3. There is a tendency throughout the document to group law enforcement activities, 
i.e. those associated with counter terrorist and organised crime, with societal education and 
civil protection.42 In most cases, the Institute would suggest they are mutually exclusive for 
very good strategic, tactical and operational reasons, e.g. different skill sets, information 
requirements, drivers of national legislation, equipment, locations, etc. 
 
4. It follows that many non-law enforcement agencies are likely to exclude themselves 
from this holistic view on the basis that it involves wider ‘security’ issues with ‘civil 
protection’ providing the all-encompassing safety net at the back end, following the common 
threats and main challenges for EU internal security.   Indeed, the Institute would suggest 
that what the Commission appear to have done is to take an internal security strategy and 
merely bolt onto the end of certain parts of it, civil protection.   Therefore, although the 
document acknowledges that “civil protection systems represent an essential element of any 
modern and advanced security system”,43 the Institute takes the view that the document 
loses something by not acknowledging, in its title, the link between the two terms and the 
interdependency of the two functions.   Developing a collective understanding that an 
“Internal Security and Safety Strategy for the EU” might have been more inclusive in 
accepting that the two span a continuum and that everyone can benefit from the economies 
 
39 UK Cabinet Office (2010). A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy. London: The 
Stationary Office. 
40 Ibid, p.10, para.0.14. 
41 Council of the European Union (2010). Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European Union “Towards a European 
Security Model”.    Council Doc. 7120/10 dated 8 March 2010, p.10. 
42 Ibid, pp. 2, 7, 8 & 15. 
43 Ibid, p.6. 
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of scale in most of the key areas highlighted in the ‘Response to These Challenges’44 and the 
‘Strategic Guidelines’45 sections. 
 
5. With that in mind, it is the Institute’s submission that some of the observations and 
suggestions in the document apply equally to the civil protection community.   Two 
examples are given here: 
 
a) Training.   The paper points out that “a strategic approach to professional 
training in Europe” is an essential objective in “enabling European law-
enforcement training to take a major step forward and become a powerful 
vehicle for promoting a shared culture amongst European law-enforcement 
bodies and facilitating transnational cooperation.”46   But why does this only 
apply to law-enforcement if the document is to provide a holistic approach to 
all threats?   Such training should include those involved in other forms of civil 
protection and crisis management. 
 
b) Operational cooperation.   Again the document focuses on “law-enforcement 
and border management authorities, including the control and protection of 
external borders, and when appropriate judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters”.47   The Institute submits that operational cooperation between civil 
protection agencies is equally important. 
 
6. Additionally, the document refers to matters which are, in the Institute’s submission, 
not of an appropriate level for a pan EU internal security strategy.   For instance, reference is 
made to road traffic accidents.   As the note rightly points out, road traffic accidents do 
“take the lives of tens of thousands of European citizens ever year”,48 but these are not 
mass-fatality events, nor do they have a significant economic impact in the short term.   
Unless, the road traffic accident occurs on an international border or involves multiple 
Member States by reason of the different nationalities of those involved, it is of little interest 
to Member States, other than the state in which it occurs.   Later in the document, mention 
is also made, in relation to information sharing and the facilitation of joint investigations and 
operations of “missing persons ... stolen vehicles and visas which have been issued or 
refused.”49 
 
7. The document identifies the importance of planning, programming and handling the 
consequences of any crisis and mentions the fact that the EU Community Civil Protection 
Mechanism “coordinates the response of Member States to natural and man-made 
disasters.”50   This was tested recently during the field exercise ‘Orion’.   This was, as far as 
the Institute is aware, the largest and most generously funded exercise that the EU has held.   
It involved field scenarios, 22 in all, in Liverpool and Portsmouth and Gold level command 
posts working off those scenarios in Hampshire, Merseyside, Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire, 
with a co-ordinating control at the Fire Service College and participants acting at national 
level at the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) national coordination centre (FRSNCC) in West 
 
44 Ibid, pp. 7-8. 
45 Ibid, pp. 10-17. 
46 Ibid, p.16. 
47 Ibid, p.13. 
48 Ibid, p.6. 
49 Ibid, p.8. 
50 Ibid, p.8. 
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Yorkshire.   In addition, civil servants simulated the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) emergency room and Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR). 
 
8. The lessons identified included issues such as having a common language to describe 
levels of command and control at local, regional, national and EU level.   It demonstrated 
that there are significant differences in the way that assistance will be received in advanced 
EU Member States as opposed to third party nations, where there has currently been 
greater experience.   When providing assistance to areas devastated by earthquakes, such as 
Pakistan (2005) and Haiti (2010), the mechanism works well.   However, when coping with 
developed structures and heightened sensitivities found in Member States, the structure and 
operating assumptions are severely tested, mainly due to the frictions that occur with 
established laws, constitutions, command structures and organisational cultures.   This 
cannot be ignored if the Five Strategic Objectives mentioned in the Second Document are to 
be achieved.51 
 
9. However, when the document refers to the fact that evaluation mechanisms have 
been developed to assess the effectiveness of the EC’s actions, it merely quotes as examples, 
“peer-to-peer evaluation exercises in the field of terrorism and organised crime” as “having 
contributed to the improvement of mutual trust.”52   Again, there is the suggestion here that 
natural and man-made disasters have been added on to an existing security strategy 
developed primarily with law-enforcement activities in mind.   
 
The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure 
Europe. 
 
10. The document is more focused on the aspiration of what is to be achieved, that is, 
“common efforts to deliver responses to the security challenges of our time … to 
strengthening and developing the European model of a social market economy put forward 
in the Europe 2020 strategy.”53 
 
11. It also sets out the vision for achieving these common efforts: 
 
a) “Solidarity must characterise our approach to crisis management.”54   This 
centres on the concept of mutual aid.   The Institute points out, however, that 
there are enormous challenges in the command, control and coordination of 
multi-national assets with different standards of training, competency and 
equipment, as well as the challenges of language, concept of operations and 
standard operating procedures. 
 
b) “Our counter terrorism policies should be proportionate to the scale of the 
challenges and focus on preventing future attacks.”55   The Institute suggests 
this may cause some concern, particularly in the area of harmonisation of 
national counter terrorism legislation.   The UK has amongst some of the 
most draconian CT legislation in Europe.   Attempts to either ‘water down’ 
 
51 European Commission (2010).   Communication from the Commission: The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five 
steps towards a more secure Europe (COM(2010)673 final, 22 November 2010, pp. 4-15. 
52 Council of the European Union, op. cit. 3, p.8. 
53 European Commission, op. cit. 13, p.3. 
54 Ibid, p.3. 
55 Ibid, p.3. 
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UK legislation or bring legislation in other EU countries up to the level of the 
UK may be a ‘bridge too far’. 
 
c) “Where efficient law enforcement in the EU is facilitated through information 
exchange, we must also protect the privacy of individuals and their 
fundamental right of protection of personal data.”56   Clearly, the Institute 
suggests, this highlights the dilemma of ‘Security v Privacy’.   It is a challenging 
area and there are no easy solutions.   There is likely to be resistance to an 
EU database, should one be suggested.   Also the transfer of personal data 
between different law enforcement agencies in EU member countries is likely 
to be controversial. 
 
12. The five strategic objectives and specific actions for 2011-2014 are both informative 
and helpful.   They provide a series of steps to be achieved to help ensure the security of the 
population within the EU.   However, the Institute wishes to make a number of observations 
in relation to these five strategic objectives. 
 
Objective 1: Disrupt international crime networks 
 
13. Under Action 1, “the Commission will propose in 2011 EU legislation on the 
collection of Passenger Name Records (PNR) of passengers on flights entering or leaving the 
territory of the EU.”57   The Institute suggests that, as this only refers to passengers entering 
or leaving the EU, travelling criminals and/or terrorists from within the EU, who may or may 
not be EU citizens, would be unaffected by this proposed legislation when they travel from 
one part of the EU to another, without passing through an external border.   Therefore, the 
Institute submits that PNR should also include travel between EU countries. 
 
Objective 2: Prevent terrorism and address radicalisation and recruitment 
 
14. In the introduction, it states that “threats now come from both organised terrorists 
and from so-called ‘lone wolves’, who may have developed their radical beliefs on the basis 
of extremist propaganda and found training materials on the internet.”58   The Institute 
suggests that the implication from this statement is that this objective is directed at Al 
Qaeda motivated or inspired terrorism.   This neglects to address the threat from domestic 
terrorism, such as that experienced in Greece, Northern Ireland and Spain.   In addition, the 
threat of violence from ‘single-issue’ extremists, e.g. animal rights, is not addressed. 
 
15. Under Action 3, it states that “the Commission considers that as a first step towards 
further action, it would be useful to explores the establishment of a standing committee on 
land transport security, chaired by the Commission and involving experts in transport and in 
law enforcement, and a forum for exchanging views with public and private stakeholders, 
taking account of previous experience in aviation and maritime transport security.”59   The 
Institute feels that this is an innovative and welcome initiative to provide a common view of 
the terrorist threats to the rail infrastructure but it does not go far enough.   The Institute’s 
view is that whilst it focuses on passenger and cargo movement by rail and air, it does not 
appear to consider the movement of freight by road and barge, e.g. container/freight barge 
traffic on the River Rhine in Germany and other large European rivers.    However, by 
 
56 Ibid, p.3. 
57 Ibid, p.5. 
58 Ibid, p.7. 
59 Ibid, p.9. 
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restricting it to transport, there would appear to be a gap in the area of ‘crowded spaces’   
Terrorists attack trains because people travel on trains.   They also attack hotels, night clubs, 
shopping malls, etc., because people tend to frequent such places in large numbers.   
Therefore, rather than confine this initiative to transport, the Institute feels it should be 
widened to include ‘crowded places’. 
 
Objective 3: Raise levels of security for citizens and businesses in cyberspace 
 
16. Under Action 1 it is claimed that “by 2013, the EU will establish, within existing 
structures, a cybercrime centre, through which Member States and EU institutions will be 
able to build operational and analytical capacity for investigations and cooperation with 
international partners ..... and interface with a network of national/governmental Computer 
Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)” and such a centre “should become the focal point in 
Europe’s fight against cybercrime.”60   Under Action 3, it states that “every Member State, 
and the EU institutions themselves should have, by 2012, a well-functioning CERT” and that, 
once they are set up, it is important that “all CERTs and law enforcement authorities 
cooperate in prevention and response.”61   The Institute sees this as a priority area that 
needs to be addressed.   Although Member States should have a “well-functioning CERT by 
2012”,62 the cybercrime centre will not be established until 2013.   Given the ease with 
which hackers have recently closed down Visa, Mastercard and Amazon for periods of time, 
the Institute believes that this is a priority area. 
 
Objective 4: Strengthen security through border management 
 
17. The Institute has no observations to make in respect of the actions to be taken in 
relation to this objective. 
 
Objective 5: Increase Europe’s resilience to crises and disasters 
 
18. Under Action 1 it is stated that “the solidarity clause in the Lisbon Treaty introduces 
a legal obligation on the EU and its Member States to assist each other when a member 
State is the object of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster” and that “through 
the implementation of this clause the EU aims to be better organised and more efficient in 
managing crises, in terms of both prevention and response.”63   The Institute believes that a 
careful analysis needs to be conducted by any Member State as to the impact of this on 
national operational discretion.   With that obligation comes the responsibility to be 
competent to manage the response effectively   The Institute believes that there is an 
opportunity to mirror the security sector here by looking to integrate further action and 
expertise using the skills and knowledge of Members States in the area of civil protection.   
The European External Action Service suggests that “security expertise should be deployed 
to EU Delegations, particularly in priority countries, including ... liaison officers”.64   
However, the Institute sees an opportunity here for civil protection expertise to also be 
deployed to EU Delegations.    As with the liaison officers providing security expertise, 
“appropriate responsibilities and functions for these experts could be defined by the 
Commission and the European External Action Service”.65 
 
60 Ibid, p.9. 
61 Ibid, p.10. 
62 Ibid, p.10. 
63 Ibid, p.13. 
64 Ibid, p.3. 
65 Ibid, p.3. 
Memorandum by the Institute of Civil Protection and Emergency Management (ICPEM) (ISS 
6) 
50 
                                           
 
19. Given this “legal obligation”, the Institute poses a problem that could arise unless 
clear lines of authority and decision-making are established.   In the event of a major crisis 
involving all three emergency services, in the UK police resources are likely to be managed 
by the Police National Information Coordination Centre (PNICC), fire and rescue resources 
by the Fire and Rescue Service national Coordination Centre (FRSNCC), and the medical 
services by the Department of Health, and above all of these will be the Cabinet Office 
Briefing Room (COBR).   If urban search and rescue (USAR) resources are required in the 
EU mainland, but decisions have already been taken by COBR and FRSNCC as to their 
disposition, which set of priorities will take precedence?   Likewise, in the case of a tidal 
surge which affects the UK east coast at the same time as the Netherlands, who has the final 
say as to where the UK’s High Volume Pump (HVP) resources are to be deployed?     
 
20. Under Action 2, the document mentions the development of risk assessment and 
mapping guidelines and threat assessment and states that, by 2014, the EU should have 
established “a coherent risk management policy linking threat and risk assessments to 
decision-making.”66   The Institute has identified a problem in relation to this and that is one 
of transparency regarding the threat component.   For sound reasons, the detail of the 
threat assessment in the UK is not as visible and well understood as the non-terrorist 
components of weather, industrial action, transport mishap, power outage, etc.   In the 
wider EU arena, this issue would be magnified and the effects compounded.   In a pan-27 
member organisation, issues of focus, trust, transparency and credibility could all conspire to 
render the process almost unworkable.   Solutions could be proposed but at the cost of 
further erosion of the autonomy of individual Member States.   Also, Member States would 
inevitably focus most strongly on the hazards most relevant to themselves.   Investigations 
during the ongoing EU-funded project ERGO (Evacuation Responsiveness by Government 
Organisations) being conducted by the Aston Crisis Centre (a part of Aston University in 
the UK) demonstrate clearly that, despite an ostensible “all-hazards approach”, most 
jurisdictions focus very strongly on the hazard immediately at hand, e.g. Hamburg, Germany, 
on flooding; Iceland on volcanic activity and glacial flooding; the UK on terrorism.   This is 
understandable and rational, but casts doubt on the achievability, or indeed the sense or 
value, of a pan-EU consolidated threat and risk assessment. 
 
21. Action 3 relates to situation awareness.67   Much effort is currently being expended 
in an attempt to ease the task of building and maintaining situation awareness during a crisis.   
There is also much debate about the decision-making processes that this supports.   How 
much information is “enough” to base critical decisions on?   Do all decision-makers share 
the same picture of the events that are unfolding as the crisis progresses?   Do decision-
makers in each Member State perceive the hazards and threats in the same way?   Linguistic, 
cultural and common/integrated technology platforms have challenged the EU for some time.   
The EU has already funded a number of projects in this area with little or no effective 
solutions forthcoming.68   The Institute suggests that there is a need to recognise the likely 
sensitivity of sharing information across Member States and apply realistic classifications.   
Open systems often work better and provide more reliability and are more appropriate 
within the operational environment.   Secure systems would need to share risk register 
 
66 Ibid, p.14. 
67 Ibid, p.14. 
68 For example, a part of Cranfield University based in the UK Defence Academy was involved in a four-year EU project to 
prove the benefits of integrating Europe’s diverse and separate emergency response systems, called OASIS (Open 
Advanced Systems for Disaster and Emergency Management).   The project was completed in October 2008 with very 
little noticeable difference since then. 
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information, etc..   One centrally funded and properly equipped EU ‘situational awareness 
centre’ fed by existing domestic Member State components could be effective – this could 
interlink with existing EU security/intelligence sharing structures and systems.   Law 
enforcement agencies must recognise that this can be done without compromising security.   
 
22. Action 4 proposes “the development of a European Emergency Response Capacity 
based on pre-committed member States’ assets on-call for EU operations and pre-agreed 
contingency plans” and goes on to suggest that “efficiency and cost-effectiveness should be 
improved through shared logistics, and simpler and stronger arrangements for pooling and 
co-financing transport assets” before stating that “legislative proposals will be tabled in 2011 
to implement the key proposals.”69    
 
23. The Institute points out that providing mutual aid, or ‘solidarity’ is a challenging issue 
within a national border, let alone trying to coordinate external aid.   So, there has to be a 
clear willingness for a Member State to accept assistance.   This may sound obvious, but 
some Member States may suffer from misplaced pride as to their ability to cope with any 
challenge.   In addition, there needs to be a clear command and control framework in place, 
which is accepted by all Member States and incorporated into standard operating 
procedures of responders in all Member States in order that they can work effectively 
together without delay, and which has been tested and exercised before resources have to 
be deployed in earnest.   The current draft international standard, ISO 22320 (Societal 
security – Emergency management – Requirements for command and control) could form 
the basis for this framework.   Therefore, the Institute sees this as an opportunity to develop 
and promote joint training and cross-border exercises.   Uncoordinated and unrehearsed 
support may make the role of the responders more difficult and, instead of assisting the 
response and recovery efforts, may actually hinder those efforts. 
 
24. In conclusion in relation to Objective 5, the Institute feels that the proposals are all 
focused towards reactive measures with little or no focus on proactive measures to reduce 
risk.   Indeed, in the first document, reference is made to the phases of a crisis as being 
prevention, response and recovery.70   Thus both mitigation and preparedness, two 
extremely important phases of the crisis cycle have been omitted. 
 
Implementing the Strategy 
 
25. In terms of implementing the strategy, the document states that “EU funding that 
might be necessary for the period 2011-2013 will be made available within the current 
ceilings of the multiannual financial framework”.   It goes on to say that “for the period post-
2013, internal funding will be examined in the context of a Commission-wide debate on all 
proposals made for that period” before concluding that “as part of that debate, the 
Commission will consider the feasibility, of setting up an Internal Security Fund.”71   The 
Institute is of the view that the absence of a clear commitment on the level of funding and 
on-going support for funding these important initiatives may lead to a lack of commitment, 
both from the EU institutions and the Member States. 
 
26. In its concluding comments, the document sets out the main challenge to the 
successful implementation of the strategy when it states that “only by joining forces and 
working together to implement this strategy can Member States, EU institutions, bodies and 
 
69 European Commission, op. cit. 13, p.15. 
70 Council of European Union, op. cit. 3, p.14. 
71 European Commission, op. cit. 13, p.15. 
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agencies provide a truly coordinated European response to the security threats of our 
time.”72   The Institute feels that a failure to deliver the key components within the strategy 
will lead to a Europe that is less safe and more vulnerable to terrorists, criminals, cyber-
attacks and disasters.   Whilst this document may not be “All things to All men”,73 it is a 
starting point along a long road.                     
 
Concluding remarks on both documents under review 
 
27. The Institute submits that there are two serious omissions from the two documents.   
The first is that neither document refers to the role of the military.   At a workshop 
organised by the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection held in July 
2010, it was clear that there was a wide divergence of opinion between Member States on 
the use of the military.   As a result, the Commission would appear to have placed the 
subject in “the too difficult tray” (but see paragraph 30 below).    And yet, the reality is that 
most, if not all, EU countries will, in response to a natural or man-made disaster, deploy the 
military when they can add value to the response by the civil authorities.   In addition, in a 
number of EU Member States, the military are part of the response mechanism to counter 
terrorism. 
 
28. The other serious omission is the failure of either document to deal with the role of 
intelligence.   The need to exchange information is mentioned on a number of occasions but 
no attempt has been made to explain the difference between information and intelligence.   
And yet, the Third of the Strategic Guidelines in the First Document highlights the 
importance of “prevention and anticipation” suggesting what is needed is “a proactive, 
intelligence-led approach”.74   However, the Fourth of the Strategic Guidelines in the First 
Document highlights the need to develop “a comprehensive model for information 
exchange.”75   No attempt is made to differentiate between ‘intelligence’ and ‘information’.      
Neither is there any mention of the national security and intelligence agencies. Other than 
that which has just been mentioned, each of the documents makes only one passing 
reference to intelligence.   In the First Document, it merely states that “we should ensure 
that Member States share intelligence in time to prevent crime and bring offenders to 
justice.”76   In the Second Document, in relation to Frontex, Europol and the European 
Asylum Support Office, it merely states that “by 2014, the Commission will develop 
minimum standards and best practices for interagency cooperation.   These shall particularly 
be applied to joint risk analysis, joint investigations, joint operations and exchanging 
intelligence.”77   The sharing of intelligence between the different agencies in a single 
Member State is frequently difficult.   The Institute believes, therefore, that the sharing of 
intelligence between the different agencies in 27 Member States has similarly been placed in 
“the too difficult tray” for neither document makes any attempt to suggest how this can be 
organised on an EU basis.   And yet, it is difficult to see how the EC can achieve success, 
particularly in Objectives 1, 2 and 3 under the Five Strategic Objectives for Internal 
Security78 without the timely sharing of appropriate intelligence.  
 
29. In addition, whilst the European Security Strategy “recognises relationships with 
other partners, in particular the United States, are of fundamental importance in the fight 
 
72 Ibid, p.16. 
73 1 Corinthians 9.22. 
74 Council of European Union, op. cit. 3, p.14. 
75 Ibid, p.13. 
76 Ibid, p.11. 
77 European Commission, op. cit. 13, p.13. 
78 Ibid, pp. 4-10. 
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against serious and organised crime and terrorism”79 both documents are somewhat 
parochial in that although there is a reference of the need to link in with regional and 
international organisations,80 no account seems to have been taken of such bodies as 
Interpol or the actions taken by NATO under its emergency planning function.   As a result, 
the Institute submits that there would appear to be a danger of duplicating the services that 
are already supplied by existing organisations. 
 
An additional document that possibly needs to be considered 
 
30. Finally, the Institute wishes to point out that on 26 October 2010, less than one 
month before the Second Document was issued, the European Commission issued another 
Communication to the European Parliament and Council entitled ‘Towards a stronger 
European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance’. 
COM(2010) 600 final.   What this document does is to effectively put some ‘meat’ on the 
‘skeleton’ that is provided by Objective 5 of the Second Document81 even to the extent that 
it claims arrangements have “been developed to facilitate the deployment of Member States’ 
military assets when these are required as part of an overall EU disaster response.”82  
However, it makes no reference to the First Document under review by the Sub-
Committee, supporting the Institute’s view that civil protection has been tagged onto an 
existing security strategy, and only makes passing reference to the Second Document in 
claiming that “the proposals for improving response capacity would constitute a major 
contribution” to it because “increasing Europe’s resilience towards disasters is one of the 
strategic objectives.”83   Similarly, the Second Document makes only a passing reference to 
the document issued on 26 October when it refers to the establishment of a European 
Emergency Response Capacity.84   The fact that the ‘meat’ was published before the 
‘skeleton’ leads one to ask – how joined up will the various Directorates-General within the 
European Commission be in achieving what is set out in the two Documents appertaining to 
the Internal Security Strategy for the European Union? 
 
Conclusion       
 
31. Having said that, it is the Institute’s submission that the two documents under review 
by the Sub-Committee on Home Affairs of the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Union, offer a basis for progress provided the whole process is headed by 
operationally experienced officials rather than people who are politically driven.   Experience 
of large-scale exercises in the Netherlands (Floodex) and the UK (Orion) demonstrate the 
benefits which may be derived from better collaboration, shared situation awareness and 
operational cooperation.   However, operational responders, as practically orientated 
organisations and individuals, do not function well in bureaucratic and over-officious 
environments; so simplicity and transparency must be the order of the day. 
 
21 December 2010 
  
 
79 Ibid, p. 3.   The ‘European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World’ was adopted in 2003 and reviewed in 
2008. 
80 European Commission, op. cit. 13, p.3. 
81 Ibid, pp. 13-15. 
82 European Commission (2010).   Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council entitled 
‘Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance’. COM(2010) 600 
final, dated 22 October 2010, p.5.   Also see p.10, para. 4.6 of the same document. 
83 Ibid, p.3. 
84 European Commission, op. cit. 13, footnote on p.15. 
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Memorandum by JANET UK (ISS 4) 
 
1. This is JANET(UK)’s submission to the inquiry into the EU Internal Security Strategy85 by 
the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Union. JANET(UK)86 is the operator of JANET, the UK’s National Research 
and Education Network, which connects universities, colleges, research organisations 
and regional schools networks to each other, to peer research networks in other 
countries and to the public Internet. Our evidence therefore relates only to Objective 3 
of the Strategy – Raise Levels of Security for Citizens and Businesses in Cyberspace – 
and in particular to pages 9 and 10 of the Commission Communication “ISS in Action” 
(COM(2010) 673).87 JANET(UK) has operated a Computer Security Incident Response 
Team (CSIRT)88 for its network and customers since 1993 and has participated in CSIRT 
cooperation activities in the UK, Europe and worldwide, including operating the 
EuroCERT pilot from 1997 to 1999. 
2. In the area of operational cooperation we welcome the recognition in Action 3 of 
the important role of cooperating CSIRTs in dealing effectively with security incidents 
and promoting good preventive practice. Since many security incidents involve more 
than one country we strongly support the recommendation to increase the proportion 
of the European Internet that is covered by a CSIRT by encouraging the creation of at 
least a national CSIRT in each Member State and a CSIRT for the European Institutions. 
It is important that such CSIRTs are brought into existing trusted collaboration networks 
such as the European Government CERTs group,89 TERENA’s CSIRT Task Force90 and 
the global Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST).91 
3. Since ENISA has provided, and continues to provide, an important facilitating role by 
gathering and promoting best practice in the field of Network and Information Security 
we welcome the proposal in Action 1 to provide a complementary body, working with 
ENISA, to gather and promote good practice in dealing with cybercrime. However we 
doubt that a direct operational role for such a body would be helpful since it would at 
best add an additional layer of organisational complexity and at worst disrupt existing bi- 
and multi-lateral working relationships between national cybercrime centres. The new 
body’s role, like that of ENISA and the EISAS discussed below, should be to ensure – by 
developing, documenting and disseminating best practice – that relationships between 
those centres exist and work effectively, not to replace them. 
4. On prevention and anticipation, we welcome the focus in Action 2 on dealing with 
criminally illegal material at source rather than, as has been suggested elsewhere, 
attempting to create blocks that are likely to be ineffective at the technical level and do 
 
85 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/eu-home-affairs-sub-committee-f-/news/lords-
committee-to-investigate-the-eu-internal-security-strategy/  
86 http://www.ja.net/  
87 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0673:FIN:EN:PDF  
88 http://www.ja.net/services/csirt/  
89 http://www.egc-group.org/  
90 http://www.terena.org/activities/tf-csirt/  
91 http://www.first.org/  
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little either to address the crime or to help its victims. However processes for requiring 
material to be removed from Internet hosts must have a clear definition of what material 
is covered and effective and trusted safeguards (as provided, for example, by sections 3 & 
4 of the Terrorism Act 200692 and the Internet Watch Foundation’s93 handling of indecent 
images of children) otherwise there is a risk, as identified by the Law Commission in 
2002 for defamation law,94 of creating mechanisms that can be used to censor legitimate 
comment and criticism. 
5. On Action 3’s proposal to create a European Information Sharing and Alert System 
(EISAS) we note and support the conclusion of ENISA’s 2007 report95 that the most 
effective role for the EU is as a facilitator for national Information Sharing and Alert 
Systems (ISAS) – such as the UK’s GetSafeOnline96 –  rather than itself attempting to run 
an ISAS. This role would provide a clearing house to analyse and promote good practice 
in running national ISAS and a facilitator of discussions between those national Systems. 
Provided it is this facilitating role that is intended, we consider that the plan to work with 
ENISA to establish an operational service by 2013 should be achievable. 
December 2010 
  
 
92 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/section/3  
93 http://www.iwf.org.uk/  
94 http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/defamation2.pdf para 1.12 
95 http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/cert/other-work/files/EISAS_finalreport.pdf   
96 http://www.getsafeonline.org/  
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Memorandum by Professor Valsamis Mitsilegas (ISS ) 
 
1. Thank you for the invitation to submit written evidence for the purposes of the 
Committee’s inquiry into the EU Internal Security Strategy. This is a timely inquiry, as the 
recent proposals for the development of a strategy for internal security at EU level have 
followed the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which has enhanced significantly the 
Union’s institutional capacity to emerge as an actor in the field. On the basis of both the 
Council (doc. 7120/10) and the Commission (doc. (2010) 673) approaches to internal 
security, I will attempt to highlight the key strands of the envisaged EU internal security 
strategy and assess their implications for European citizens in the light of the development of 
the Union as a security provider. 
 
A wide range of objectives and tools 
 
2. The Commission has identified five strategic objectives for EU internal security: disrupting 
international crime networks; preventing terrorism and addressing radicalisation and 
recruitment; raising levels of security in cyberspace; strengthening security through border 
management; and increasing resilience to crises and disasters. This is a departure from the 
Council’s approach of adopting more concrete strategic guidelines for action. Some of the 
objectives set out by the Commission are more focused (combating crime and terrorism) 
than others (security in cyberspace or via border management). The breadth of certain 
objectives also creates potential overlaps between objectives (for example there is a 
potential overlap between combating crime and terrorism and security in cyberspace; there 
is also a potential overlap between combating crime and terrorism and the aim of achieving 
security via border management). The Commission’s list contains a mix of security 
objectives (e.g. combating crime) and means of achieving security (security via border 
management). 
 
3. The breadth of the internal security objectives set out by the Commission at times sits at 
odds with the Union’s competence to legislate as conferred to it in the Lisbon Treaty. The 
limits of the Union’s powers to act may explain why, on a number of occasions, concrete 
measures envisaged to achieve EU internal security objectives are ‘soft’ or non-legislative 
(examples include measures to prevent radicalisation, measures to combat cyber crime and 
crisis management measures). Softer measures are coupled with proposals for ‘hard’ law 
which largely develop existing EU legislation (in particular legislation on money laundering 
and confiscation). A striking exception in this context involves measures to combat 
corruption. The Commission envisages tabling merely a proposal on how to monitor and 
assist Member States’ anti-corruption efforts, notwithstanding the fact that the EU legal 
framework on criminalising corruption (in particular corruption of public officials) is quite 
dated and stems from ‘old’ third pillar instruments which still have limited effect. 
 
The intensification of surveillance  
 
4. A key strategic guideline of the EU internal security strategy is according to the Council 
prevention and anticipation: a ‘proactive, intelligence-led approach’. The focus on prevention 
dictates the adoption of a series of measures (such as legislation on the transfer of Passenger 
Name Records (PNR data) to police authorities) which entail essentially the intensification of 
State surveillance and the continuous monitoring of every day life. This intensification of 
surveillance is particularly evident in proposals aiming at enhancing the monitoring of 
movement of persons, goods and capital. Such proposals can be found throughout the 
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Commission’s Internal Security Strategy. The Commission envisages: proposing legislation on 
the collection of PNR data on flights entering or leaving the EU (under the objective of 
combating crime); developing an EU policy for extracting and analysing financial messaging 
data (under the objective of preventing terrorism); developing policies to protect transport, 
working to ‘ensure public acceptance by seeking an ever better balance between the highest 
possible level of security and travel comfort, cost control, and the protection of privacy and 
health’ (p.8, under the same counter-terrorism objective). The emphasis on the surveillance 
of movement is also evident in the fact that strengthening security through border 
management has been elevated by the Commission to a separate, self-standing internal 
security objective, with concrete proposals including the development of a European Border 
Surveillance System (EUROSUR).   
 
5. If adopted in their entirety, these proposals will lead to the establishment of wide-ranging 
surveillance mechanisms at EU level. Surveillance will be generalised: rather than focusing on 
specific incidents or specific individuals, large-scale collection and analysis of every day 
personal information (such as passenger records or bank details) will be normalised. 
Surveillance will not be limited to third country nationals (who are already the target of 
information databases such as EURODAC and the Visa Information System), but will be 
potentially extended to EU citizens as well (via the development of PNR transfers and an EU 
entry-exit system based on registered ‘trusted travellers’. Continuous risk-assessment is key 
to this concept of internal security. However, as is evident, the impact on fundamental rights 
(in particular privacy and data protection) and citizenship rights may be far-reaching. 
Monitoring the movement of EU citizens via PNR data may also be in breach of EU free 
movement law, and is certainly at odds with the development of freedom in a European 
Union without internal frontiers. In the light of the potentially far-reaching consequences 
that an EU internal security model based on generalised surveillance may entail, it is 
submitted that in the development and scrutiny of future EU proposals in the field two main 
interrelated questions should be asked: 
 
a. is the measure necessary, effective and proportionate?  
And, if the answer is in the affirmative,  
b: how can the measure in question be designed in order to comply fully with fundamental 
rights at EU level?  
 
The EU as a global security actor- what place for European values? 
 
6. The external dimension of internal security is a key strategic guideline for the Council, and 
is also central to the Commission’s proposals for an EU Internal Security Strategy. However, 
EU attempts to emerge as a global security actor post 9/11 have been fraught with 
difficulties. The controversy surrounding the conclusion of counter-terrorism agreements 
between the EU and the US on the transfer of Passenger Name Records (PNR data) and on 
the transfer of financial records (under the so-called US ‘TFTP’- Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Programme) is indicative of the complexities surrounding external relations in the field: EU 
external action has been repeatedly criticised (by actors including the expert EU data 
protection bodies and the European Parliament) for failing to uphold European fundamental 
rights standards in complying with US requirements. In the light of this controversy, it is 
noteworthy that the Commission is envisaging to adopt US approaches on PNR and TFTP in 
tabling proposals on internal Union law in the field. In view of the significant impact of the 
adoption of such measures on fundamental rights (in particular data protection and privacy) 
it is important that the necessity, efficiency and proportionality of these measures are fully 
explored. 
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7. In any case, the Lisbon Treaty makes clear that EU external action must take into account 
the values of the European Union. These are set out in Article 2 of the TEU and include the 
respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law. According to Article 3(1) TEU, the 
promotion of these values is a key aim of the Union. The role of the Union in promoting its 
values is further highlighted with regard to EU external action, with Article 3(5) TEU stating 
that ‘in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and 
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens’. The centrality of the values of the 
Union when the Union acts at the global level is further confirmed by the specific Treaty 
provisions on external action. According to Article 21(1) TEU ‘the Union’s action on the 
international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, 
development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world’, which 
include: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and respect for human dignity. It goes without saying that these 
provisions also apply to the development of the external dimension of the EU Internal 
Security Strategy. 
 
Fundamental rights in the EU Internal Security Strategy 
 
8. Respect for fundamental rights, the rule of law and privacy is recognised as a key principle 
of the European Security Model put forward by the Council. The Commission’s Internal 
Security Strategy also stresses that the tools and actions for implementing it must be based 
on common values including the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights. The potential 
impact of measures adopted under the EU Internal Security Strategy on fundamental rights 
has been highlighted in detail above. The purpose of this section is to stress that, along with 
the central place fundamental rights occupy in the Union external action after the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, fundamental rights are now also even more at the heart of 
internal Union legal and policy developments. This is particularly the case in the light of the 
explicit introduction of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights into the EU constitutional 
framework, and in the light of the forthcoming accession of the European Union in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Any measure aimed at furthering the EU Internal 
Security Strategy must be fully compliant with fundamental rights as enshrined in the Union 
constitutional framework.  
 
Inter-agency cooperation and operational action 
 
9. A key element of the Council’s response to the perceived security challenges facing the 
Union is the work of EU agencies, institutions and bodies in the field: these include Europol, 
Eurojust, Frontex, and the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator. The work of EU bodies and 
agencies in the field of internal security is also highlighted by the Commission. The 
Commission strategy is two-prong: to propose the establishment of new structures in 
Member States or at EU level (see for instance calls for the establishment of Asset Recovery 
Offices, of an EU radicalisation-awareness network, of an EU cyber-crime centre, of 
EUROSUR and of a European Emergency Response Capacity); and to further develop 
existing agencies, in particular Frontex which is envisaged to develop intelligence capacities in 
the field of organised crime. Interagency cooperation is also prioritised throughout the 
document. 
 
10. While some of these developments may provide added value in the EU Internal Security 
Strategy, there remains a considerable lack of clarity with regard to the mandate, functions 
and accountability of EU bodies working in the field of internal security. Some of these 
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bodies (such as the Counter-terrorism Co-ordinator) are not founded upon a clear legal 
basis. Other agencies (such as Frontex) have been established in accordance with detailed 
legislation, but in practice the extent of their operational capacity – and the division of 
powers between the EU and the national level- are not always clear. In this light, it is 
noteworthy that the Commission seems to envisage a clearer criminal intelligence role for 
Frontex, although this is an agency established under a Treaty legal basis dealing with 
immigration (and not criminal) law, and although such a development may in practice create 
an overlap with the work of other bodies in the field (such as Europol). It should be 
reminded here that, in its most recent Report on Frontex, the Committee stated that ‘it 
would be an unacceptable enlargement of the mandate of Frontex for it to concern itself 
specifically with counter-terrorism or serious cross-border crime which is not directly linked 
to illegal immigration (FRONTEX: the EU external borders agency, 9th Report, session 2007-
2008, HL Paper 60, para. 214). 
 
The importance of parliamentary scrutiny 
 
11. The lack of clarity as to the precise mandate of EU bodies in the field of internal security, 
the growing shift towards operational and interagency cooperation (including information 
exchange and the accountability gaps which arise from these developments (which are 
exacerbated by differences in the purpose and nature of EU bodies in the field of internal 
security) render the enhanced scrutiny of the work of these bodies by the European 
Parliament and national parliaments essential. The Lisbon Treaty provides the legal 
mechanism for such scrutiny as regards the work of Eurojust and Europol. It is submitted 
that both the European Parliament and national parliaments should assume a proactive role 
in scrutinising in detail the work of all EU bodies working in the field of internal security, by 
focusing in particular on the operational action of these bodies via the organisation of fact-
finding missions. The European Parliament and national parliaments should also ensure that 
they participate actively in the development of strategy on internal security, a role which is 
largely attributed in the Lisbon Treaty to a new EU Internal Security Committee (COSI). 
While of immense value, scrutiny which is confined to the examination of EU legislative 
proposals and calling EU officials to give evidence may not provide the most effective way of 
parliamentary control over the development of measures implementing the EU Internal 
Security Strategy if not combined with scrutiny at the level of strategy and operations. 
 
5 January 2011 
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Introduction 
The Internal Security Strategy (ISS) and the Communication from the European Commission 
represent an attempt to draft a strategy and implement an action plan for the EU’s area of 
internal security. It responds to pressure for a long-sought internal security counterpart to 
the European (external) Security Strategy (European Council (2003), ‘A Secure Europe in a 
Better World’, 12 December, Brussels). The EU has possessed competences in the domain 
of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) since the 1993 Treaty on European Union (TEU) but these 
were weak and divided across the three pillars. Progress in internal security depended upon 
a complex process of inter-pillar coordination and it was not until the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(ToA) that major steps were taken to develop this area. The ToA brought to an end the 
purely intergovernmental nature of JHA by ‘communitarising’ the fields of asylum, border 
and immigration policy. Since then the Union has been developing a variety of instruments 
and agencies that enable it to be a more effective actor in internal security, with a major 
impetus arising from the post-9/11 threat from international terrorism. The Lisbon Treaty 
collapsed the separate pillar structure of the Union (thereby leaving the UK with the choice 
of whether to opt in to future measures) and has made possible the forging of an Internal 
Security Strategy.   
 
The Contribution of the EU 
 
The EU needs to convince its member states that it has a role to play in internal security. It 
has sought to make that case by demonstrating ‘added value’ in relation to security threats 
that have an explicit transnational dimension. It does this in a number of ways. First, by 
conducting analysis of the threats at a European level that draws on inputs from its member 
states. Second, by co-ordinating the responses of its member states through Europe-wide 
agencies. Third, by reaching out on behalf of its members to other international actors such 
as the US or the UN. An example of where the EU can add value is by identifying European 
level Critical Infrastructure, namely infrastructure which, if disrupted, would have serious 
consequences for two or more member countries.   
 
The fact that the EU role in internal security policy has been growing is evidence that its 
members appreciate the contribution that it can make. In particular, the increasing number 
of EU actors and agencies with competences in internal security supports this contention. 
These include the European Police Office (Europol), the European Judicial Agency (Eurojust), 
the Police Chiefs Operational Task Force (PCOTF), Frontex, the European Police College 
(CEPOL) and the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN). The most 
significant recent addition is the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation in Internal 
Security (COSI). It is hoped, within the expert community in Brussels, that COSI will play a 
central role in pulling the strands of internal security policy together and increasing its 
coherence. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate that there continue to be problems and 
limitations for the EU in this field. Internal security remains a subject over which member 
states maintain tight control and regard as a key aspect of their sovereignty. Operational 
powers to conduct arrests and prosecutions still reside with nationally based police and 
judicial agencies. The constraints imposed upon the EU are illustrated by the slow domestic 
patterns of implementation of European legislation, some of which has extended over years. 
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Both of the EU’s Counter-terrorism Coordinators (CTC) have drawn attention to this 
problem. Similarly, member states have found ways to increase patterns of internal security 
cooperation outside the structures of the Union. The Group of 6, for example, consists of 
some of the larger members who prefer to share intelligence in an ad hoc forum.  
 
Threats 
 
The section of the ISS pertaining to threat perceptions is distinctly modest. It lists several 
important problems but it fails to prioritise between them. It would be true to say that the 
preoccupation with Islamist terrorism over the last decade has led to a neglect of other 
issues. The ISS attempts to re-assert that balance. It refocuses attention upon the challenge 
from international organised crime. This is also one of the five threats highlighted in its 
counterpart, the ESS. The ISS also lists some of the different facets of organised criminal 
activity: drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms smuggling, money-laundering and the sexual 
exploitation of women and children.  
 
In both the ISS and Commission documents, particular attention is devoted to the 
vulnerabilities of borders. Pressure upon the EU’s borders is seen to come from illegal 
migrants entering covertly into the Schengen space or from visitors overstaying visas that 
have expired. The ESS also identified illegal immigration as one of the foremost threats to 
the EU. Borders have become more porous to activities such as drug trafficking as organised 
crime has grown increasingly global in nature. The EU recognises the need to engage 
proactively with neighbouring countries to address internal security threats before they spill-
over the Union’s borders. It is no longer sufficient to believe that a common external border 
will keep out these problems.  
 
The ISS acknowledges that the sorts of threats facing the Union are interlinked in nature and 
exhibit similar characteristics. These include the threat of violence, risks to the integrity of 
financial systems, the abuse of vulnerable citizens and the potential for large-scale fraud. For 
example, the internet can be misused both for the radicalisation of individuals for terrorism 
as well as for the conduct of cybercrime. Just as the threats are interlinked, so are the 
responses for dealing with these problems. Law enforcement and judicial instruments can be 
mobilised to address a range of different security challenges. For example, whilst the 
European Arrest Warrant (EAW) was originally conceived as a way to deal with 
international crime, it has proved to be highly effective in combating terrorism. Similarly, the 
efforts undertaken to protect European critical infrastructure against terrorist attack have 
spin-offs in promoting resilience in the face of natural disasters.  
 
Both documents emphasise the risks associated with weak and failing states. Such countries 
act as potential incubators or sanctuaries for actors with malevolent intent, such as drug 
traffickers, terrorists or people traffickers. This has echoes once again of the ESS: a 
recognition that states with weak governance or security agencies of limited effectiveness 
may be a source of instability for all countries. Whilst the US has tended to treat these 
countries as threats, the EU has tended to offer assistance and expertise. The response from 
the Union has focused upon helping to build capacity in these countries so that they are 
capable of rectifying their weaknesses.  
 
The Values of the EU 
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The principles of transparency and accountability are lauded in these documents. The Lisbon 
Treaty has created a single, more transparent legal framework and rationalised the complex 
and overlapping legal bases on which some of the EU’s agencies were based. The Treaty has 
ended the intergovernmental nature of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and in police 
cooperation and extended majority voting and co-decision between the Council of Ministers 
and the European Parliament. The aim has been to enhance the role of the Parliament. This 
is seen as addressing some of the accountability deficits in this policy field, particularly 
through the involvement of its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. In the 
past there was much criticism of the fact that the Council of Ministers took decisions on 
internal security matters behind closed doors. The involvement of the European Court of 
Justice (EJC), after a transition period of five years, also provides judicial oversight into an 
area of policy that impacts on the rights of citizens of the EU.  
 
The EU has long been criticised for paying disproportionate attention to issues of security, at 
the expense of freedom for its citizens. The Stockholm Programme was an avowed attempt 
to find a better balance between improved security and the rights of European citizens. The 
experience of cooperation with the US in its War on Terror has been salutary: the EU found 
itself critical of American policies on the detention of ‘non-combatants’, extraordinary 
rendition and torture. This has encouraged the Union to place its commitment its citizens’ 
freedoms and the Charter of Fundamental Rights at the centre of its security policies. For 
example, particular attention is paid to the issue of data protection – a topic that has been 
the cause of endless tensions with the United States. The EU still needs to move beyond 
declarations of intent and demonstrate that it is committed to upholding the interests if its 
individual citizens. If security of personal information is really to mean something, then it 
should extend to an individual’s right to challenge the information and test its veracity.   
 
Enhancing Practical Cooperation 
 
Much of the Commission’s ‘Five Strategic Objectives for Internal Security’ seek to build upon 
initiatives that already exist. One of the leading areas, predictably, is counter-terrorism. 
Since the formulation of the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy of 2005, the Union has initiated 
a range of measures and has mobilised an array of agencies and actors to carry these out. 
The Counter-terrorism Strategy contained four elements, all of which are identifiable in the 
Commission’s document.  In particular, the ‘Prevent’ strand is mirrored by Objective 2 on 
preventing terrorism. This focuses on the risks associated with the radicalisation of young 
people in European countries that can be drawn into violent activity through the influence of 
radical preachers and the internet. The Commission had already refined its thinking on this 
subject in an earlier communication, the ‘Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and 
Recruitment to Terrorism’ (Council of the European Union (2005) 14781/1/05 REV 1, 24 
November 2005).  
 
Similarly, Action 2 (under Objective 1) seeks to ‘Cut off terrorists’ access to funding’ and 
this mirrors the ‘Pursue’ strand of the Counter-terrorism Strategy. This aimed to disrupt 
terrorist planning by cutting off their access to funding. Action 2 seeks to develop additional 
financial instruments to seize criminal assets and deny terrorists access to funding through 
cash and wire transfers. It tries to combat the laundering of money and the use of the 
charitable sector for the channelling of illegal funds. The Union draws for its inspiration upon 
the recommendations on Terrorism Funding of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 
 
Memorandum by Professor Wyn Rees (ISS 13) 
63 
Moving beyond the area of counter-terrorism, another of the objectives in the Commission 
Communication is to improve the sharing of law enforcement information relating to 
organised crime. It has long been accepted that intelligence-led policing is the most effective 
instrument and yet the information shared with Europol is known to be patchy at best. In 
order to drive forward the concept of sharing information, the ‘principle of availability’ was 
introduced, generating the expectation that information would be shared where possible 
between member state police forces. Such information includes fingerprints, vehicle 
registration numbers and telephone details. This principle was embodied in the 2005 Treaty 
of Prum that was subsequently absorbed into the Union. The potential to exploit these 
opportunities has increased with the introduction of new data management systems and the 
enhancement of existing systems, such as the Schengen Information System II and the Visa 
Information System  
 
Securing prosecutions, when criminal activity may have been carried out across several legal 
jurisdictions, demands the admissibility of evidence between national judicial systems as well 
as the willingness of courts to respect judicial decisions from neighbouring countries. The 
Commission document appreciates that multi-jurisdictional prosecutions require careful 
planning and coordination. For this purpose Eurojust was established in order to facilitate 
judicial cooperation between member states on complex cases. This is a central part of 
Objectives to disrupt criminal networks as well as build cross-border judicial capacity. 
 
Integrated border management is another area given prominence by the Commission. At the 
heart of the Union’s strategy is an effort to push out the common external border of the 
Schengen states. There are echoes here of the US Strategy for Homeland Security. Like the 
US, the EU has concluded that it must harness the efforts of its neighbours if it is to improve 
significantly the security of its borders. In relation to its central European members, the EU 
has learnt the lesson that it has most influence over other countries during the period that 
they are awaiting accession. The EU has linked overtly the implementation of its internal 
security requirements with the process of accession. Once states have actually joined the 
Union, then its power of persuasion diminishes markedly. The EU envisages a more 
significant role for Frontex in assisting members states and acting as a Europe-wide monitor 
of immigration-related issues. It is also concentrating its attention upon the screening of 
goods in transit – unsurprisingly, in the light of the recent scare with goods air freighted 
from Yemen.  
  
The final issue is that of the security of cyberspace. The EU intends to create a Cybercrime 
Centre, that will draw upon expertise already built up within Europol. By acknowledging the 
importance of cybercrime, the Commission is responding to a groundswell of concern 
amongst its members. The UK’s recent Strategic Defence and Security Review, for example, 
announced £800m in spending to address this challenge. It is evident that the EU needs to 
involve the private sector in this field. The risk to private enterprise is acute and much of the 
expertise for addressing the problem also resides there. Cybercrime is an area where the 
EU can act as an umbrella for all its members and can readily demonstrate its added value. 
 
The Interdependence of Internal and External Security 
 
Both the ISS and the Communication from the European Commission recognise that the 
Union’s internal security has important external dimensions. This in itself is nothing new, it 
was acknowledged in the ESS and was the subject of an EU paper five years ago (See the 
Council of the European Union (2005) ‘A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: 
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Global Freedom, Security and Justice’, 14366/3/05, Brussels, 30 November). It is important 
to note that in the light of the Lisbon Treaty, this dimension is of increased significance due 
to the EU’s enhanced ability to act. Yet the interface within the EU between external 
policies, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP), on the one hand, and JLS on the other, is likely to remain 
problematic. The Lisbon Treaty preserves the intergovernmental nature of CFSP and CSDP 
and their separate decision-making methods. No mechanism has been found to form a 
bridge between internal and external security policies despite the inevitable synergies 
between them.  
 
The part that third countries can play in the security of the Union is accepted in the two 
documents. Third countries can export security problems to the EU and therefore the 
Union has sought to embed internal security provisions in its external policies. For example, 
the EU places requirements in its trade agreements for countries to enter into counter 
terrorism cooperation. Similarly, in relation to illegal migration and asylum, the EU has taken 
steps to obtain cooperation on matters of self-interest from other countries. ‘Readmission 
Agreements’ have been imposed under which countries accept the return of their own failed 
asylum seekers or people who have transited across their territory. The EU has designated 
certain countries as safe from persecution, with the result that asylum seekers from these 
states are immediately determined to have an unfounded claim for sanctuary.  
 
The EU has found that countries that have no prospect of joining the Union have been more 
resistant to its internal security provisions. European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
countries, for example, have been offered trade agreements in return for supporting EU 
policies on migration and the Commission has approved measures to speed up the supply of 
visas for entry into Europe for nationals from compliant states. Yet many ENP countries 
have regarded Union policies as selfish and have been reluctant to participate. Likewise, the 
Russian Federation has been resistant to EU incentives, despite the fact that a Common 
Space of Freedom, Security and Justice was designated with Russia. The Kremlin has 
considered itself to be too important to have its policies moulded by Brussels.   
 
By contrast, the US has been in a different relationship with the EU. Throughout the ISS and 
the Communication from the European Commission, it is striking the importance attached 
to cooperation with the US. In fact, since 9/11, America has been treated as the 28th 
member of the EU: it enjoys a presence in Europol and Eurojust and has signed a range of 
agreements with Brussels on internal security matters. Whilst the EU has reacted to a 
stream of American ‘homeland security’ initiatives, it is less clear what the Europeans have 
received in return from Washington. The US has been an important influence on the 
development of the EU’s model of internal security. This may be about to be taken further. 
Wolfgang Schauble, as German Interior Minister, put forward the idea of a Euro-Atlantic 
area of internal security and this appears to have been taken up within the Commission as 
something worth pursuing.  
 
The last aspect of the external dimension that deserves comment is the global perspective 
discussed in the ISS. This reflects an acknowledgement of the need to build an international 
architecture to make internal security cooperation effective on a global scale. The UN must 
be the focus of this effort as the premier international security organisation. For instance, 
the UN is home of the 2000 Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime. In 2001 it 
passed UN Security Council Resolution 1373 that declared terrorism to be a threat to 
international peace and security and created a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) to 
monitor the compliance of its members with existing UN Conventions. Whilst European 
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governments have been aware of the deficiencies of the UN they have nevertheless been 
attached to the principles of multilateralism and the rule of law and this has meant that they 
have regarded the UN as a vital part of an international campaign. Only in such a way will the 
norms contained within the EU’s approach to internal security de diffused throughout the 
wider international community. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Is there a big, underlying vision in these two documents? The answer is no, there is little in 
the way of a grand objective in either the Internal Security Strategy or the Communication 
from the Commission. Rather, these documents seek to draw together a set of established 
policies into a coherent whole. They build on existing policies and make practical 
improvements. They marry up the internal security agenda - albeit imperfectly - with the 
external security agenda embodied in the ESS. It is part of the vision contained in the 
Stockholm Programme, that is designed to take forward internal security policy over the 
next five years. Better cooperation among law enforcement and judicial authorities are 
designed to address malevolent action, such as organised criminal activity and terrorist 
attacks, whilst close coordination amongst the emergency services of member states are 
designed to deal with natural disasters.  
 
An ‘EU Model of Security’, whilst rather grand sounding, is nevertheless an apt description of 
what is presented in these documents. It is something in its relatively early stages of 
evolution (hence ‘Towards a Security Model’ in the title). It deserves the title of a ‘model’ 
because this policy area of internal security has seen rapid expansion over the last decade. 
Justice, Liberty and Security has been one of the most important growth areas in EU activity. 
Furthermore, it presents an example to surrounding countries because it is being adhered to 
by 27 individual countries. It is one of the EU’s contributions to the creation of a European 
order. This fact has meant that the Union’s neighbours have been forced to conform to its 
model if they wish to enjoy the benefits of interaction with the EU. The influence that the 
EU wields means that other countries are drawn into a web of cooperative relationships. 
 
22 December 2010 
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Symantec welcomes the opportunity to provide input to the Committee’s inquiry into the 
EU’s approach to internal security. Both the EU’s Internal Security Strategy and the recent 
Commission’s Communication rightly highlight the cyber crime and cyber security risks and 
challenges being faced by European government, businesses and citizens. Given the ever 
changing online threat landscape and recent incidents of cyber attacks motivated by specific 
goals, there is clearly a need to protect the increasingly interconnected and interdependent 
ICT systems and networks that span across Europe and play a critical role in the ongoing 
stability and security of the EU as a whole. 
 
Given Symantec’s position as the world’s leader in internet and information security the 
follow comments are provided on the overall scope of the ISS as well as the 
Communication’s Communications key objectives which address risks in cyberspace and 
increasing European resilience to cyber related attacks, namely Objectives 3 and 5. In 
developing these comments Symantec will touch on the topics of interest outlined in the 
Committee’s call for evidence including the role of information exchange and operational 
cooperation.  
 
Overall scope of the EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS)  
 
The publication of the Commission’s Internal Security Strategy played a key role in not only 
identifying the cyber security risks facing the EU but more generally outlining a common 
policy approach and core set of principles. These have provided the foundations upon which 
the Commission’s recent Communication for taking the ISS has been built. Taking a principle 
based approach will ensure the security strategy remains grounded in its core aims and 
objectives whilst also enabling a degree of flexibility which will be needed as the ISS itself 
remains constant while the threat landscape continues to evolve. This flexibility is 
particularly vital when addressing cyber security given the rate at which the online threat 
environment changes and matures. According to the latest Symantec Internet Security 
Threat Report in 2009 alone Symantec created 2,895,802 new malicious code signatures (to 
combat new malware including computer Trojans, worms and viruses)which represents  51 
percent of all malicious code signatures ever created by Symantec. This shows the significant 
continued increase in the number of new global cyber threats. 
 
The ISS’s recognition of the current reality where criminals are taking advantage of “high 
speed communications” to conduct cyber crime is useful to highlight although this is perhaps 
not a new revelation to many Member States including the UK. It is important to remember 
however that different Member States will be at different stages of understanding and 
perhaps experience, of cyber related threats. The ISS can therefore play an important role in 
creating a common European understanding and recognition of the threat from cyber 
criminals who are increasingly organised, coordinated and targeted in their operations which 
continued to be focused on gaining data and information.  
 
The ISS’s acknowledgment that major EU ICT systems and networks are facing cyber 
security risks and that the strategy moving forward must also protect the security, integrity 
and available of key networks is particularly supported by Symantec. Particularly given that 
Member States critical national infrastructures are increasingly built upon and dependent on 
the continued availability and integrity of advanced ICT and as a result a cyber related 
security attack on these systems could lead to a disruption in the service provided or lack of 
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availability of ICT systems in not just one Member State but potentially across a whole 
region. Recent real life example of the power of cyber related attacks include the Estonia 
denial of service attack and more recently the Stuxnet attack which specifically targeted 
energy systems. 
 
The Stuxnet incident provides a real life case study of how such an organised and structured 
cyber attack on critical infrastructure systems can succeed and how they could be used in 
the future.  While details of the attack are still unfolding, with further analysis currently 
taking place, it is estimated that at least four zero day vulnerabilities attacks were involved in 
the incident which allowed attackers to steal confidential Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) design and usage documents for industrial systems such as those used 
by the energy sector. This is the first time that so many zero-day vulnerabilities have been 
exploited in one attack and indicates that the people needed to develop and execute such an 
attack were not amateurs. It is understood that once the attackers gained entry into the 
targeted systems a root kit was used to hide their presence while they targeted software 
within the systems used to control industrial assets and processes. The use of zero-day 
vulnerability, root kit, stolen digital certificates, and in-depth knowledge of SCADA software 
are all high-quality attack assets and points to an estimated group of at possibly up to ten 
people were involved in developing this specific, targeted and technically sophisticated cyber 
attack.  
 
In the past this type of cyber attack focusing on critical national infrastructures were seen by 
many as theoretically a possibility. It is fair to say that most would have dismissed such an 
attack as simply a movie-plot scenario. Symantec believe the Stuxnet attack is clear evidence 
that such attacks are real and a possible threat and are no longer just a theory but a reality 
that European Member States need to prepare for. According  to a recent survey by 
Symantec 53% of all firms surveyed suspected or were pretty sure that they had experience 
an attack on their systems waged with a specific goal in mind. The Stuxnet incident has 
shown that such targeted, organised threats do exist where external actors motivated 
possibly by organised crime, terrorism or even hostile nations, attempt to gain access to 
major ICT systems and networks. 
 
The ISS is therefore correct to identify and highlight the security risks facing such systems 
and networks and how these security risks should be addressed particularly given the 
potential that such incidents could impact more than one Member State. This is of course 
also being addressed in the Commission’s EP3R initiative which Symantec supports and is 
involved with given its focus on the protection and resilience of critical national 
infrastructures.   
 
The ISS is also correct for recognising that unfortunately there will never be a situation 
when there is “zero risk” facing EU citizens. In the online threat environment there is no 
such thing as one hundred percent security as threats and risks continue to evolve at an 
increasingly fast rate. In light of this shifting threat landscape Symantec welcomed the ISS’s 
recognition of the importance of developing trusted relationships between different 
organisations involved in addressing security challenges.  Given the very nature of the online 
environment, there is no one entity, organisations, law enforcement agency or Member 
States that alone can be held responsible or address cyber crime or online security risks.  
The ISS’s recognition that Member States government, law enforcement and industry are 
having a role to play where and when appropriate is supported by Symantec. Addressing 
online security risks is a joint responsibility that must be shared. For Symantec a partnership 
approach where governments, law enforcement along with industry and other key 
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stakeholders work together is key to identifying, addressing and combating cyber security 
threats. 
 
The ISS and the Commission Communication both highlight the role information sharing and 
exchange can play and ensuring operational capabilities exist to address situations if and 
when they occur. The development of Public Private Partnerships is seen by Symantec as 
playing a key role in helping to develop relationships built on mutual trust which can facilitate 
the sharing of threat information and intelligence within a trusted community. However, it is 
suggested that a first step in building a successful partnership is having a common objective 
or concrete goal that the partnership is under agreement to addressing. The purpose, scope 
and mandate of the partnership should be clearly outlined at the beginning of the initiative. In 
addition given the involvement of many different parties in a public private partnership 
approach, particularly in an EU wide context, it is also important that the rules of 
engagement are clearly defined to ensure the parameters within which it will operate are 
clearly understood by all involved. These parameters should include relevant jurisdictional 
and legal requirements that could be involved such as around the sharing of information and 
data protection. The ISS provides a good foundation for such partnerships to be built upon 
and the Commission’s Communication goes forward to outline the aims and objectives of 
such partnerships. In Symantec’s view without taking the time to build and then maintain 
trust, within a partnership approach, the willingness of those involved to share information, 
experience or insights may be put at risk.  Time should therefore be taken to consider which 
parties should be involved in the ISS’s activities going forward and how “mutual trust” can 
best be developed between the identified partners with the understanding that this may not 
simply happen overnight but could take time to develop and build.  
 
Looking ahead a key issue for Symantec is how the ISS will be taken forward. The 
Committee’s inquiry asks for input on how the success of the ISS should be judged. This is a 
fair question which may not be easily answered at this stage. Perhaps an additional question 
that could be asked to is how the success of the ISS should be measured. For example how 
will it be determined, or perhaps judged, that the strategy and actions that will be taken 
forward has had any impact on the security of the EU. While in the case of a natural disaster 
this may be difficult to measure in an area such as cyber crime it is suggested that a 
benchmark study on the level of cyber crime across the EU today could be conducted now 
and then repeated at the end of the ISS’s lifecycle in 2014. The results could then be 
compared to measure the impact of the EU strategy. An understanding of the measure by 
which success will be determined will however be key. For example metrics related to a 
specific problem or issue can be useful in determining where a particular project or initiative 
has resulted in a positive change or impact on a cyber security threat or risk perhaps to a 
particular sector or section of society. 
 
Objective 3: Raise levels of security for citizens and businesses in cyberspace 
 
Symantec also agrees with the Commission’s Communication that encouraging greater 
cooperation between Member States to address security issues, particularly cyber security is 
important. Of course Symantec continues to also support the call for continued international 
cooperation given the fact that cyber security is a global problem that requires a global 
solution which needs international cooperation and collaboration.  
 
While it is still not fully clear what role the proposed creation of an “EU Cybercrime 
Centre” would in fact play the proposal is welcomed in theory by Symantec at this time. 
Clearly the results of the proposed feasibility study are needed to move this idea forward. 
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On the basis of the results of this study further discussion and debate should be held on the 
overall aims and objectives of the centre and how the centre’s work might be structured. 
These discussions should include input from industry as Symantec believes a public-private 
partnership approach should be included in the development of such a centre. Public private 
partnerships have been shown around the world to play a key tool to addressing cyber 
security issues and should be integral to the development of any cybercrime centre for 
Europe. A partnership approach can bring all those impacted by cyber security incidents 
together to share information and form a common vision of cyber threats as well as share 
knowledge and information needed to not only identify a threat but also take steps to 
proactively address such risks. Further discussion and insight would also be welcomed on 
how the work of an EU Cybercrime Centre could be coordinated or linked with the 
operations of other bodies currently already undertaking work in this area in the EU 
including ENISA, Europol and European Defence Agency (EDA).  
 
The proposal to enable EU citizens to report cybercrime incidents and to have access to 
information on online safety is supported.  A European wide reporting capability would be an 
important step forward, not only for citizens but also to build a clearer picture of the 
cybercrime landscape across all Member States. It will be important however that when this 
clear picture does emerge law enforcement bodies in all Member States are allocated 
sufficient funds and trained individuals to take action accordingly to address the level or 
types of crimes that may be identified.  
 
Given that the ongoing security of the EU will depend heavily on the continued availability 
and resilience of critical national infrastructures and therefore the natural cross over in the 
security aims and objectives between the ISS and EP3R it is seen as important that the 
activities developed in the EP3R work are recognised and incorporated in the work of the 
ISS going forward. More importantly the ISS should not seek to duplicate work already being 
developed by the EP3R but support its efforts.   
 
The action in Objective 3 for all Member States to establish centres of excellence is seen as 
key to improving the capability within all Member States to be prepared for and where 
possible prevent cyber security incidents. Member States should be prepared to act if a 
cyber incident occurs that may impact their citizens. As the ISS states Member States cannot 
and should not work in isolation. However it is not clear from the Commission 
Communication whether the activities of these national centres of excellence will be 
coordinated in any way or to what extent the work of these centres could possibly feed in 
the work of the proposed EU cybercrime centre. While both Member States activities and 
the development to a EU wide capacity for addressing cyber security issues are needed in 
light of the overall objective of the ISS is to encourage greater cooperation and 
collaboration, it is suggested that activities in the area of cyberspace should (as much as 
possible) be coordinated and encourage Member States to co-operate, share best practice 
and learn from each other’s experiences.   
 
The Commission’s Communication call for all Member States to have a CERT in place by 
2012 is particularly welcomed. CERT’s play an important role for providing a national focal 
point for information, guidance, providing warning, reports and alerts. The CERT model is 
flexible to enable Member States to develop multiple CERTS, or different types of CERTS, 
depending on the particular requirements and needs based on the type of risk or threat 
activity that may need to be covered. Although it should perhaps be remembered that many 
EU Member States already have in place CERTs and have done for some time Symantec 
supports the Communication’s support for CERTS and sees the further development as 
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envisaged by the Commission’s Communication as an appropriate means of sharing 
information and encouraging a collaborative approach to addressing cyber related issues 
within, and between, all Member States.  
 
The proposed creation of a European Information Sharing and Alert System (EISAS) is 
also highlighted in the action plan.  It is important to underline that the development of 
any common European system in this area should recognizes and take into account the 
current activities of the private sector and the solutions and tools already developed 
given the current online threat environment. Given the experience of industry in this 
area it is important that ways are found to involve those in industry with the technical 
capabilities, skills and expertise in the development of any European approach.  
 
The suggestion that Member States, along with ENISA, should develop national plans to 
response to cyber incidents that national and EU exercises should be conducted is also 
supported. Symantec has already participated in cyber security incident exercises across the 
world and believe such activities play an important role in testing responses and preparing 
for possible incidents. However any exercises that are planned should not only include the 
CERT community as proposed, but the wider ICT industry given its role in addressing cyber 
security incidents. In addition it is highlighted once more that any activities or exercises that 
are developed should be mindful of and where possible planned and coordinated with 
activities that may be organised through other EU initiatives such as ENISA and those being 
proposed in the E3PR project or other bodies such as NATO. 
 
Objective 5:  Increase Europe’s Resilience to crises and disasters 
 
The overall recognition by the Commission Communication of the risk and threat to EU 
critical national infrastructures from cyber attack is seen by Symantec as key given the level 
of threat this risk poses to the future security of all EU Member States and the EU.  A shift 
towards greater interoperability between interconnected European wide IT networks and 
systems, particularly those involved in provision of critical infrastructures, means a targeted 
cyber attack on one Member State has the potential to have a cascading effect and impact on 
other connected systems.  It is therefore vital that adequate levels of protection are in place 
that can identify security risks to major IT and ICT based systems and networks in real time 
and ensure operational capabilities are deployed to mitigate such security threats quickly and 
effectively. As outlined earlier in this submission, the recent Stuxnet attack represents a real 
life example of how threats designed to gain access to and reprogram industrial control 
networks and systems could have an impact on critical national systems and infrastructure 
such as energy and utilities.  
 
The emphasis placed on the role of threat and risk assessments at an EU level is supported 
by Symantec. Only by identifying potential risks and security threats can effective and 
appropriate prevention measures be put in place to mitigate such risks. Also welcomed is 
the call for a “coherent” overall risk management policy to be in place by 2014. Clearly this 
timescale gives the EU and Member States time to take the necessary steps towards having 
in place an effective risk based policy to increasing resilience and disaster management. It is 
suggested that the first step that should be prioritised in this process is an EU wide threat 
assessment. Only by identifying the cyber security threats facing the EU can a risk 
management policy be put in place that are appropriate to managing these specific risks. To 
develop an effective risk management approach requires an understanding of the risks 
involved which requires threat intelligence information to be collected, analysed and 
evaluated.  
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For Symantec an appropriate approach to addressing possible security threats requires both 
prevention against incidents occurring as well as preparedness to act if and when an incident 
may occur.  In this light the call for the need for a “proactive, intelligence-led approach” to 
addressing security risks is supported by Symantec particularly when it comes to cyber 
related security risks.  A key component of being prepared to deal with a cyber security 
incident is having the right information at the right time to consider the possible threat or 
risk and take action as and when necessary. As mentioned above having real time threat 
intelligence information that can be analysed by experts and shared amongst partners can 
assist in the assessment of a risk and enable a timely response to the threat situation or 
incident by deploying appropriate operational capabilities to address specific security risks. 
However it is not clear as yet from the ISS or the communication how threat intelligence 
information may be collected and where the responsibility will rest to coordinate such 
activities and conduct the risk evaluation of the information gathered in order to enable the 
dissemination of threat intelligence as and when appropriate.  
 
Given the complex cyber ecosystem of the internet it is suggested that the threat 
information, technical intelligence and cyber security related expertise and advice that 
may be needed to support such EU efforts to address cyber related incidents will reside 
across a number of different sources both inside and outside of government. For example 
it is estimated that 90% of critical national infrastructures that are increasingly reliant on 
interconnected networks and systems, and therefore a possible target for cyber attacks, 
are privately owned and managed. As a result public and private sector co-operation and 
collaboration  is seen as a key factor to assisting not only the government but also 
industry to identify, assess and evaluate the level of seriousness of cyber related incidents 
and better prepare for and react to a cyber incidents. Symantec believes that information 
sharing is a fundamental component of a modern cyber security strategy and that the 
development of trusted information sharing networks and systems a key element to the 
development of successful public and private cooperation in this area.    
 
Therefore action 3 in Objective 5 to develop situational awareness centres so that the EU 
can take a more integrated and common approach to crisis situations is welcomed. Although 
it is not clear from the communication whether the work of these awareness centres might 
be coordinate with the actions outlined in objective 3 related to cyberspace security. For 
example situational awareness centres could play a role in providing real time threat analysis 
information to the activities of CERTs and also provide intelligence and situational awareness 
to the proposed EU Centre for Cybercrime. Also it is not clear how these situational 
awareness centres would relate to the development of a common European Information 
Sharing and Alert System (EISAS).  It is suggested that the Commission consider further 
whether, or to what extent, all these activities could be coordinated in some way going 
forward.  
 
Symantec supports the Communication’s recognition of the importance of having the right 
technology and solutions in place to address security incidents effectively.  Clearly as 
implementation of the ISS moves forward this will be conducted at a time where all are 
acutely aware of the cost challenges that we all face in the current economic climate. 
Organizations across the whole of EU from all sectors are being faced with the same 
challenges around reducing costs. At the same time however the increase in cyber threats 
and attacks on high profile organizations and critical national infrastructure systems are also 
a reality being faced and recognized in the ISS. This reality raises many issues and questions 
as to how the ISS can be taken forward in a way that is most cost effective and efficient 
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whilst also achieving the aims and objectives outlined. Clearly cost is going to be a factor for 
all Member States but so is the need to ensure Member States have in place the necessary 
technologies and solutions, particularly in the fight against cyber crime and the need to 
protect and secure critical EU networks, systems and critical infrastructures from potential 
security challenges from cyber attacks. Given the actions outlined particularly in Objective 3 
and 5 Symantec feel it is important that Member States recognize the importance of having 
in place up to date, effective and appropriate technologies to execute the cyber security 
strategy effectively and achieve the aims the ISS is seeking.   
 
December 2010 
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Introduction 
 
Terrorism is a special type of political violence,97 not a synonym for political violence in 
general.  It is the deliberate use or threat of extreme violence to create a climate of fear.  It 
is usually aimed at intimidating a wider target than the immediate victims of terrorist attacks 
and it involves attacks on civilians, symbolic and random targets as well as elements of the 
critical infrastructure and the wider economy.  It is usually (though not exclusively) aimed at 
bringing about political change. 
 
It is important to recognise that there are many types of terrorism.98  Historically the most 
lethal and destructive has been state or regime terror.  In the first half of the 20th century 
the Hitler and Stalin regimes used the weapon on a colossal scale, both against their own 
populations and the peoples of countries they had occupied.  This reminds us that terror is 
not always the weapon of the weak.  It is precisely because state terror is implemented by 
the armed forces, secret police and police, with all the weaponry and manpower they can 
deploy that it is so effective, at least in the short and medium term, in suppressing 
opposition and sustaining systems of brutal dictatorship and totalitarian one-party rule.99 
 
In the post-Cold War world there are still many regimes using the weapon of terror,100 and, 
as recent cases have demonstrated, the international community has as yet failed to find 
effective and democratically legitimate ways of halting, or even radically curtailing the mass 
violations of human rights by regimes of terror. 
 
In the case of non-state terrorism a basic distinction can be made between internal or 
domestic terrorism confined to the borders of a single state and international terrorism 
involving the citizens and/or jurisdiction of more than one state.  Terrorism becomes truly 
transnational when it crosses the borders of numerous states.101 
 
It is also useful to categorise terrorism groups by their overall political motivation and 
objectives.  For example, there are ethno-separatist groups such as ETA (Euzkadi Ta 
Askatasuna, Basque Fatherland and Liberty) and the Real IRA which claim to be struggling for 
the ‘self-determination’ of a specific ethnic group.  Ideological terrorists are those groups 
with extreme left or extreme right objectives involving reshaping the political and/or socio-
economic systems of their respective countries.  Examples would be the Red Brigades in 
                                            
97 For a valuable discussion of the concept of terrorism see Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman et al, Political Terrorism: A 
New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature, Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Co., 
1988 
98 David Rapoport provides a useful historical interpretation of different types of terrorism in his article ‘The Four Waves 
of Modern Terrorism’ in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Eds) Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand 
Strategy, Washington D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2004.  See also Paul Wilkinson ‘Why Modern Terrorism? 
Differentiating Types and Distinguishing Ideological Motivations in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., The New Global Terrorism: 
Characteristics, Causes, Controls,, Upper Saddle River, NJ, Prentice Hall, 2003 
99 For classic accounts of totalitarian systems see, for example, Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 3rd Edition, 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1967, and Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslaner, Political Terrorism Communist System, 
Standard, Calif, Stanford University Press, 1970. 
100 The annual reports of Amnesty International give abundant evidence of the continuing use of the weapon of terror by 
regimes in many parts of the world. 
101 Al Qaeda is an example of a truly transnational movement because it has demonstrated its ability to mount attacks in 
different countries, and aims to change the whole international system.  There are many groups which confine their attacks 
to the countries where their chosen enemy regime is in power but which also employ support networks overseas to supply 
finance, weapons, and to conduct propaganda and, in some cases, recruitment for their respective groups.  These groups 
would be more accurately designated ‘international’. 
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Italy,102 the Red Army Faction103 in Germany and the Vlanmse Militante Orde (VMO) in 
Belgium.  Single issue terrorist groups such as violent animal rights extremists and violent 
anti-abortion groups are also present in several western countries.  The single-issue groups 
unlike the ideological terrorists seek only to change one aspect of society and public policy.  
They are not trying to alter the entire political and socio-economic system.  Most troubling 
for both Europe and the wider international community there is the challenge from 
transnational religio-political terrorism from the Al Qaeda movement and its widely 
dispersed network of affiliates and support networks around the world.104 
 
Europe has experienced terrorist attacks and threats of attacks from all the types of 
terrorist groups listed above.  However, by far the most dangerous of these threats at the 
time of writing (2010) is from the transnational religio-political terrorism of the Al Qaeda 
movement and its affiliates and support network. 
 
However, it is vital to enter a word of caution at this point.  European governments and 
their counterterrorist agencies cannot afford to neglect continuing threats from the other 
types of terrorist groups, such as ethno-separatist extremists, ideological groups, single issue 
groups and state-sponsored terrorist groups which remain active and capable of attacks.  
Hence, counter-terrorism has to deal simultaneously with ‘traditional’ terrorist groups, the 
major challenge of the Al Qaeda movement and its network, and newly emerging groups.  
The complexity of this task in our open democratic societies in Europe should not be 
underestimated. 
 
It calls for the highest quality of intelligence, policing and judicial coordination and skill within 
our national systems, on a pan-European scale,105 and globally. 
 
In arguing that the threat from Al Qaeda’s transnational network is the worst terrorist 
challenge faced by Europe, I do not mean to imply that it is the worst security threat faced 
by Europe or by the international community as a whole.  It is just as foolish to exaggerate 
the terrorist threat as it is to underestimate or ignore it.  On the global security agenda 
dramatically rapid climate change and war between nuclear weapon states are clearly far 
more serious longer term threats to peace and security.  This is not in any way to suggest 
that we can afford to ignore transnational terrorism from the Al Qaeda network.  We must 
bear in mind that Al Qaeda has already succeeded in triggering war in Southwest Asia and 
that it is showing determined efforts to acquire its own weapons of mass destruction 
(wmd).106  We should try to keep a sense of perspective in assessing the terrorist threat. 
 
In analysing trends in terrorism by far the best guide we have is a careful study of the history 
and track record of particular terrorist movements/networks, their ideologies, objectives, 
                                            
102 On these European ideological groups, see Donatella della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A 
Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995 and Peter H Merkl, ‘West 
German Left-Wing Terrorism’, in Martha Crenshaw (Ed.), Terrorism in Context, University Park, PA, Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1995, pp160-210 
103 On ideological terrorism in West Germany see also the perceptive account by Jillian Becker in Hitler’s children: the 
Story of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, St Albans, Granada, 1978 
104 On the development of terrorist networks see Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia, University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005, and Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for New Ummah, New York, Columbia University Press, 2006 
105 For a discussion of European cooperation against international terrorism see Paul Wilkinson, ‘International Terrorism: 
The Changing Threat and the EU’s Response’, Chaillot Paper No. 84, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 
October 2005 
106 When allied forces entered former Al Qaeda premises in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001 
they discovered documentary and video evidence that Al Qaeda had been studying and experimenting with wmd material.  
For example, one video, later shown on CBS TV News, showed dogs being exposed to poison gas. 
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modus operandi and demonstrated capabilities.  We must now proceed to apply this to the 
current Al Qaeda network.  By so doing we can gain insights into the characteristics and 
likely behaviour of the movement, its strengths and weaknesses, and the lessons that can be 
learned from the brief history of efforts to tackle Al Qaeda terrorism around the world.107 
 
All the above are key requisites for an informed assessment of the current and emerging 
threats from international terrorism.  But by themselves they are not going to be enough: 
we also need to pay attention to significant developments in the global strategic environment 
and their potential impact on transnational terrorism.  For example, what could be the likely 
effects of a possible change in US presidential leadership?  Or suppose several states in 
possession of nuclear or other forms of wmd began to employ state sponsored terrorism on 
a major scale, with the danger of the conflict escalating to full-scale interstate war and all the 
death and destruction emanating from such a conflict?  We also need to consider the 
possibility of an environmental disaster or a major insurgency providing a terrorist group 
with an unexpected opportunity to acquire wmd material, possibly including weapons grade 
uranium.  Such developments could radically alter the threat assessment relating to the 
group acquiring such materials, especially in the case of a group which has already acquired 
the necessary expertise to weaponise them. 
 
Origins and Ideology of Al Qaeda 
 
The key ideas in Al Qaeda’s ideology were derived from Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian Islamist 
who taught that the world is divided between those who live strictly in accordance with the 
Shari’a (Islamic religious law) and the infidel (unbelievers) who do not submit to Islamic law 
and who live in the world of darkness.  Qutb believed that all Muslim believers have a duty 
to wage holy war in order to establish Shari’a rule not only in Egypt but globally.  He 
regarded both the ‘infidel’ governments of the United States and other western countries, 
and the secular Arab regimes he accused of collaborating with them, as legitimate targets of 
jihad.  Qutb visited the United States and was outraged by what he saw as the depravity and 
hedonistic materialism of the American way of life.  He returned to the Middle East more 
determined than ever that it was the duty of all faithful Muslims to wage jihad not only 
against the west but also against the secular regimes of the Arab world which he regarded as 
‘apostates’ because of their willingness to cooperate with the US and other western states 
and to allow western secularism and materialism to influence their societies.  It should be 
noted that Qutb’s concept of jihad was not limited to a spiritual struggle: he believed that 
faithful Muslims should prepare for physical confrontation with the western powers and with 
‘apostate’ regimes in the Middle East.108 
 
Osama bin Laden came under the influence of Abdallah Azzam, a follower of Qutb’s ideas 
and a teacher of Islamic Law at King Abdul-Aziz University, Jeddah, while he was a student at 
the same university.109 Later bin Laden was to become a key figure in the Makhtab al-
Khidmat (Services Office) which had been founded by Abdallah Azzam and which was 
recruiting volunteers and raising funds for the Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation all 
around the world.  This experience provided bin Laden with an ideal opportunity to 
disseminate the ideas he had acquired from Qutb and Azzam to radical Islamist groups in 
                                            
107 An interesting and very constructive analysis on these lines is Daniel Byman’s The Five Front War: The Better Way to 
Fight Global Jihad, Hoboken, NJ, John Wiley and Sons, Inc, 2008. 
108 Quoted in Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, New York, Random House,, 2002, p.66 
109  Abdallah stated ‘jihad is every man’s duty’ in cases were foreigners occupy Muslim lands.  See Giles Kepel, Jihad: The 
Trail of Political Islam, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, P. 318 
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many countries.110 In 1988/89 Osama bin Laden and Abdallah Azzam founded Al Qaeda 
(‘The Base’) and many of the groups which bin Laden had been in contact with were later to 
become affiliates and networks in Al Qaeda’s global jihad.111 
 
From the outset, bin Laden appears to have aimed to be the ‘emir’ or leader of the Al Qaeda 
movement.  Abdallah Azzam died in rather mysterious circumstances and so Osama bin 
Laden’s one really serious contender for the leadership position was removed from the 
scene.  It is also clear that from the beginning Al Qaeda (‘The Base’) was seen as the hub of a 
global network of affiliate militant groups functioning as a transnational movement.  Al 
Qaeda declared a jihad against the US and its allies and set up a ‘World Islamic Front for 
Jihad’, declaring that it is the duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens – civilians or military, and 
their allies everywhere,112 including Israel and Muslim regimes/governments which Al Qaeda 
regards as ‘apostates’ because of their friendly relations with the US and other western 
countries. 
 
In 1992 Al Qaeda claimed to have mounted bomb attacks against US troops in Aden.  In 
1993 it claimed to have shot down US helicopters and killed US servicemen in Somalia.  Well 
before the mass lethality attacks against the US on 9/11 2001, Al Qaeda had demonstrated 
that its chosen method of asymmetric conflict against the US was terrorism.  The 
coordinated no warning suicide bombing attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania 
in August 1998, killing over 240 and injuring over 5,000 should have served as a warning to 
the US government of worse to come. 
 
In the next section I shall be examining Al Qaeda’s track record of terrorist attacks 
particularly 9/11 and major attacks on European targets.  Ultimately Al Qaeda aims to 
establish a pan-Islamist caliphate (super-state) uniting all Muslims, thus changing the entire 
international system in accordance with its ideology.  As this would necessitate Al Qaeda 
seizing control of all Muslim countries this seems an utterly unrealistic objective, but we 
must bear in mind that Al Qaeda militants believe that they are holy warriors fighting for 
Allah, that Allah is on their side and that this means they will ultimately be victorious over 
the infidel of the Great Satan and all the lesser Satan’s.  They work on a different timeline 
from that of western societies and declare their readiness to continue their struggle 
however long it may take. 
 
Why the Al Qaeda is the worst Terrorist Threat Faced by the International Community 
 
Brian Jenkins once correctly observed that the terrorist groups of the 1970s and early 80s 
‘wanted a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead’113 Al Qaeda and its affiliates want 
both a lot of people dead and a lot of people watching.  The 9/11 attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon were the most lethal attacks by a non-state organisation in 
the history of modern terrorism.114 They have shown no remorse about the number of 
innocent lives including those of fellow Muslims, they have destroyed.  Moreover, their 
typical weapon has been no-warning coordinated suicide attacks, the most difficult type of 
terrorism to prevent in ‘open’ democratic societies such as those in Europe. 
                                            
110 Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc.  Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, New York, Free Press, 2002 
111 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qa’ida, New York, Columbia University Press, 2002 
112 Statement issues announcing formation of the ‘World Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders’, 
February 1998 
113 Brian M. Jenkins, Will Terrorists go Nuclear?, Santa Monica, Calif, RAND Paper p.5541, p4 
114 For the most thorough investigation into these attacks see Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, New York, N W Norton & Co. 
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Secondly, Al Qaeda’s network has global reach: it is the most widely dispersed international 
terrorist movement in history with a presence in at least 60 countries. 
 
Although Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, his deputy, and Al Qaeda central provide 
the ideological and strategic direction to the movement, its global network is a complex of 
cells and affiliated organisations, including support networks, which enable them to mount 
operations in most parts of the world.  For example, their close affiliate in S.E. Asia, Jemaah 
Islamiyah, has carried out major attacks in Indonesia, and the Egyptian group al-Jihad, led by 
Ayman Zawahiri, merged with Al Qaeda in 1998 and Zawahiri became Osama bin Laden’s 
deputy.  More recent examples of affiliates are Al Qaeda in Iraq, which has recently suffered 
a major backlash from Iraqi Sunni leaders angry at Al Qaeda’s brutal methods and 
oppression, and Al Qaeda in the land of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  This affiliate comprises 
the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, 
and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.  In 2008 it was reported that Al Qaeda-linked cells 
had been established in Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Senegal and Niger.  From open sources alone 
it has been possible to verify the presence of Al Qaeda-linked groups in 60 countries.  The 
US intelligence community estimates that they are present in 90 countries. 
 
Al Qaeda’s global reach is one of the factors which make it particularly difficult to assess 
their prospects of long term success.  Just as they appear to be knocked back in Iraq, at least 
at time of writing (2010), so they are consolidating their position in the mountainous 
northwest frontier areas of Pakistan where bin Laden and key members of Al Qaeda 
‘Central’ are thought to be hiding.  The Pakistani Army has suffered heavy losses in clashes 
with Al Qaeda, and the newly established government in Pakistan seems willing to negotiate 
with the warlords who have been supporting Al Qaeda, much to the fury of the US 
government. 
 
Another important reason why Al Qaeda is the worst terrorist threat to the international 
community is that its leaders seem to be incorrigible.  That is to say there is no sign of a 
more pragmatic political strategy emerging in the movement.  They are bitterly opposed to 
democracy, which they see as a despicable western secular idea, and they show no sign of 
being willing to compromise on their core ideological beliefs and objectives.   There have 
been recent suggestions that the UK government (and presumably other European 
governments) should start negotiations with Al Qaeda.  The harsh truth is that Al Qaeda is 
not simply a bigger international version of the IRA.  The IRA’s aims were limited to bringing 
about radical change in Ireland.  They were not trying to change the whole international 
system.  Moreover they had a very active political front which has now succeeded in 
transforming itself into the largest political party of the Catholic minority in Northern 
Ireland.  Above all the IRA’s leaders became convinced that there was a political pathway to 
gaining some if not all their objectives.  There is no comparable political pathway in the case 
of Al Qaeda, and it is a dangerous misapprehension to assume that bin Laden’s network is a 
suitable partner for negotiations with democratic governments.  The only alternative is to 
combat this particularly lethal terrorist movement by expert internationally coordinated 
intelligence, police and judicial cooperation, ensuring that the rule of law and the principles 
of human rights protection are not sacrificed in the name of ‘national security’. 
 
Perhaps the most worrying aspect of the Al Qaeda movement, and the most powerful 
reason for recognising it as posing the most serious terrorism threat to international peace 
and security is the intense interest it has shown in acquiring the necessary expertise, 
technology and materials to construct CBRN weapons.  In a notorious statement issued as 
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early as 1998 Osama bin Laden said it was the duty of Muslims to prepare the maximum 
force to terrorise the infidel enemy.  The statement was entitled ‘The Nuclear Bomb of 
Islam’.  There have been many reports of Al Qaeda seeking to obtain wmd from former 
Soviet Union countries and trying to buy uranium, presumably to make an atomic bomb.  
Most experts on CBRN weaponry emphasise the considerable technological problems 
involved in trying to construct a viable atomic bomb.  However, even if the terrorists were 
only able to make a relatively crude low-kiloton device it would greatly increase Al Qaeda’s 
ability to blackmail potential targets and to massacre much larger numbers of civilians than 
can be achieved using conventional weapons.  For all these reasons I believe that since the 
emergence of Al Qaeda the threat of transnational terrorists using some form of CBRN 
weaponry has increased from low probability to medium probability.115 
 
Nor is there any evidence that Al Qaeda’s interest in acquiring such a capability has 
decreased.116 
 
Al Qaeda’s Track Record and Modus Operandi 
 
In a brief article it is not practicable to include a comprehensive chronology of Al Qaeda 
attacks, disrupted and pre-empted conspiracies to attack and threats.  Clearly many of these 
events and attacks involve the Middle East, South and South East Asia, Africa and North 
America.  There have been a number of attacks and disrupted pre-empted attacks on 
European targets, and this should remind us that Al Qaeda certainly regards Europeans and 
European cities, gathering places, civil aviation, trains, shopping centres and markets, 
commercial offices and critical infrastructure as legitimate targets. 
 
Al Qaeda-linked groups have also been responsible for killing large numbers of Europeans in 
its attacks on targets overseas.  For example, large numbers died in the 9/11 attacks on New 
York, the Bali bombings and attacks on overseas embassy and consular buildings. 
 
The general public tend to ignore or forget disrupted and pre-empted attacks, but it should 
be borne in mind that if it had not been for the successful intervention of the French and 
German police and intelligence services ,the first mass lethality attack by Al Qaeda against 
western citizens would not have been 9/11, it would have been the planned attack on the 
busy market beside Strasbourg Cathedral on New Year’s Eve in 2000, a time when the 
market would have been packed with Christmas and New Year revellers and visitors.  Four 
Algerians accused of plotting the attack were convicted in a Frankfurt court of conspiring to 
murder.117 
 
Among the targets Jemmah Islamiyah (an Al Qaeda affiliate) planned to attack in Singapore in 
the autumn of 2001 was the British Embassy.  When Al Qaeda used a petrol tanker filled 
with explosives to attack the synagogue at Djerba, Tunisia, in April 2002, 21 people, most of 
them German tourists, were killed in the attack.  And in October 2002 Al Qaeda carried out 
a suicide attack on a French oil tanker, MV Limburg off the coast of Yemen, killing one 
member of the crew and injuring 4. 
 
                                            
115 For interesting discussions of the possibility of nuclear terrorism see Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman, and Bradley 
Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1998, and Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate 
Preventable Catastrophe, New York, Times Books, Henry Hold & Co. 2004 
116 But for interesting views for and against this view see Max Taylor and John Horgan (Eds.) ‘The Future of Terrorism in 
Europe’, a symposium published in Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11 No. 4 Winter 1999 
117 ‘Four convicted of Strasbourg bomb plot’, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/10/germany.France 
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Nor has Europe been spared mass fatality attacks by Al Qaeda-linked cells.  In March 2004 a 
Moroccan cell based in Spain carried out a massive bombing of trains at Madrid railway 
stations, killing 191 and injuring 2051.  In July 2005 an Al Qaeda-linked cell carried out 
suicide bombings of London Underground trains and a double-decker bus, killing 52 and 
injuring 700.  There was a further bombing attempt in London on 21st July but it failed and 
the perpetrators were captured and brought to justice. 
 
In 2007, 42 people were convicted of terrorist offences relating to 16 known operations. 
Half of them pleaded guilty.118 Some of the plots prevented by the work of the intelligence 
and police services would have undoubtedly led to large numbers of deaths and injuries.  
Improved intelligence and police cooperation also led to conspiracies being thwarted in 
Germany, France, Italy, Germany and Belgium.  In June 2008 there was a massive bomb 
attack on the Danish Embassy in Pakistan.  It is believed to have been carried out by Al 
Qaeda.  There is certainly no evidence for believing that European countries and citizens 
have ceased to be seen as legitimate targets in the eyes of Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda-linked 
cells. 
 
There have been numerous reminders that Al Qaeda linked groups are determined to attack 
targets in Europe, including airliners departing from European airports.  For example a group 
of Al Qaeda linked terrorists have been convicted for plotting to blow up 7 airliners leaving 
Heathrow for north American destinations, using liquid explosives.  If their plan had 
succeeded the death toll might well have matched that of the 9/11 attacks.  On Christmas 
Day 2009, a young Nigerian allegedly attempted to blow up an airliner as it approached 
Detroit having boarded the plane at Amsterdam.  In 2010 European Governments were 
warned that Al Qaeda planned multiple Mumbai-style attacks on European cities, and in the 
autumn, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) threatened to attack civil aviation by 
planting bombs in air cargo.  Devices were found on board an aircraft that landed at East 
Midlands Airport and on an aircraft bound for Germany, flying from Namibia.  Al Qaeda 
propaganda repeatedly threatens attacks on European NATO states deploying troops in 
Afghanistan.  Intensive efforts by intelligence services and police in close cooperation with 
foreign intelligence services have helped to thwart or at least seriously disrupt, some major 
terrorist conspiracies.  However, intelligence is an art, not a science.  It will not always 
succeed in pre-empting attacks.  Europe is right to play its part in the wider struggle against 
the Al Qaeda network, a struggle that needs to be waged globally.  The threat to Europe’s 
internal security and the global struggle against international terrorism are inextricably 
intertwined.   
 
Major Conducive Conditions for the Spread of the Al Qaeda Network 
 
Al Qaeda and its affiliates exploit both religious and political motivations in their ideological 
and propaganda messages to potential recruits and supporters.  Potential suicide bombers 
are told that if they carry out acts of voluntary self-sacrifice or martyrdom they will go to 
Paradise and be rewarded by Allah.  Al Qaeda constantly portrays the Muslim world as being 
‘victimised’ by the US and other western states, and claims that it is true defender of Islam.  
Hence, wherever there is a religious fault-line between Muslims and non-Muslims around the 
world Al Qaeda claims to be the only true protector of the Muslim community. 
 
                                            
118 See Home Secretary Jacqui Smith’s speech at the first International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence 
in London, called terrorism 'a crime that doesn't discriminate.' 27th January 2008. 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/news/ct-speech-08  
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However, as was noted in the Introduction to this article, Al Qaeda can best be described as 
a religio-political movement because it also plays on and magnifies hatreds, grievances and 
resentments against the US and the western world generally.  They incite hatred of the US 
and its foreign policies and allies.  They magnify the already latent hatred of Israel and all 
countries that cooperate with Israel.  They blame the US in particular for its major political 
and financial support for Israel.  And they continually stir up hatred and resentment against 
the regimes in the Muslim world which have in many cases suppressed fundamentalist 
Islamist movements (e.g. Egypt, Jordan) and those regimes that have blocked them gaining 
power via the ballot box (e.g. in Algeria in 1991). 
 
It is also very important to take into account a number of sociological influences which have 
a particularly crucial part in helping Al Qaeda to recruit and mobilise its militant followers.  
For example, many young men in the Muslim communities in Europe see themselves as being 
treated as second class citizens and robbed of their identity – i.e. no longer part of the 
traditional world of Islam, and not accepted as full citizens of countries where they now 
reside.  In many cases the sense of alienation felt through this loss of identity is reinforced by 
failure to gain employment or to rise up to the socio-economic ladder, even when they have 
acquired suitable educational and professional qualifications. 
 
Another sociological factor which must not be underestimated is the spread of the internet 
and other global media of communication enabling individuals anywhere in the world to gain 
access to Al Qaeda network propaganda, images of conflict and alleged victimisation etc., and 
to instructions on explosives, weaponry etc.  It is surely significant that in all the recent trials  
of suspected Al Qaeda-linked terrorists in the UK which have resulted in convictions 
prosecution evidence includes reference to the fact that the accused was accessing 
substantial amounts of Al Qaeda propaganda and practical guidance via the internet.  Indeed 
it seems theoretically possible for a ‘loner’ terrorist to obtain all the incitement 
indoctrination and training required to become an Al Qaeda operative from the internet 
alone.  However, it is necessary to enter a word of caution here.  It is quite rare to find a 
case of loner terrorism of the kind practised by the ‘Unabomber’ in the US.  In almost every 
case of Al Qaeda attacks and conspiracies small groups or cells have been involved.  
Terrorism is quintessentially a group phenomenon, with leaders, bomb-makers, couriers and 
other individuals working together in teams to carry out or support particular operations.  
Nevertheless in a transnational terrorist movement the value of the internet as a method of 
communication is particularly significant and serves to make the term ‘home-grown terrorist’ 
a contradiction in terms when applied to the Al Qaeda movement. 
 
Triggering Conditions for Recruitment into the Al Qaeda Network 
 
In addition to the above general religious, political and sociological factors which are 
conducive to Al Qaeda radicalisation and recruitment there are a number of precipitant 
events or experiences that may be important in pushing an individual in Al Qaeda’s direction 
and making them more vulnerable to being identified, targeted, groomed and indoctrinated. 
 
For example, the individual may be influenced by peer group pressure, particularly from 
strong charismatic personalities.  The individual may want to express their anger and outrage 
at specific events (e.g. the US/UK invasion and occupation of Iraq).  Or they may experience 
great resentment at what is seen as unjust or repressive treatment of relatives or close 
friends by the police or other security or government agencies. 
 
Channels for Radicalisation and Recruitment 
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As we have noted above, the internet is undoubtedly now the most significant channel for Al 
Qaeda radicalisation and recruitment. However, there are other significant channels 
including radical leaders based in particular mosques, radical prison imams and militant fellow 
inmates, campus extremists and visits to family members or friends in Islamic countries, 
leading in some cases to personal links with extremists overseas, and attendance at terrorist 
training camps overseas. 
 
A Holistic Strategy to Counter the Al Qaeda Threat 
 
I have addressed the difficult problems of designing an effective response to Al Qaeda 
terrorism in a number of recent publications.119  In broad terms I conclude that it is a 
serious error to place the main responsibility for countering Al Qaeda terrorism on the 
shoulders of our hard-working and dedicated professional armed services.  In some 
circumstances particular military units (e.g. bomb disposal experts, special forces) may play 
an invaluable role, but they should be seen as only one part of a broader holistic multi-lateral 
and multi-pronged strategy involving intelligence services, police, judiciary, private sector, the 
media and the general public.  Unfortunately President George W. Bush’s administration 
decided on a predominantly military response to Al Qaeda, taking the concept of a ‘war on 
terrorism’ literally. 
 
This concept of the war on terrorism tended to create false expectations among the US 
public and gives people the idea that there can be a solution to the terrorism threat by 
defeating Al Qaeda on the battlefield.  This is of course to seriously misunderstand the 
nature of terrorism.  Terrorists learn to hide themselves among the civilian population in 
cities around the world, and a sophisticated network, such as Al Qaeda, has learned how to 
disguise its communications from the authorities and how to evade security measures at 
international borders and regulatory measures designed to suppress terrorist financing.  For 
these and many other reasons a holistic multi-pronged approach which develops much 
closer and more effective international cooperation is vital. 
 
Priority Tasks 
 
Four particularly important elements of an effective strategy are too often neglected or even 
overlooked: 
 
1. Comprehensive and rigorous enforcement of counter-proliferation measures to 
prevent acquisition of CBRN weapons/materials by terrorists and; 
 
2. Long term measures to win the battle of ideas with leaders/mentors of Al Qaeda 
terrorism. 
 
3. We need to make a major effort to work in partnership with moderate Muslim 
leaders to help ensure that Al Qaeda’s claim to be ‘true Islam’ is totally discredited.  This 
effort will be helped by Al Qaeda’s ruthless and deadly terrorist attacks in which scores of 
fellow Muslims have been killed – a huge strategic blunder by Al Qaeda. 
4. Last but not least, we need to ensure that our own preparedness to emergency 
mass-casualty terrorist attack is greatly improved. Al Qaeda is still very much in business and 
                                            
119 See for example, Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 2nd Edition, London and New York, Routledge, 2006 and 
Paul Wilkinson (Ed), Homeland Security in the UK, London and New York, Routledge, 2007. 
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is capable of mass casualty attacks not only using tactics such as suicide airliner hijacking and 
suicide vehicle bombs, but also CBRN materials.  It would be foolish to discount the 
possibility of attacks using chemical or biological materials, or radioactive isotopes used to 
make ‘dirty’ bombs. 
 
December 2010 
 
